History Main / DoAndroidsDream

** The show deliberately asks this question, especially with [[RobotGirl Cameron]]. Interestingly, while Cameron remains an unabashedly mechanical entity ruthlessly bound by her programming to protect [[spoiler:or, when temporarily reverted to factory settings, kill]] John Connor, within that programming she shows remarkably human-like tendencies, such as enjoying certain types of music, practicing ballet, or pondering getting a tattoo. She also shows hints of emotion in spite of being supposedly emotionless, with worries and concerns about suicide [[spoiler: after she goes "bad" and tries to kill John]], confusion and annoyance when John picks up a girlfriend, and what has to be the closest thing to ''emotionless'' angst pertaining to [[spoiler: her conflicting desires to both protect and to kill John]].
** This is not including the episode "Allison from Palmdale" where Cameron's chip glitches and she literally ''becomes'' Allison Young, [[spoiler: a resistance fighter whose personality and appearance she stole and then killed.]] While in the Allison persona, Cameron shows outright fear, panic, anger, happiness, and even undergoes an [[BreakTheCutie emotional breakdown]] complete with a sobbing fit and actual tears. In fact, the entire episode is one ''long'' example of this trope in action.
** And this is ''before'' we even factor in John Henry and Catherine Weaver. Catherine in particular is certainly independently sentient [[spoiler:from whatever future AI assigned her]] and human to the point of being a significant wise-ass.

** The episode [[Recap/TheTwilightZoneS2E44TheLatenessOfTheHour "The Lateness Of The Hour"]] featured an old couple living happily in a mansion filled with robot servants, and their unhappy daughter that wants to get out of the house. In the end, in true Twilight Zone style, she was a robot all along; when this revalation causes her a mental breakdown, the couple reprogram her to be a massagist.

** The show deliberately asks this question, especially with [[RobotGirl Cameron]]. interestingly, while Cameron remains an unabashedly mechanical entity ruthlessly bound by her programming to protect [[spoiler:and kill]] John Connor, within that programming she shows remarkably human-like tendencies, such as enjoying certain types of music, practicing ballet, or pondering getting a tattoo. She also shows hints of emotion in spite of being supposedly emotionless, with worries and concerns about suicide [[spoiler: after she goes "bad" and tries to kill John]], confusion and annoyance when John picks up a girlfriend, and what has to be the closest thing to ''emotionless'' angst pertaining to [[spoiler: her conflicting desires to both protect and to kill John]].

* On ''[[Anime/SpaceBattleshipYamato Star Blazers (Space Battleship Yamato),]]'' I.Q.-9 (Analyzer), who is [[FunnyRobot normally used]] mostly as [[PluckyComicRelief comic relief,]] delivers a [[OOCIsSeriousBusiness beautiful, heartbreaking little speech]] on the subject in one episode.
-->"And if I’m destroyed and only scrap metal is left, well, it once held a heart."
* In ''Anime/OutlawStar,'' Melfina worries whether or not she has a soul. She visits a chapel in one episode, hoping for some enlightenment on the question.

* In ''Series/RedDwarf'', the notion of 'Silicon Heaven' is programmed into all AIs above a certain standard (it's implied that scutters, at least, lack this programming). In the episode "The Last Day", Kryten faces shutdown, and accepts it humbly because of his belief in Silicon Heaven. Lister tries to argue him out of his belief, apparently unsuccessfully; however, Kryten later disables his robocidal replacement, Hudzen, with the same arguments Lister used on him.
-->'''Hudzen:'''(in existential agony) No... Silicon heaven? Calculators... Just... ''Die''?
** [[spoiler:Kryten then explains that he was only using these arguments to disable Hudzen, and that his faith in Silicon Heaven is unshaken.]]
* ''Series/StarTrekTheOriginalSeries'' has examples that cover the whole range from "clearly nonsentient" (the Yonadan Oracle) to "clearly sentient" (Rayna), with most examples falling somewhere in between. When the crew encounters Nomad, it's interesting not only that Spock is ''able'' to mind-meld with it, but that he ''expects'' to be able to.

