History Analysis / ValkyriaChroniclesIII

In real life, nuclear weapons can be deployed in various ways in an attempt to prevent them from being neutralized by the enemy. Land-based strategic [=ICBMs=] are traditionally set up in underground silos where the launcher shaft containing each missile is protected by armored blast doors, which open when a missile is launched. Each missile is set up in its own individual silo so that all of the missiles can be launched at the same time, while the operators are sheltered in sealed underground control bunkers. Land-based silos were more effective earlier in the Cold War when a counter-force nuclear strike would have been fairly inaccurate, meaning the silos just had to survive a nearby detonation rather than a direct hit. Once it became possible to target ICBM silos with precision, the best defense was to get early warning of enemy missiles and launch one's own [=ICBMs=] before they could be destroyed in their silos. Part of the reason the United States continues to operate land-based ICBM bases—particularly in its more remote and less populated states—is to serve as a "nuclear sponge" for the rest of the country. Any opponent who engages in a nuclear war with the United States will be forced to expend large numbers of nuclear weapons trying to neutralize these ICBM bases in order to save their own from retaliation, thus reducing the number that they can allocate to US centers of administration and population.\\

In real life, nuclear weapons can be deployed in various ways in an attempt to prevent them from being neutralized by the enemy. Land-based strategic [=ICBMs=] are traditionally set up in underground silos where the launcher shaft containing each missile is protected by armored blast doors, which open when a missile is launched. Each missile is set up in its own individual silo so that all of the missiles can be launched at the same time, while the operators are sheltered in sealed underground control bunkers. Land-based silos were more effective earlier in the Cold War when a counter-force nuclear strike would have been fairly inaccurate, meaning the silos just had to survive a nearby detonation rather than a direct hit. Once it became possible to target ICBM silos with precision, the best defense was to get early warning of enemy missiles and launch one's own [=ICBMs=] before they could be destroyed in their silos. The alternative to hardening a stationary facility is to have mobile launch systems where the missiles can be kept moving around to make them harder for the enemy to find and target, namely by using wheeled transporter\erector\launcher (TEL) vehicles, missile trains, or nuclear ballistic missile submarines.\\

Any discussion of nuclear warfare needs to first address a curious fact. Since 1945, numerous countries have spent untold billions of dollars accumulating stockpiles of nuclear bombs and missiles. Yet despite their earth-shattering power, these devices are most beneficial and useful to their owners when they're sitting in their launch tubes seemingly not doing anything. Well, in reality they ''are'' doing something: deterring potential enemies like nothing else can.\\

Now okay, we might imagine a scenario in which you or your predecessor built up a nuclear arsenal for deterrence despite secretly intending to never use it ''no matter what'', and just hoped that enemies would never see through the bluff, but that's pretty unlikely to be the case and your enemy shouldn't count on it. A nuclear weapons program is such a long and expensive undertaking that it requires sustained work and sacrifice with powerful motivation behind it, that motivation often being an ideology which praises independent statehood under a certain form of government as something worth fighting and dying to preserve. [[note]]As an aside, it would be an even worse idea to pretend to have built practical nuclear weapons when you actually didn’t, and use it as a bluff to deter potential enemies. Your lie would definitely be found out. First of all, nobody would believe you unless you conducted a detectable nuclear test blast, which would require you to either build a real device (which defeats the point of lying), obtain a real one from an actual nuclear state (if you can do that, why do you need this bluff at all?), or as a last resort create a fake underground nuclear blast by setting off literal kilotons of TNT underground. A nuclear-magnitude conventual explosion might show telltale signs of trickery, but that would be the least of your problems. You would also have to create massive and elaborate Potemkin facilities simulating nuclear research and fuel production to deceive enemy spies, signals intelligence, and aerial reconnaissance. It would be even harder to convincingly fake the possession of effective delivery systems such as strategic bombers, ballistic missiles, or missile subs, meaning you would probably have to build and test real versions. In short, you wouldn’t be able to fool your enemy unless you spent almost as much money on fake activity as you would have spent doing it for real. It’s hard enough to justify so much expense in order to create a real nuclear deterrent, but it becomes completely indefensible if all of the work is non-productive in nature. If a threat is dangerous enough to make you think you need a fake nuclear weapons program, then it’s actually dangerous enough for you to need a ''real'' nuclear weapons program. Furthermore, you might make yourself a target of international sanctions, sabotage, or preventative war to eliminate your alleged nuclear program, meaning the benefits obtained would be fake but the drawbacks incurred would be real. And that doesn’t even get into the massive humiliation and loss of credibility that would result if the charade was exposed.[[/note]] At the extreme, it applies "live free or die" to the entire country, positing that it would be better for all its people to be wiped off the face of the Earth than to submit to foreign tyranny. That end may not be what the leaders of government ''want'' to happen, but if there were any persuasive reason to use nuclear weapons ''ever'', it would be to protect the country's right to exist. You probably got yourself those nukes because there's something you're willing to sacrifice for, and if your enemy would be willing to defend his country with nukes, he'd best believe that you would too.\\

