History Analysis / ValkyriaChroniclesIII

Any discussion of nuclear warfare needs to first address a curious fact. Since 1945, numerous countries have spent untold billions of dollars accumulating stockpiles of nuclear bombs and missiles. Yet despite their earth-shattering power, these devices are most useful and beneficial to have when they're sitting in their launch tubes seemingly not doing anything. Well, in reality they ''are'' doing something: deterring potential enemies like nothing else can.\\

After the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atom bombs, the world became familiar with the destructive power of nuclear weapons. In the subsequent Cold War environment of mutually assured destruction--during which politicians and citizens alike witnessed repeated nuclear test detonations and learned about the curse of radioactive fallout--there developed a strong disapproval of and motivation to discourage offensive nuclear first use. People think about nuclear weapons in a fundamentally different way compared to conventional weapons such as machine guns and howitzers: they are considered ''so'' destructive and destabilizing that their use is not morally justified or rational except when the survival of the country itself is actively being threatened.\\

Any discussion of nuclear coercion needs to first explain a curious fact. Since 1945, numerous countries have spent untold billions of dollars accumulating stockpiles of nuclear bombs and missiles. Yet despite their earth-shattering power, these devices are most useful and beneficial to have when they're sitting in their launch tubes seemingly not doing anything. Well, in reality they are doing ''something'': deterring potential enemies like nothing else can.\\

Any discussion of nuclear coercion needs to first explain a curious fact. Since 1945, numerous countries have spent untold billions of dollars accumulating stockpiles of nuclear bombs and missiles. Yet despite their earth-shattering power, these devices are most useful and effective when they're sitting in their launch tubes seemingly not doing anything. Well, in reality they are doing ''something'': deterring potential enemies like nothing else can.\\

Any discussion of nuclear coercion needs to first explain a curious fact. Since 1945, numerous countries have spent untold billions of dollars accumulating stockpiles of nuclear bombs and missiles. Yet despite their earth-shattering power, these devices are most useful and effective when they're sitting in their launch tubes seemingly not doing anything. Well, in reality they are doing something: ''deterring'' potential enemies like nothing else can.\\

After the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atom bombs, the world became familiar with the destructive power of nuclear weapons. In the subsequent Cold War environment of mutually assured destruction--during which politicians and citizens alike witnessed repeated nuclear test detonations and learned about the curse of radioactive fallout--there developed a strong taboo and motivation to discourage offensive nuclear first use. People think about nuclear weapons in a fundamentally different way compared to conventional weapons such as machine guns and howitzers: they are considered ''so'' destructive and destabilizing that their use is not morally justified or rational except when the survival of the country itself is actively being threatened.\\

In a lot of popular fiction, having nuclear weapons when your opponent doesn't is treated as an instant checkmate that lets you force them to do anything you demand. But if we look at real life examples, this isn't what actually happened. The United States dropped atomic bombs on Japan on the 6th and 9th of August, 1945, inaugurating a period in which the United States was the only country which had nuclear weapons. Despite this, the US either could not or would not use them to force the Soviet Union to capitulate during disputes over Eastern Europe and Iran, nor could it prevent the Soviet Union from achieving a successful nuclear test on the 29th of August, 1949. There have also been multiple wars in which a nuclear power accepted conventional defeat at the hands of a non-nuclear power instead of resorting to nuclear coercion, such as the US war in Vietnam and the Soviet war in Afghanistan. So what's going on here?\\

If you're a national leader, the problem is that nuclear weapons are far more believable and effective as a threat when you're trying to dissuade your opponent from invading your territory or blowing up your cities (i.e. nuclear deterrence), than if you're threatening to nuke them unless they give you parts of their territory or agree to become your vassal state (i.e. nuclear coercion).\\

People think about nuclear weapons in a fundamentally different way compared to conventional weapons such as machine guns and howitzers: they are considered ''so'' destructive and destabilizing that their use is not morally justified or rational except when the survival of the country itself is actively being threatened.\\

Now that deterrence is covered, let's look at nuclear coercion.\\

If you make a nuclear threat against a rival, then there are three possible outcomes:

#They cave in to your demands, so you get what you wanted even without using your nukes.
#They reject your demands, so you nuke them.
#They reject your demands, and you decide not to nuke them.
\\