** The episode "The Measure of a Man" has Data fighting for his rights as a sentient being. [[spoiler:He wins a court case establishing him as a "person".]]
** Data actually does dream in the episode "Birthright, Part 1".
** And his ''nightmares'' kickstart the plot of "Phantasms".
* ''Series/StarTrekVoyager'' has a few episodes applying this trope to the [[ProjectedMan holographic]] Doctor, including an episode where the Doctor himself has to wonder if he's capable of dreaming of "electric sheep" as a hologram or if he's really a human deluded into thinking he's a hologram - by the way, all of this occurs ''while he's having said dream.'' There was another episode where he literally programmed himself to dream (daydream, specifically), which of course went horribly (and hilariously) wrong.
** One episode, directly referencing "The Measure Of a Man" above, has the Doctor take a publisher to court after they refused to withdraw a short story he wrote on the grounds that he isn't legally a person and has no creators rights. [[spoiler:Unlike said episode, the Doctor doesn't win personhood, as the official in the case isn't prepared to grant the status to beings who possesses no actual physical form. However, he IS granted the status of "Artist" and given full creative rights. The ending also implies that the story has sown the seeds of rebellion among other holographic lifeforms.]]
* The humanoid Cylons of ''Series/{{Battlestar Galactica|2003}}'' seem to be constantly struggling to figure out exactly how human they want to be, and exactly how much "better" than humans they want to be. Sometimes this is the source of conflict among themselves. Other times it seems they have found some interesting balance in some areas. The Cylons are an interesting study of the downsides for a machine that wants to be human: they are [[ArtificialHuman biological androids]], which means that all it takes is choking or blood loss to kill them. Without their ability to [[BrainUploading brain upload]], they'll even die of old age. Cavil has a point when he complains about having been made so [[RidiculouslyHumanRobots ridiculously human]]. The Cylons are also, with the exception of Cavil, firmly convinced that they have souls, and the fact that they get as many religious visions as the humans would seem to back that up.

* The episode "Tin Man" of ''Series/StargateSG1'' plays with this concept when the team visits an alien planet and is immediately knocked unconscious. When they wake back up in a strange room, they meet Harlan, a cheerful but mysterious man, who will only insist that he has "made them better." Eventually the team discovers that "better" means "turned into androids". [[spoiler:It isn't discovered until later that Harlan did not transform the team into androids, but made perfect android copies of the original SG-1 team, who have been held "captive" on the alien planet and that Harlan himself is an android copy of the original. When the two teams meet, they have to decide what rights each one has to the "life" that they previously each believed to be their own. There are a few SandInMyEyes moments such as when the viewer realizes that Harlan made the replicas not only to help him maintain his machinery, but also because he was lonely, and Robot O'Neil has a particularly difficult time accepting the fact that he's not the real one.]] The androids, left as a loose end at the end of that episode, are brought back in a later episode when it turns out that they have been [[spoiler: conducting their own missions, and have found a big threat. The two teams team up, and the by the end of the episode the androids have all died. It ties up the loose end, but comes off as being cheap.]]

* Surprisingly, this makes TEC in ''VideoGame/PaperMarioTheThousandYearDoor'' one of the most well-developed characters in the game. He starts off as just a hyper-intelligent mainframe for the [[NebulousEvilOrganization X-Nauts]], then falls in love with [[DistressedDamsel Peach]], goes through a period of WhatIsThisThingYouCallLove, before [[spoiler:pulling a truly [[TearJerker tear jerking]] HeroicSacrifice at the end to try and protect her at the cost of ''all'' his data relating to Peach and ''all his Artificial Consciousness functions''. Many ManlyTears were shed.]] Of course [[spoiler: he gets better]].

* In Creator/DouglasAdams' ''Literature/TheHitchhikersGuideToTheGalaxy'' series, Marvin, a menial robot, makes a lullaby about counting electric sheep. It's very depressing.

** [[NietzscheWannabe Tyr]] has no respect for the rights of AIs, but his people are generally douche bags and overfixated on biological procreation, so this is no surprise.

--> '''Claypool''': "Your machine, is it wonderful?"
--> '''Finch''': "Wonderful, yes. And terrible. We saved good people, and lost good people. In the end, I'm afraid we've only given the deck a shuffle."
--> '''Claypool''': "[[TheAntiNihilist Everything slides towards chaos. Your creation, it brings us poor souls a cupful of order.]] Your child is a dancing star."
--> '''Finch''': "It's not my child, it's a machine!"
--> '''Claypool''': "A false dichotomy, it's all electricity. Does it make you laugh? Does it make you weep?"
--> '''Finch''': "Yes."
--> '''Claypool''': "What's more human?"

** The question is posed in "Valerie 23" when the protagonist gets involved with a SexBot and wonders if she could truly be considered alive. He determines that the difference between a RidiculouslyHumanRobot and a real human being is that the latter has fear of death. His belief is confirmed when she proves unafraid at the prospect of her own destruction when she is due to be dismantled after developing a [[{{Yandere}} psychotic obsession]] with him. [[spoiler:When he ultimately destroys Valerie after she tries to kill his human love interest again, she admits that she's afraid of what's coming.]]
** In "Glitch", Dr. Edward Normandy tells the android Tom Seymour that he doesn't dream when Tom learns of his true nature and thinks that he is having a nightmare. He later claims that androids do not have a soul as everything that they are is contained on a personality chip. After escaping, Tom leaves a holographic message for Normandy refuting this.