Now okay, we might imagine a scenario in which you or your predecessor built up a nuclear arsenal for deterrence despite secretly intending to never use it ''no matter what'', and just hoped that enemies would never see through the bluff, but that's pretty unlikely to be the case and your enemy shouldn't count on it. A nuclear weapons program is such a long and expensive undertaking that it requires sustained work and sacrifice with powerful motivation behind it, that motivation often being an ideology which praises independent statehood under a certain form of government as something worth fighting and dying to preserve. [[note]]As an aside, it would be an even worse idea to pretend to have built practical nuclear weapons when you actually didn’t, and use it as a bluff to deter potential enemies. Your lie would definitely be found out. First of all, nobody would believe you unless you conducted a detectable nuclear test blast, which would require you to either build a real device (which defeats the point of lying), obtain a real one from an actual nuclear state (if you can do that, why do you need this bluff at all?), or as a last resort create a fake underground nuclear blast by setting off literal kilotons of TNT underground. A nuclear-magnitude conventual explosion might show telltale signs of trickery, but that would be the least of your problems. You would also have to create massive and elaborate Potemkin facilities simulating nuclear research and fuel production to deceive enemy spies, signals intelligence, and aerial reconnaissance. It would be even harder to convincingly fake the possession of effective delivery systems such as strategic bombers, ballistic missiles, or missile subs, meaning you would probably have to build and test real versions. In short, you wouldn’t be able to fool your enemy unless you spent almost as much money on fake activity as you would have spent doing it for real. It’s hard enough to justify so much expense in order to create a real nuclear deterrent, but it becomes completely indefensible if all of the work is non-productive in nature. If a threat is dangerous enough to make you think you need a fake nuclear weapons program, then it’s actually dangerous enough for you to need a ''real'' nuclear weapons program.[[/note]] At the extreme, it applies "live free or die" to the entire country, positing that it would be better for all its people to be wiped off the face of the Earth than to submit to foreign tyranny. That end may not be what the leaders of government ''want'' to happen, but if there were any persuasive reason to use nuclear weapons ''ever'', it would be to protect the country's right to exist. You probably got yourself those nukes because there's something you're willing to sacrifice for, and if your enemy would be willing to defend his country with nukes, he'd best believe that you would too.\\

Now okay, maybe you or your predecessor built up a nuclear arsenal for deterrence despite secretly intending to never use it ''no matter what'', and just hoped that enemies would never see through the bluff, but that's pretty unlikely to be the case and your enemy shouldn't count on it. A nuclear weapons program is such a long and expensive undertaking that it requires sustained work and sacrifice with powerful motivation behind it, that motivation often being an ideology which praises independent statehood under a certain form of government as something worth fighting and dying to preserve. At the extreme, it applies "live free or die" to the entire country, positing that it would be better for all its people to be wiped off the face of the Earth than to submit to foreign tyranny. That end may not be what the leaders of government ''want'' to happen, but if there were any persuasive reason to use nuclear weapons ''at all'', it would be to protect the country's right to exist. You probably got yourself those nukes because there's something you're willing to sacrifice for, and if your enemy would be willing to defend his country with nukes, he'd best believe that you would too.\\