Nuclear weapons are also TooAwesomeToUse outside of the extremely narrow set of defensive circumstances where their use is legitimately "provoked", because as soon as you become the first one to start launching nukes, you automatically force your opponent across the GodzillaThreshold while simultaneously using up your final trump card. At that point there is nothing you can threaten to do to them that you aren't already doing. Therefore they have no more reason to restrain themselves or respect the red lines you draw in the sand, which means that they might feel free to kill your civilians, assasinate your leaders, SinkTheLifeboats, ShootTheMedicFirst, etc. That might not matter in a narrow military sense if you succeed in squashing their ability to resist in one fell swoop, but if you use the nuclear option and it somehow ''doesn't'' result in their complete military defeat and unconditional surrender, then you end up looking not only evil, but also weak. There's also the problem of radioactive fallout, especially when ground burst detonations are used, which depending on the prevailing winds could [[HoistByHisOwnPetard blow back over your own troops]] and will definitely make any other countries in the fallout path very angry at you.\\

The great thing is that you don't necessarily even need a nuclear arsenal capable of defeating or destroying your enemy to deter him, although that would certainly help; you just need to make the probable cost of victory [[PyrrhicVictory so high for him]] that he can't afford to start a war against you. It isn't rational for your enemy to initiate an aggressive war unless they think they can get a favorable cost/benefit tradeoff. On one hand, he may be eager to invade you if he's confident of a CurbStompBattle. In his dream scenario you'll either have no weapons of mass destruction, or they'll be sufficiently few and vulnerable for him to take them out with a pre-emptive strike. After that he may expect to fight the war entirely on your turf so that none of his population or infrastructure gets destroyed; knock out your air defenses and achieve air superiority on day one; wage a blitzkreig campaign in which he advances rapidly while losing just one man for every sixty of yours; and have your side's capitulation within a couple of weeks so his troops can be HomeByChristmas.\\

In real life, nuclear weapons can be deployed in various ways in an attempt to prevent them from being neutralized by the enemy. Land-based strategic [=ICBMs=] are traditionally set up in underground silos where the launcher shaft containing each missile is protected by armored blast doors, which open when a missile is launched. Each missile gets its own silo, from which it can be launched at any time. Land-based silos were more effective back when a counter-force nuclear strike would have been fairly inaccurate, meaning the silos just had to survive a nearby detonation rather than a direct hit. Once it became possible to target ICBM silos with precision, the best defense was to get early warning of enemy missiles and launch one's own [=ICBMs=] before they could be destroyed in their silos. The alternative to hardening a stationary facility is to have mobile launch systems where the missiles can be kept moving around to make them harder for the enemy to find and target, namely by using tracked or wheeled transporter erector launcher (TEL) vehicles, nuclear missile trains, or nuclear ballistic missile submarines.\\

The problem with the Hammer of the Valkyrur is that it's based out of only one large, above-ground structure. Because it's immobile, unconcealed, poorly fortified, and not part of a redundant network spread over a large area, it is highly vulnerable to a pre-emptive attack. An imperial force could just ride in and destroy the missile on the launchpad, especially if unlike the Nameless they were willing to risk blowing themselves up to stop the launch. Since there's only one launchpad for a whole magazine full of spires, only one missile at a time can be made ready, so the attacker can neutralize all the missiles at once just by capturing the launchpad. Even the spire's ability to bombard an area with energy projectiles turns out to be insufficient for area denial against ground troops.

[[folder:The Hammer's Vulnerability]]

[[folder:Deterrence Versus Coercion]]

In contrast, he'll probably think twice about invading if he knows that you have enough nukes and delivery capability to blow up several of his major cities; vaporize whole divisions of his ground forces; use nuclear demolition charges to blow up tunnels, bridges, highways, and ports necessary to his advance and logistics; and altogether put up so much of a fight that he's forced to use up many or even most of his weapons of mass destruction to destroy your ability to resist. Even if he enlarges his country's territory by 100% and eliminates you as an economic and political rival, that won't make it worthwhile after he's lost millions of civilian lives; sent his economy back to the stone age; and gotten his military so mauled it will take at least ten years to rebuild it into an effective defense, let alone a force capable of offensive warfare. If you were capable of inflicting that kind of damage in retaliation, then your enemy would have to be completely insane to attack you instead of just leaving you alone.

%%In some cases, nukes might even be called upon to protect against serious but not immediately existential threats to national sovereignty. For example, you might worry that a neighbor with a bigger and stronger conventional army will try to invade and annex one of your border provinces, and that your conventional army won't be strong enough to kick them back out. Even if your intelligence tells you that the invader intends to stop after taking that one province, it would still be disastrous if you just let them take it because you'd teach them that there are no consequences for violating your sovereignty. Once they find out that you can't defend yourself there will be nothing to stop them from doing it again, leading to a possible future where they either nibble you to death with successive annexations or decide to try for the whole country next time. If you haven't got any strong ally to bolster your conventional defense, or if your ally is distant enough that the enemy would overrun you by the time help arrived, then you've got to consider having an open policy of using nuclear weapons against invasion forces in a specific and proportionate way.\\

#They reject your demands, and you nuke them just like you said you would.