* ''VideoGame/Borderlands2'' dabbles a little into this. Claptrap has a sense of humor, which comes out better when he's not trying rather than when he tries hard to be funny, and clearly has enough human-like feelings to be considered as one more of the supporting cast. Hyperion robots, meanwhile, are programmed with a pain-like response to damage; one of them, which has PinocchioSyndrome, determines that feeling pain and being sentient are the defining traits of being a human.

* Averted in ''Manga/FullmetalAlchemist'' where the homunculi do have human souls. ''[[EldritchAbomination Lots of human souls]]''.
** Still, it goes out of its way to point out, evil disgusting birth aside, the Homunculi ''are'' living creatures. This is clearly demonstrated with [[spoiler:Greed, Pride's "rebirth," and the deaths of Wrath and Envy]].
** Played straight a few times in [[Anime/FullmetalAlchemist the 2003 anime version]] when dealing with the humanity of the homunculi. They may not be the person the alchemist was ''trying'' to bring back to life, but they ''are'' people (broken, emotionally wrecked people), generally capable of the full range of human emotions and motivations.

Compare to RobotBuddy; AndroidsArePeopleToo; ClonesArePeopleToo; OurSoulsAreDifferent; AnimateInanimateObject; RidiculouslyHumanRobots; DeceptivelyHumanRobots; JustAMachine; EmptyShell; CompanionCube; SlidingScaleOfRobotIntelligence; TuringTest; AlternativeTuringTest; ReligiousRobot; and RobotReligion.

Similarly, ArtificialHumans and other artificial-but-still-organic beings are much more likely to be given the benefit of the doubt than inorganic ones. But not always. Per WordOfGod, Creator/PhilipKDick really intended for the androids in ''Literature/DoAndroidsDreamOfElectricSheep'' to be soulless (as he was obsessed with the distinction between real things and imitations), but the film adaptation ''Film/BladeRunner'' (which Dick [[ApprovalOfGod did in fact like)]] strongly implies that the answer is yes, and the sequel ''Film/BladeRunner2049'' makes it extremely clear that they are full-blown people (while introducing ''another'' class of dubiously sentient artificial beings, the [[KissMeImVirtual Jois).]] The question of whether ''animals'' are conscious is a natural corollary to this.

* X-51 (a.k.a. Machine Man, a.k.a. Aaron Stack) spends a lot of time wondering whether he is really a person in the ''ComicBook/EarthX'' trilogy, especially after Uatu the Watcher destroys his human disguise, tells him humans are actually less sapient than rational beings like themselves, and finally tries to get him to delete his personality simulation entirely. Unusual in that [[spoiler:after all that buildup, a Cosmic Being tells X-51 that no, he is not really a person and has no soul. Then tries to make him feel better about it.]]

Another reason for a narrative's answer to be "yes" is that it can be difficult to write a character as an above-mentioned "philosophical zombie" — a hypothetical thing that can act very convincingly like a conscious being [[EmptyShell but is not actually conscious.]] The parser program ELIZA surprised people by doing a decent job of subverting the TuringTest all the way back in the 60s, despite being even less complex than a mid-80s [[Creator/{{Infocom}} Infocom]] [[InteractiveFiction game,]] and modern [=ChatBots=] are getting very good at cheating the test while still apparently being completely unaware of what they're talking about. Rather than honestly deal with the dilemma of something that looks, walks, and quacks like a duck but manifestly is not actually a duck, many writers will default to assuming that, yes by gosh, it's a duck. It's simply easier to write about a robot that dreams than to write about one that only claims it does.

* ''Anime/TimeOfEve'' never makes ''entirely'' clear just how much androids feel and how much is imitation, but it's implied that they're every bit as human as we are, and the final episode even goes so far as to show one cry. [[CryCute Very cutely]].

It can also make the audience feel betrayed to make them empathize with a character, and then pull the rug out from under them and reveal that character ''is'' JustAMachine, incapable of loving or even truly being aware of itself or others. The endings of [[spoiler: ''Film/ExMachina'' and ''Film/BladeRunner2049'']] leave it very dubious whether [[spoiler: Ava or Joi]] are capable of true human feeling, despite everything we've previously seen them do. Then again, if that sense of betrayal is exactly what the writer is trying to evoke, than that's totally justified.

Compare to RobotBuddy; AndroidsArePeopleToo; ClonesArePeopleToo; OurSoulsAreDifferent; AnimateInanimateObject; JustAMachine; EmptyShell; CompanionCube; SlidingScaleOfRobotIntelligence; TuringTest; AlternativeTuringTest; ReligiousRobot; and RobotReligion.

*** Even a decade ago, it was common to hear materialists insist that consciousness was an illusion (particularly A.I. researchers, because it would be extremely inconvenient for it to be real), but popular opinion has shifted somewhat.