It might be tempting to think that a limited, tactical use of a nuclear weapon against military targets could turn the tide of a battle without provoking the full international backlash associated with an all-out strategic nuclear volley against the enemy's cities or centers of government. However, this is far from reliable. Since ground troops are often spread out over a wide area, and many modern armored fighting vehicles are specifically designed for resistance to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, it would probably take multiple nuclear warheads to make a significant difference on the operational level of warfare. Therefore the attacker may have to choose between only using one weapon and getting very little military benefit compared to the diplomatic penalties incurred, or launching such a barrage of tactical nukes that the scale of outrage and risk of retaliation would be similar to what would have been incurred by resorting to strategic nukes in the first place.

* If the country you threaten with nukes ''is'' convinced there’s a significant chance you would actually do it, then suddenly their number one priority will become getting themselves a new deterrent against you. Either they will start their own nuclear program, or they will apply to join an alliance in which they are covered by another power's nuclear umbrella. It is very difficult to threaten somebody to stop their nuclear program (Iran and North Korea) or keep them out of an alliance (The Baltic States, Ukraine, etc.), because the more you threaten them the more you convince them that they need such protection. Even if there is a very high risk associated with refusing your demands, they balance that against the concern that if they give in to your terroristic threats, they will be rewarding and incentivizing that behavior. They fear that if they let you bully them once, you’re just going to keep doing it again and again. That's a slippery slope towards complete loss of autonomy and independence. And if they think your regime is so evil that it would contemplate nuclear mass murder--not in self-defense, but out of spite towards those who refuse to be subjugated--it’s easy to see why those being threatened might risk everything to defy you.

In contrast to the defensive scenario, whoever uses the nuke offensively and ''without'' provocation gives up the moral high ground and invites the condemnation even of neutral and allied nations, partly because the taboo on using nuclear weapons is broadly in everyone's interest. People are generally willing to give up their right to make a nuclear first strike if it means that other people will agree not to do it to them. It would be dangerous to all countries if using nuclear weapons was demystified or destigmatized, and the only way to re-establish the nuclear taboo after it gets broken is to ostracize the violator with the dissolution of alliances, imposition of economic sanctions, and provision of support to the country that was attacked. These negative consequences make it difficult to use nuclear weapons frivolously.\\

* If the country you threaten with nukes ''is'' convinced there’s a significant chance you would actually do it, then suddenly their number one priority will become getting themselves a new deterrent against you. Either they will start their own nuclear program, or they will apply to join an alliance in which they are covered by another power's nuclear umbrella. It is very difficult to threaten somebody to stop their nuclear program (Iran and North Korea) or keep them out of an alliance (The Baltic States, Ukraine, etc.), because the more you threaten them the more you convince them that they need such protection. Even if there is a very high risk associated with refusing your demands, they balance that against the concern that if they give in to your terroristic threats, they will be rewarding and incentivizing that behavior. They fear that if they let you bully them once, you’re just going to keep doing it again and again. That's a slippery slope towards complete loss of autonomy and independence. And if they think your regime is so evil that it would contemplate nuclear mass murder--not in self-defense, but out of spite towards those who refuse to be subjugated--it’s easy to see why those being threatened might risk everything to defy you.\\

In contrast to the defensive scenario, whoever uses the nuke offensively and ''without'' provocation gives up the moral high ground and invites the condemnation even of neutral and allied nations, partly because the taboo on using nuclear weapons is broadly in everyone's interest. People are generally willing to give up their right to make a nuclear first strike if it means that other people will agree not to do it to them. It would be dangerous to all countries if using nuclear weapons was demystified or destigmatized, and the only way to re-establish the nuclear taboo after it gets broken is to ostracize the violator with the dissolution of alliances, imposition of economic sanctions, and provision of support to the country that was attacked. These negative consequences make it difficult to use nuclear weapons frivolously.\\
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In a lot of popular fiction, having nuclear weapons when your opponent doesn't is treated as an instant checkmate that lets you force them to do anything you demand. But if we look at real life examples, this has rarely if ever proved effective. The United States dropped atomic bombs on Japan on the 6th and 9th of August, 1945, inaugurating a period in which the United States was the only country which had nuclear weapons. Despite this, the US either could not or would not use them to force the Soviet Union to capitulate during disputes over Eastern Europe and Iran, nor could it prevent the Soviet Union from achieving a successful nuclear test on the 29th of August, 1949. Since World War Two there have also been multiple wars in which a nuclear power accepted conventional defeat at the hands of a non-nuclear power instead of resorting to nuclear coercion, such as the US war in Vietnam and the Soviet war in Afghanistan. So what's going on here?\\