[[folder:Aggressive Negotiations]]

[[folder:Vulnerability to Counter-Force Attack]]

The problem is that nuclear weapons are far more believable and effective as a threat when you're trying to dissuade your opponent from invading your territory or blowing up your cities (i.e. nuclear deterrence), than if you're threatening to nuke them unless they give you parts of their territory or agree to become your vassal state (i.e. nuclear coercion).\\

%%The great thing is that you don't necessarily even need a nuclear arsenal capable of defeating or destroying your opponent, although that would certainly help; you just need to make the probable cost of victory [[PyrrhicVictory so high for him]] that he'd be better off just leaving you alone.

In some cases, nukes might even be called upon to protect against serious but not immediately existential threats to national sovereignty. For example, you might worry that a neighbor with a bigger and stronger conventional army will try to invade and annex one of your border provinces, and that your conventional army won't be strong enough to kick them back out. Even if your intelligence tells you that the invader intends to stop after taking that one province, it would still be disastrous if you just let them take it because you'd teach them that there are no consequences for violating your sovereignty. Once they find out that you can't defend yourself there will be nothing to stop them from doing it again, leading to a possible future where they either nibble you to death with successive annexations or decide to try for the whole country next time. If you haven't got any strong ally to bolster your conventional defense, or if your ally is distant enough that the enemy would overrun you by the time help arrived, then you've got to consider having an open policy of using nuclear weapons against invasion forces in a specific and proportionate way.\\

If the threat to your state is not immediately existential, it makes sense to use the mimimum level of threat and force that will be effective. For example, you could lead with a nuclear ultimatum to get out of your borders accompanied by overt preparation and positioning of your nuclear delivery methods; follow by exploding a small nuclear device near their invading troops if they ignore your ultimatum; escalate to actually nuking the forces invading your territory if they ignore the "warning shot"; and only unleash your arsenal against both their field forces in your territory and strategic targets within their territory as a last resort if they still refuse to stop attacking. As stated already, if you have such a policy you must be prepared to act on it if the enemy provokes you. If you just throw threatening words at them but don't make any concrete preparations for using nuclear force, your nuclear deterrent will quickly lose credibility.\\

%%The great thing is that you don't necessarily even need a nuclear arsenal capable of defeating or destroying your opponent, although that would certainly help; you just need to make the cost of victory [[PyrrhicVictory so high for him]] that no benefit he'd gain by conquering you could make up for what he'd lose.

People think about nuclear weapons in a fundamentally different way compared to conventional weapons such as machine guns and howitzers: they are considered ''so'' destructive and destabilizing that their use is not morally justified or rational except when the survival of the country itself is actively being threatened. In general, the GodzillaThreshold for defensive use of nukes is only crossed if your enemy is:

Usually, nuclear deterrence works because the country menacing you can understand how your government might arrive at a rational decision to counterattack with nukes if the self-rule or physical survival of the state is at stake. If you pick up the red telephone to order a nuclear launch, it's because you asked yourself "can using my nukes make this situation any worse?" and decided the answer was basically "no." Obviously, if enemy [=ICBMs=] are about to hit your capital and every major city in your country, then there's little reason not to pull TakingYouWithMe on the enemy. An unstoppable conventional invasion or a surgical strike against your chain of nuclear command are different in that your government might be able to avert mass death if it offers unconditional surrender in exchange for promises of humane treatment. But if you aren't willing to give up your country's nuclear arsenal and right to govern itself without a fight, then your only chance to protect those things (or at least punish the enemy for trying to take them away) is to start lobbing nukes. At that point your precious nuclear weapons are going to fall into enemy hands and become useless to you if you don't take your last chance to use them. Your enemy will be acutely aware of you being under this "use-it-or-lose-it" pressure, and that's why if they're smart they won't even attack you in the first place.\\

Now okay, maybe you or your predecessor built up a nuclear arsenal for deterrence despite secretly intending to never use it ''no matter what'', and just hoped that enemies would never see through the bluff, but that's pretty unlikely to be the case and your enemy shouldn't count on it. A nuclear weapons program is such a long and expensive undertaking that it requires sustained work and sacrifice with powerful motivation behind it, that motivation often being an ideology which praises independent statehood under a certain form of government as something worth fighting and dying to preserve. At the extreme, it applies "live free or die" to the entire country, positing that it would be better for all its people to be wiped off the face of the Earth than to submit to foreign tyranny. That end may not be what the leaders of government ''want'' to happen, but if there were any persuasive reason to use nuclear weapons ''at all'', it would be to protect the country's right to exist. You probably got yourself those nukes because there's something you're willing to sacrifice for, and if your enemy would be willing to defend his country with nukes, he can figure out that you're probably willing to do the same.\\