Compare to JustAMachine; EmptyShell; RobotBuddy; AndroidsArePeopleToo; ClonesArePeopleToo; OurSoulsAreDifferent; AnimateInanimateObject; CompanionCube; SlidingScaleOfRobotIntelligence; TuringTest; AlternativeTuringTest; ReligiousRobot; and RobotReligion.

Another reason for a narrative's answer to be "yes" is that it can be difficult to write a character as an above-mentioned "philosophical zombie" — a hypothetical thing that can act very convincingly like a conscious being [[EmptyShell but is not actually conscious.]] The parser program ELIZA surprised people by doing a decent job of subverting the Turing Test all the way back in the 60s, despite being even less complex than a mid-80s Infocom game, and modern [=ChatBots=] are getting very good at cheating the test while still apparently being completely unaware of what they're talking about. Rather than honestly deal with the dilemma of something that looks, walks, and quacks like a duck but manifestly is not actually a duck, many writers will default to assuming that, yes by gosh, it's a duck. It's simply easier to write about a robot that dreams than to write about one that only claims it does.

Compare to JustAMachine; EmptyShell; RobotBuddy; AndroidsArePeopleToo; ClonesArePeopleToo; OurSoulsAreDifferent; AnimateInanimateObject; CompanionCube; SlidingScaleOfRobotIntelligence; AlternativeTuringTest; ReligiousRobot; and RobotReligion.

Another reason for a narrative's answer to be "yes" is that it can be surprisingly difficult to write a character as an above-mentioned "philosophical zombie" — a hypothetical thing that can act very convincingly like a conscious being [[EmptyShell but is not actually conscious.]] The parser program ELIZA surprised people by doing a decent job of subverting the Turing Test all the way back in the 60s, despite being even less complex than a mid-80s Infocom game, and modern [=ChatBots=] are getting very good at cheating the test while still apparently being completely unaware of what they're talking about. Rather than honestly deal with the dilemma of something that looks, walks, and quacks like a duck but manifestly is not actually a duck, many writers will default to assuming that, yes by gosh, it's a duck. It's simply easier to write about a robot that dreams than to write about one that only claims it does.

Compare to JustAMachine; AndroidsArePeopleToo; ClonesArePeopleToo; OurSoulsAreDifferent; AnimateInanimateObject; CompanionCube; AlternativeTuringTest; ReligiousRobot; and RobotReligion.

Another reason for a narrative's answer to be "yes" is that it can be surprisingly difficult to write a character as a so-called "philosophical zombie" (see Real Life, below) — a hypothetical thing that can act very convincingly like a conscious being [[JustAMachine but is not actually conscious.]] The parser program ELIZA surprised people by doing a decent job of subverting the Turing Test all the way back in the 60s, despite being even less complex than a mid-80s Infocom game, and modern [=ChatBots=] are getting very good at cheating the test while still apparently being completely unaware of what they're talking about. Rather than honestly deal with the dilemma of something that looks, walks, and quacks like a duck but manifestly is not actually a duck, many writers will default to assuming that, yes by gosh, it's a duck. It's simply easier to write about a robot that dreams than to write about one that only claims it does.

If a robot is conscious and even empathetic without necessarily acting like a human, it may be a [[Main/MechanicalAnimals Mechanical Animal.]] Or, if it's conscious but in a deeply alien, unrelatable sort of way, it may be on its way to becoming a MechanicalAbomination (not that that would necessarily make it evil, [[StarfishAliens just weird enough that establishing meaningful relations might very difficult).]]

If a robot is conscious and even empathetic without necessarily acting like a human, it may be a [[Main/MechanicalAnimals Mechanical Animal.]] Or, if it's conscious but in a deeply alien, unrelatable sort of way, it may be on its way to becoming a MechanicalAbomination (not that that would necessarily make it evil, just weird).

If a robot is conscious and even empathetic without necessarily acting like a human, it may be a [[Main/MechanicalAnimals Mechanical Animal.]] Or, if it's conscious but in a deeply alien, unrelatable sort of way, it may be on its way to becoming a MechanicalAbomination.

And of course, it may be unclear to the creator, as well as to the audience, just how sentient the robot is.

If a robot is conscious and even empathetic without necessarily acting like a human, it may be a [[Main/MechanicalAnimals Mechanical Animal.]] Or, if it's conscious but in a very alien, unrelatable sort of way, it may be on its way to becoming a MechanicalAbomination.

If a robot is conscious and even empathetic without necessarily acting like a human, it may be a [[Main/MechanicalAnimals Mechanical Animal.]] Or, if it's conscious but in a ''very'' alien, unrelatable sort of way, it may be on its way to becoming a MechanicalAbomination.