%%If you make a nuclear threat against a rival, then there are three possible outcomes:

%%#They cave in to your demands, so you get what you wanted even without using your nukes.
%%#They reject your demands, so you nuke them.
%%#They reject your demands, and you decide not to nuke them.

%%The extortionist will definitely be hoping for outcome 1, since in that case they get exactly what they wanted from the victim at minimal cost to themselves. Case 2 would involve using up at least some of their finite supply of expensive and hard-to-replace nuclear missiles; possibly rendering any territory or assets they could have stolen worthless or unusable; and at the very least facing condemnation and sanctions from other countries.

On one hand, Dahau will have a large advantage in first strike capability as soon as he finishes preparing the next missile following the Randgriz launch. Given that the distance between the Gallian border and Schwartzgrad is similar to that between London and the Soviet ICBM sites in Eastern Europe, then assuming similar flight characteristics it may take less than 15 minutes for the Hammer to strike Schwartzgrad. The situation is even worse when you consider that the Empire almost certainly lacks a Ballistic Missile Early Warning System, meaning they wouldn't know the missile was coming until the moment of impact. This means that the emperor and other leaders wouldn't have enough time to flee the city even if they started doing so when the missile was launched, and it's unclear whether they have any bunker capable of surviving the blast.\\

In real life, nuclear weapons can be deployed in various ways in an attempt to prevent them from being neutralized by the enemy. Land-based strategic [=ICBMs=] are traditionally set up in underground silos where the launcher shaft containing each missile is protected by armored blast doors, which open when a missile is launched. Each individual missile gets its own silo so they can all be launched at the same time, while the operators are sheltered in sealed underground control bunkers. Land-based silos were more effective earlier in the Cold War when a counter-force nuclear strike would have been fairly inaccurate, meaning the silos just had to survive a nearby detonation rather than a direct hit. Once it became possible to target ICBM silos with precision, the best defense was to get early warning of enemy missiles and launch one's own [=ICBMs=] before they could be destroyed in their silos. The alternative to hardening a stationary facility is to have mobile launch systems where the missiles can be kept moving around to make them harder for the enemy to find and target, namely by using wheeled transporter\erector\launcher (TEL) vehicles, missile trains, or nuclear ballistic missile submarines.\\

Granted, the Empire might not immediately realize how vulnerable Dahau is, being unfamiliar with the secret weapon's capabilities as well as the status of Dahau's defenses. But if they pretend to cooperate with his ultimatum as a way of buying time, they should be able to spy out the situation a little better and then come up with a plan to capture the Hammer.

Fortunately, in the event that another country is threatening the self-rule or physical survival of your state, it should be obvious to that potential aggressor that if they attack you'll be motivated and even ''forced'' to make a nuclear counterattack. If in any scenario you pick up the red telephone to order a nuclear launch, it's because you asked yourself "can using my nukes make this situation any worse?" and decided the answer was basically "no." It should go without saying that if enemy [=ICBMs=] are about to hit your capital and every major city in your country, then there's little reason not to pull TakingYouWithMe on the enemy. An unstoppable purely conventional invasion or a surgical strike against your chain of nuclear command are different in that your government might be able to avert mass death if it offers unconditional surrender in exchange for promises of humane treatment. But if you ''aren't'' willing to give up your country's nuclear arsenal and right to govern itself without a fight, then your only chance to protect those things (or at least punish the enemy for trying to take them away) is to start lobbing nukes. At that point your precious nuclear weapons are going to fall into enemy hands and become useless to you if you don't take your last chance to use them. Your enemy will be acutely aware of you being under this "use-it-or-lose-it" pressure, and that's why if they're smart they won't even attack you in the first place.\\

