- Would Weps really have opened the safe because Ramsey threatened the specialist? Weps was willing to eat a bullet himself, and he was willing to go down rather than make a mistaken launch. He knows the Captain and XO disagree on launch, and they cannot launch for that reason, and there’s obviously a collapse of the command structure. Threatening Weps and a subordinate with a gun is such a grotesque violation of regulations, that, as an officer, Weps’ conclusion must be that Ramsey is irrational.
- He's flip-flopping a bit. He originally supported Ramsey taking command back, but as they get closer to launch time, he begins to have second thoughts about unleashing nuclear Hell. And because Ramsey's threatening another crewmember, he can't bear to have someone else die due to his inaction. It's essentially a version of the classic "railroad switch" moral dilemma: let a fellow sailor get killed to prevent WWIII and it feels like a personal betrayal? Or save his subordinate from being murdered to absolve his conscience, despite the holocaust that might ensue?
- Does the galley really rely on the XO suiting up in firefighting gear to hit the “put out the fire button”? There are acceptable breaks from reality, but this is crazy. And does a nuclear sub galley really have cooking methods that could result in such a raging fire?
- Navy ships take damage control seriously, especially on submarines. Fires are made all the worse submerged, due to the limited sources of fresh oxygen (they have electrolytic crackers that can make oxygen from seawater, but they can only work so fast with a fire consuming the reserves) and the loss of the sub's essential stealth if they're required to surface. To that end, any substantial fire on the ship is met with a full response; submariners, be they officers or enlisted, don't get their dolphins without being incredibly well familiar with damage control (flooding, fire, air contamination, etc.) on every part of the boat, not just their duty station. As far as a fire source, it could be as simple as an electrical spark lighting off some aerosolized cooking oil in a deep fryer.
Broken Aesop - How is Ramsey not being charged with war-crimes or attempted omnicide?
I just recently re-watched this great film, but the ending still really irks me. Ramsey, without sufficient knowledge of what the orders regarding the nuclear strike were, attempted to launch the Alabama's nuclear-tipped ICBMs at a target. This is bad enough as it is. What makes it worse, though, is that he had been informed that this had a high likelihood of resulting in retaliatory fire that would cause the deaths of millions, even billions. Yet he goes along with it with such conviction; even threatening to kill his own men, including his XO, Hunter, who was completely within his rights to refuse to comply with the launch order.The motivation of Ramsey's seemed to ultimately boil down to a matter of ego, and his desire to be seen as the alpha of the pack, rather than anything logical - this is exemplified by the various discussions and interactions between Ramsey and Hunter, such as the time when Hunter informs Ramsey that the crew is on edge (due to the dangerous nature of their mission), and Ramsey proceeds to berate them [the crew] for it.
At the end, it is conclusively proven that Ramsey was utterly in the wrong, and that the launch order had not been given, and that Ramsey could NOT have forced compliance from Hunter regarding the launch, as it was Hunter's job to serve as a third-party control (and as such, Hunter's "mutiny" against Ramsey is really a lawful arrest due to Ramsey not following protocol, rather than Hunter unlawfully usurping the chain of command). If that is the case, how is it that the perfectly reasonable resistance to comply with the incorrect launch command is being weighed as equivalent to the unlawful and completely irrational attempt to cause a nuclear holocaust? How does that even make sense?
- But a launch order actually had been given, entirely properly, and Ramsey was therefore following orders. The problem came when they were unable to verify the second message. In fact, Ramsey's position that they should proceed with the launch was entirely proper in the circumstances, and Hunter's refusal was improper, but Ramsey's methods of dealing with the disagreement were improper and Hunter's actions in removing a captain violating protocol were proper. It's a pretty well thought-out scenario.
- It is a nice scenario. I disagree that Hunter’s refusal was improper. The whole point of the two man rule is to have two thinking individuals determining that launching is the correct thing to do. Ramsey is correct that an unauthenticated message fragment is not an order at all, but Hunter has the opinion that the circumstances of them not receiving the full message (cut off because the destruction of their antenna) means it’s unlikely it was a ruse message, and he wants more information. That’s 100% his prerogative and that’s 100% why Ramsey absolutely could not relieve Hunter.
- The dilemma presented in this movie is that Ramsay did everything by the book, within regulations, and in accordance with a lifetime of government training. US Navy and US government nuclear launch protocols (the law in other words) told him 1. Launch when we tell you to. 2. An incomplete message doesn't count. 3. When in doubt refer to #1. The flip-side is when dealing with the ability to kill a billion people there needs to be some room for common sense as well. This is solved in real life by not sending a launch order unless it's for real. As Hunter pointed out, there are no take-backs.
- Correct except that there is two man control for a reason, and his refusal to accept disapproval of launch was utterly incorrect. And then he threatened to murder members of the crew, including putting a gun to the head of multiple members. Ramsey would have been cashiered and jailed and the Navy would not have been able to cover it up.
- There is also the Navy's interest to keep what exactly happened in the Alabama covered up, as the revelation that there was a mutiny aboard a United States nuclear submarine would be a huge embarrassment and scandal, and putting Ramsey up on official charges would make the whole thing public. They were willing to accept Ramsey's request for early retirement to keep the whole thing quiet.
- Although a mutiny onboard a missile sub is a serious enough matter on its own to warrant a cover up, something else occurred that is even more serious - a nuclear launch order was sent and then rescinded. Someone at the National Command Authority jumped the gun and launched, after which someone else had to probably countermand him. By focusing on this "mutiny", the admirals were diverting attention from themselves.
- It's not that someone jumped the gun. It's specifically states that Radchenko's men were fueling and arming the missiles. That kind of threat must be answered immediately. That his men refused to fire them and surrendered was after the point.