Nuclear weapons are also TooAwesomeToUse outside of the extremely narrow set of defensive circumstances where their use is legitimately "provoked", because as soon as you become the first one to start launching nukes, you automatically force your opponent across the GodzillaThreshold while simultaneously using up your final trump card. At that point there is nothing you can threaten to do to them that you aren't already doing. Therefore they have no more reason to restrain themselves or respect the red lines you draw in the sand, which means that they might feel free to kill your civilians, assasinate your leaders, break out any nerve gas or biological weapons they might have, SinkTheLifeboats, ShootTheMedicFirst, etc. That might not matter in a narrow military sense if you succeed in squashing their ability to resist in one fell swoop, but if you use the nuclear option and it somehow ''doesn't'' result in their complete military defeat and unconditional surrender, then you end up looking not only evil, but also weak. There's also the problem of radioactive fallout, especially when ground burst detonations are used, which depending on the prevailing winds could [[HoistByHisOwnPetard blow back over your own troops]] and will definitely make any other countries in the fallout path very angry at you.\\

In real life, nuclear weapons can be deployed in various ways in an attempt to prevent them from being neutralized by the enemy. Land-based strategic [=ICBMs=] are traditionally set up in underground silos where the launcher shaft containing each missile is protected by armored blast doors, which open when a missile is launched. Each individual missile gets its own silo from which it can be launched at any time, thus avoiding the need for reloading, while the operators are sheltered in sealed underground control bunkers. Land-based silos were more effective earlier in the Cold War when a counter-force nuclear strike would have been fairly inaccurate, meaning the silos just had to survive a nearby detonation rather than a direct hit. Once it became possible to target ICBM silos with precision, the best defense was to get early warning of enemy missiles and launch one's own [=ICBMs=] before they could be destroyed in their silos. The alternative to hardening a stationary facility is to have mobile launch systems where the missiles can be kept moving around to make them harder for the enemy to find and target, namely by using wheeled transporter\erector\launcher (TEL) vehicles, missile trains, or nuclear ballistic missile submarines.\\

On one hand, Dahau will have large advantage in first strike capability as soon as he finishes preparing the next missile following the Randgriz launch. Given that the distance between the Gallian border and Schwartzgrad is similar to that between London and the Soviet ICBM sites in Eastern Europe, then assuming similar flight characteristics it may take less than 15 minutes for the Hammer to strike Schwartzgrad. The situation is even worse when you consider that the Empire almost certainly lacks a Ballistic Missile Early Warning System, meaning they wouldn't know the missile was coming until the moment of impact. This means that the emperor and other leaders wouldn't have enough time to flee the city even if they started doing so when the missile was launched, and it's unclear whether they have any bunker capable of surviving the blast.\\

In real life, nuclear weapons can be deployed in various ways in an attempt to prevent them from being neutralized by the enemy. Land-based strategic [=ICBMs=] are traditionally set up in underground silos where the launcher shaft containing each missile is protected by armored blast doors, which open when a missile is launched. Each missile gets its own silo, from which it can be launched at any time. Land-based silos were more effective back when a counter-force nuclear strike would have been fairly inaccurate, meaning the silos just had to survive a nearby detonation rather than a direct hit. Once it became possible to target ICBM silos with precision, the best defense was to get early warning of enemy missiles and launch one's own [=ICBMs=] before they could be destroyed in their silos. The alternative to hardening a stationary facility is to have mobile launch systems where the missiles can be kept moving around to make them harder for the enemy to find and target, namely by using wheeled transporter\erector\launcher (TEL) vehicles, missile trains, or nuclear ballistic missile submarines.\\

On the other hand, Dahau has no spies or surveillance assets that could let him observe what the Imperial government was actually doing during the crisis negotiation, meaning he can't do much to prevent Schwartzgrad or any other Imperial City from being evacuated while the negotiators stall for time. Since the missile of the Hammer is probably barely more advanced than the V2 rocket in terms of guidance, and only capable of being targeted at a fixed point on a coordinate grid such as a city, Dahau will be helpless to target the Emperor or any particular leader if they manage to get outside the targeted city and head to some unknown rally point before the missile hits.

But then we will have a Catch22Dilemma. The problem is that if Dahau threatens to blow up Randgriz unless the Emperor gives the Darcsens a new homeland, the Emperor still cannot give Dahau what he wants unless Dahau agrees to give up the Hammer of the Valkyrur afterwards. The reason is that as long as Dahau controls the Hammer, there will be nothing to stop him from making further demands upon the Empire as soon and as often as he likes. Heck, if Dahau keeps the ability to destroy the Empire's government at the press of a button, then in practice the Empire will cease to be an autonomous and self-governing state. Any deal in which they don't get the Hammer back from Dahau is unacceptable. But as we just established, Dahau ''can't'' give up the Hammer because it's his only protection against the Emperor killing him and going back on his word.

Dahau is a former Darcsen resistance leader who fought against the Empire, and after giving up that struggle he only got into the Imperial military through the patronage of Borgia and Maximilian, both of whom are now dead. The idea of a former seperatist rebel getting his hands on such a destructive weapon ought to be deeply alarming in and of itself, especially since Dahau's ancestors are slandered by history as having terrorized the continent using similar ragnite-based weapons of mass destruction. But it gets worse: even if Dahau doesn't tell them about how Borgia hid the discovery and rebuilding of this strategic weapon as part of a treasonous plot to sabotage the war effort and eventually make himself theocrat of the entire continent, the fact that somebody developed this weapon as a rogue project without letting anybody in the government know about or approve it obviously implies premeditated disloyalty against the Empire. The fact that Dahau didn't blow the whistle on this beforehand means he is at best highly suspect, and at worst a traitor deserving of the death penalty.\\

But then we will have a Catch22Dilemma. The problem is that if Dahau threatens to blow up Randgriz unless the Emperor gives the Darcsens a new homeland, the Emperor still cannot give Dahau what he wants unless Dahau agrees to give up the Hammer of the Valkyrur afterwards. The reason is that as long as Dahau controls the Hammer, there will be nothing to stop him from making further demands upon the Empire as soon and as often as he likes. Heck, if Dahau keeps the ability to destroy the Empire's government at the press of a button, then in practice the Empire will cease to be an autonomous and self-governing state. This is a complete non-starter. But as we just established, Dahau ''can't'' give up the Hammer because it's his only protection against the Emperor killing him and going back on his word.

* If the country you threaten with nukes ''is'' convinced there’s a significant chance you would actually do it, then suddenly their number one priority will become getting themselves a new deterrent against you. Either they will start their own nuclear program, or they will apply to join an alliance in which they are covered by another power's nuclear umbrella. It is very difficult to threaten somebody to stop their nuclear program or keep them out of an alliance, because the more you threaten them the more you convince them that they need such protection. Even if there is a very high risk associated with refusing your demands, they balance that against the concern that if they give in to your terroristic threats, they will be rewarding and incentivizing that behavior. They fear that if they let you bully them once, you’re just going to keep doing it again and again. That's a slippery slope towards complete loss of autonomy and independence. And if they think your regime is so evil that it would contemplate nuclear mass murder--not in self-defense, but out of spite towards those who refuse to be subjugated--it’s easy to see why those being threatened might risk everything to defy you.\\

* If the country you threaten with nukes ''is'' convinced there’s a significant chance you would actually do it, then suddenly their number one priority will become getting themselves a new deterrent against you. Either they will start their own nuclear program, or they will apply to join an alliance in which they are covered by another power's nuclear umbrella. It is very difficult to threaten somebody to stop their nuclear program or keep them out of an alliance, because the more you threaten them the more you convince them that they need such protection. Even if there is a very high risk associated with refusing your demands, they balance that against the concern that if they give in to your terroristic threats, they will be rewarding and incentivizing that behavior. They fear that if they let you bully them once, you’re just going to keep doing it again and again. That's a slippery slope towards complete loss of autonomy and independence, an outcome which they will pay almost any price to avoid.\\