- The ending still doesn't pass the smell test; procedure fell flat on its face due to the reality of nuclear warfare — that any launch by any party is a failure condition even if it is retaliated — and the only reason civilization still exists is because the new guy was scared enough of nuclear holocaust to go against it. And instead of admitting that the whole game is insane, they put all the blame on the officers in the end, albeit in the form of an unofficial dressing-down. Their exact words were; "In this instance, the system failed because the two senior officers did not work to resolve their differences while preserving the chain of command." "Preserving the chain of command" would have resulted in an unnecessary launch and the end of civilization. They gave the order to launch because they believed missiles were about to fly, it turned out to be in error because even the renegade's men weren't crazy enough to actually do it, and when they were unable to retract the order due to the fog of war they had to basically sit and pray that the guys they trained to carry out the attack at all odds would fail to do so. This movie was made before, with the submarine swapped for a aerial bomber — except in that case the chain of command was preserved as they claimed to desire; Dr. Strangelove. "In my humble opinion, in the nuclear world, the true enemy is war itself."
- Strangelove was slightly different; the chain of command was violated (a SAC general ordering a nuclear strike on his own initiative), but it just so happened there was a loophole in doctrine that made it happen—Plan R, operating under the assumption of a decapitation strike leaving the President dead or otherwise incapable of commanding a retaliatory strike. In this case, there was definitely an NCA failure, and a possible research failure, OPSEC (operational security) being what it is. Once the Alabama got on station, it would have been prudent for the ship to set 1SQ and keep the missiles in a ready-to-fire state as long as possible, such that when the launch order was given, the time delay in launch prep would not have been a factor, providing much more time flexibility, and lessening the risk of a rescinding order having to be made when new information is available.
Why launch a nuclear weapon at all?
The ICBM was captured by a rogue faction of Russian soldiers so it wasn't as though there was a big danger of all Russian ICBMs launching. Instead it was a single instance of a launch. Why go immediately to a nuclear response - which would incite a Russian retaliation and validate Radchenko - when they could use a more surgical response as a conventional military raid or even a strike by cruise missiles and aircraft?
- It is nuclear weapons policy that any use of a nuclear weapon must be answered by a return nuclear response. It is, or was at the time the movie was released, the only way to keep MAD intact. There must be no precedent set for letting a nuclear launch have anything other than a nuclear response because that would be a very dangerous precedent to set as it is a slippery slope nobody wants to start down. If the precedent is set that a "rogue" actor can get away with it then sooner or later some government is going to authorize use of a nuke then claim it was a rogue actor really who was behind it and it would be against precedent to respond with a nuke.
- There's also the practical matter that if the captured missiles were in underground silos, then a nuclear bomb would probably be the only guarantee of destroying it.
- The drama is occasionally punctuated by a countdown to when Russian missiles will be ready to launch. The problem with this concern is the point of the Alabama's launch would have been to destroy those missiles before they launch themselves. Even submarine missiles take time to reach their targets. The odds of the sub launch stopping the Russian launch were nearly zero by the time 20 minutes were left on the clock.
- As close as the Alabama was to its target, the Trident missiles it launched would travel on a "flat" trajectory, where the warheads would not be flying halfway around the Earth to land on their targets. Travel time for the warheads would've been closer to 3 or 4 minutes than 20.
Why did Hunter et al believe a mistaken launch by the Crimson would trigger WW3?
The Russians are well aware of the very short time frame being dealt with and the extremely dangerous and desperate situation, as well as the fog of war. They know the US doesn’t have perfect information, nor do they, especially considering they’re dealing with a very high level defection.
So if the Crimson had nuked the ICBM field even an hour after Rozhenko surrendered, I just don’t see the Russians deciding to go full on WW3. Why would they want that?
It’s really more annoying that the officers never even discuss this.
- Also, it’s highly likely the Russians *themselves* would have nuked the site once Rozhenko started fueling his missiles. If a similar incident occurred in the US, that would be the correct and necessary decision. I’m quite certain in the movie scenario, the US would have told the Russians point blank that if the SLIGHTEST preparation for launching occurs, the US would nuke the site and the Russians would have said “we will too.” The only missiles passing near each other would be the 300 American and Russian missiles on the way to bomb that ICBM field.
- The Russian government might not want that, but if non-rebel Russian troops get killed in a nuclear strike, there would be little political choice other than to respond with nukes. They may choose to perform a limited exchange to match damage and even the playing field, but that's no guarantee the general public of each nation wouldn't be clamoring for blood. Both sides know there is a risk that the other might choose to use this situation to sneakily launch a full nuclear exchange under the guise of a confused informational environment. It's extremely unlikely, but the consequences of it happening are too much to contemplate leaving that back door open. As to the Russians self-nuking, that also wouldn't be politically viable for a variety of reasons; it would be retained as an option, but a conventional retaking of the complex would been preferred to irradiating your own home soil.
They're fueling their missiles!
If I'm not mistaken, ICBMs from the 1970's onwards do not need to be fueled. They are pre-fueled and ready to launch on a moment's notice. So what, did Radchenko get his hands on some 1950's missiles? Those would be pretty easy to destroy with a conventional airstrike, wouldn't they?- As of the 2000s, about 20% of the Russian ICBM stock is believed to be liquid-fueled. For instance, the R-36 Missile (better known by its NATO reporting name, the SS-18 Satan), is not expected to be fully phased out until the 2030s.
- Liquid-fueled yes, needing fueling before launch no - the SS-18 Satan/R-36 and its derivatives use storable hypergolic fuels, which can be loaded into the missiles before they leave the factory in which they're built unlike the partially cryogenic kerosene/liquid oxygen mixture used by '50s era missiles. That's part of how the R-36/SS-18 can be launched from the road-mobile transporter-erector launchers that make up a sizable portion of the Russian strategic weapons force.