%%If you're a national leader, the problem is that nuclear weapons are far more believable and effective as a threat when you're trying to dissuade your opponent from invading your territory or blowing up your cities (i.e. nuclear deterrence), than if you're threatening to nuke them unless they give you parts of their territory or agree to become your vassal state (i.e. nuclear coercion).\\

As Perun describes in his [=YouTube=] video regarding the Russian Federation's nuclear threats against Ukraine and NATO in 2022, nuclear coercion tends to create a MortonsFork and SelfFulfillingProphecy where the coercive threat will backfire somehow.\\

If the country being threatened doesn’t believe the extortionist is really prepared to nuke them if demands aren’t met, they will simply call the bluff, which so far in history has always resulted in the extortionist deciding not to actually do it. Throughout 2022 and into 2023, the Putin regime repeatedly threatened to use tactical nukes if Ukraine kept trying to recapture the territories that Russia illegally annexed, and if the "collective West" kept increasing its military aid to Ukraine. When these red lines were repeatedly crossed and Russia didn’t follow through with its threats, each subsequent threat was taken less seriously, and Russia's nuclear saber-rattling was dismissed as a symptom of their inability to achieve their goals on the battlefield. Both nuclear deterrence and nuclear coercion are thus devalued when you say you’re going to do something, and then don’t do it.\\
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An Imperial attack would risk the possibility of Dahau getting to fire at least one missile and thus destroy the capital city, but even that would probably be preferable to accepting the downfall of the empire and the monarchy as a whole. Presumably the emperor and other leaders would try to get the hell out of Schwartzgrad as soon as the counter strike was decided on so they wouldn’t still be around if the missile hits, while hoping for a best case in which the strike team prevents even the first missile from launching.\\

Granted, the Empire might not immediately realize how vulnerable Dahau is, being unfamiliar with the secret weapon's capabilities as well as the status of Dahau's defenses. But if they pretend to cooperate with his ultimatum as a way of buying time, they should be able to scout the situation a little better and come up with a plan to capture the Hammer.

It might be tempting to think that a limited, tactical use of a nuclear weapon against military targets could turn the tide of a battle without provoking the full international backlash associated with an all-out strategic nuclear volley against the enemy's cities or centers of government. However, this is far from reliable. Since ground troops are often spread out over a wide area, and many modern armored fighting vehicles are specifically designed for resistance to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, it would probably take multiple nuclear warheads to make a significant difference on the operational level of warfare. Therefore the attacker may have to choose between only using one weapon and getting very little military benefit compared to the diplomatic penalties incurred, or launching such a barrage of tactical nukes that the scale of outrage and risk of retaliation would be similar to what would have ben incurred by resorting to strategic nukes in the first place.

The fact that you’re presenting an existential threat--not just to the country you’re currently trying to extort, but also to third parties--means they will feel compelled to deter and punish your behavior with various sanctions and counter-threats. At the same time, because you do not have an existential threat pushing you over your own Godzilla Threshold, you cannot simply ignore the negative consequences you would incur by brandishing or using your nuclear weapons aggressively. This suggests that even measures short of nuclear retaliation might be able to deter your from using your nukes aggressively, in which case those whom you’re trying to extort will be less likely to believe you would actually nuke them if they refused your demands.

First of all, if nuclear coercion is possible, it almost certainly needs to be against a country that doesn't have its own nuclear deterrent. If they also have nukes and a delivery capability similar to yours, then any nuclear attack by you will cause you to be nuked in return. They can simply call your bluff, because they know that you wouldn't dare to nuke them even if they refuse to comply.\\

In a lot of popular fiction, having nuclear weapons when your opponent doesn't is treated as an instant checkmate that lets you force them to do anything you demand. But if we look at real life examples, this isn't what actually happened. The United States dropped atomic bombs on Japan on the 6th and 9th of August, 1945, inaugurating a period in which the United States was the only country which had nuclear weapons. Despite this, the US either could not or would not use them to force the Soviet Union to capitulate during disputes over Eastern Europe and Iran, nor could it prevent the Soviet Union from achieving a successful nuclear test on the 29th of August, 1949. Since World War Two there have also been multiple wars in which a nuclear power accepted conventional defeat at the hands of a non-nuclear power instead of resorting to nuclear coercion, such as the US war in Vietnam and the Soviet war in Afghanistan. So what's going on here?\\

In short, Dahau cannot possibly just give the Hammer to the Empire as a gift and hope this will make them feel generous enough to excuse his crimes and grant him a Darcsen homeland. They would probably arrest or kill him the moment he let them into the facility. He needs to come right out and say that he won't hand it over unless they give him what he wants, and from there it devolves into full-blown nuclear coercion.

The problem with the Hammer of the Valkyrur is that it's based out of only one large, conspicuous, above-ground structure. Because it's immobile, unconcealed, poorly fortified, and not part of a redundant network spread over a large area, it is highly vulnerable to a pre-emptive attack. An imperial ground force could just ride in and destroy the missile on the launchpad, especially if unlike the Nameless they were willing to risk blowing themselves up to stop the launch. Even the spire's ability to bombard an area with energy projectiles turns out to be insufficient for area denial against ground troops. Since there's only one launchpad for a whole magazine full of spires, only one missile at a time can be made ready, so the attacker can neutralize all the missiles at once just by capturing the launchpad.

In short, Dahau cannot possibly just give the Hammer to the Empire as a gift and hope this will make them feel generous enough to excuse his crimes and grant him a Darcsen homeland. They would arrest or kill him the moment he let them into the facility. He needs to come right out and say that he won't hand it over unless they give him what he wants, and from there it devolves into full-blown nuclear coercion.

The problem with the Hammer of the Valkyrur is that it's based out of only one large, conspicuous, above-ground structure. Because it's immobile, unconcealed, poorly fortified, and not part of a redundant network spread over a large area, it is highly vulnerable to a pre-emptive attack. An imperial force could just ride in and destroy the missile on the launchpad, especially if unlike the Nameless they were willing to risk blowing themselves up to stop the launch. Since there's only one launchpad for a whole magazine full of spires, only one missile at a time can be made ready, so the attacker can neutralize all the missiles at once just by capturing the launchpad. Even the spire's ability to bombard an area with energy projectiles turns out to be insufficient for area denial against ground troops.

In contrast, he'll probably think twice about invading if he knows that you have enough nukes and delivery capability to blow up several of his major cities; vaporize whole divisions of his ground forces; use nuclear demolition charges to blow up tunnels, bridges, highways, and ports necessary to his advance and logistics; and altogether put up so much of a fight that he's forced to use up many or even most of his weapons of mass destruction to destroy your ability to resist. Even if he enlarges his country's territory by 100% and eliminates you as an economic and political rival, that won't make it worthwhile after he's lost millions of civilian lives; sent his economy back to the stone age; made his country an international pariah; and gotten his military so mauled it will take at least ten years to rebuild it into an effective defense, let alone a force capable of offensive warfare. If you were capable of inflicting that kind of damage in retaliation, then your enemy would have to be completely insane to attack you instead of just leaving you alone.\\

In a lot of popular fiction, having nuclear weapons when your opponent doesn't is treated as an instant checkmate that lets you force them to do anything you demand. But if we look at real life examples, this isn't what actually happened. The United States dropped atomic bombs on Japan on the 6th and 9th of August, 1945, inaugurating a period in which the United States was the only country which had nuclear weapons. Despite this, the US either could not or would not use them to force the Soviet Union to capitulate during disputes over Eastern Europe and Iran, nor could it prevent the Soviet Union from achieving a successful nuclear test on the 29th of August, 1949. There have also been multiple wars in which a nuclear power accepted conventional defeat at the hands of a non-nuclear power instead of resorting to nuclear coercion, such as the US war in Vietnam and the Soviet war in Afghanistan. So what's going on here?\\

If you're a national leader, the problem is that nuclear weapons are far more believable and effective as a threat when you're trying to dissuade your opponent from invading your territory or blowing up your cities (i.e. nuclear deterrence), than if you're threatening to nuke them unless they give you parts of their territory or agree to become your vassal state (i.e. nuclear coercion).\\