Usually, nuclear deterrence works because the country menacing you can understand how your government might arrive at a rational decision to counterattack with nukes if the self-rule or physical survival of the state is at stake. If you pick up the red telephone to order a nuclear launch, it's because you asked yourself "can using my nukes make this situation any worse?" and decided the answer was basically "no." Obviously, if enemy [=ICBMs=] are about to hit your capital and every major city in your country, then there's little reason not to pull TakingYouWithMe on the enemy. An unstoppable conventional invasion or a surgical strike against your chain of nuclear command are different in that your government might at least be able to avert mass death if it chooses unconditional surrender. But if you aren't willing to give up your country's nuclear arsenal and right to govern itself without a fight, then your only chance to protect those things (or at least punish the enemy for trying to take them away) is to start lobbing nukes. At that point your precious nuclear weapons are going to fall into enemy hands and become useless to you if you don't take your last chance to use them. Your enemy will be acutely aware of this "use-it-or-lose-it" pressure, and that's why if they're smart they won't even attack you in the first place.\\

Now okay, maybe you or your predecessor built up a nuclear arsenal for deterrence despite secretly having no intention of using them ''no matter what'', just hoping that enemies would never see through your bluff, but that's pretty unlikely to be the case and your enemy shouldn't count on it. A nuclear weapons program is such a long and expensive undertaking that it requires sustained work and sacrifice with powerful motivation behind it, that motivation often being an ideology which praises independent statehood under a certain form of government as something worth fighting and dying to preserve. At the extreme, it applies "live free or die" to the entire country, positing that it would be better for all its people to be wiped off the face of the Earth than to submit to foreign tyranny. That end may not be what the leaders of government ''want'' to happen, but if there were any persuasive reason to use nuclear weapons ''at all'', it would be to protect the country's right to exist. You probably got those nukes because there's something you're willing to sacrifice for, and if your enemy would be willing to defend his country with nukes, he can figure out that you're probably willing to do the same.\\

In some cases, nukes might even be called upon to protect against serious but not immediately existential threats to national sovereignty. For example, you might worry that a neighbor with a bigger and stronger conventional army will try to invade and annex one of your border provinces, and that your conventional army won't be strong enough to kick them back out. Even if your intelligence tells you that the invader intendes to stop after taking that one province, it would still be disastrous if you just let them take it because you'd teach them that there are no consequences for violating your sovereignty. Once they find out that you can't defend yourself there will be nothing to stop them from doing it again, leading to a possible future where they either nibble you to death with successive annexations or decide to try for the whole country next time. If you haven't got any strong ally to bolster your conventional defense, or if your ally is distant enough that the enemy would overrun you by the time help arrived, then you've got to consider having an open policy of using nuclear weapons against invasion forces in a specific and proportionate way.\\

!!Dahau's Hammer of the Valkyrur: The Flawed Concept of Nuclear Coercion

If the threat to your state is not immediately existential, it makes sense to use the mimimum level of threat and force that will be effective. For example, you could lead with a nuclear ultimatum to get out of your borders accompanied by overt preparation and positioning of your nuclear delivery methods, follow by exploding a small nuclear device near their invading troops if they ignore your ultimatum, escalate to actually nuking the forces invading your territory if they ignore the "warning shot", and only unleash your arsenal against both their field forces in your territory and strategic targets within their territory as a last resort if they still refuse to stop attacking. As stated already, if you have such a policy you must be prepared to act on it if the enemy provokes you. If you just throw threatening words at them but don't make any concrete preparations for using nuclear force, your nuclear deterrent will quickly lose credibility.\\

Usually, nuclear deterrence works because the country menacing you can understand how your government might arrive at a rational decision to counterattack with nukes if the self-rule or physical survival of the state is at stake. If you pick up the red telephone to order a nuclear launch, it's because you asked yourself "can using my nukes make this situation any worse?" and decided the answer was basically "no." Obviously, if enemy [=ICBMs=] are about to hit your capital and every major city in your country, then there's little reason not to pull TakingYouWithMe on the enemy. An unstoppable conventional invasion or a surgical strike against your chain of nuclear command are different in that your government might at least be able to avert mass death if it chooses unconditional surrender. But if you aren't willing to give up your country's nuclear arsenal and right to govern itself without a fight, then your only chance to protect those things (or at least punish the enemy for trying to take them away) is to start lobbing nukes. At that point your precious nuclear weapons are going to fall into enemy hands and become useless to you if you don't take your last chance to use them. Your enemy will be acutely aware of this "use it or lose it" pressure, and that's why if they're smart they won't even attack you in the first place.\\

Nukes might even be called upon to protect against serious but more limited violations of national sovereignty. There’s a potential rationale for threatening retaliation with tactical nukes in response to them trying for a more limited objective such as annexing a specific province, especially if their conventional power is far superior to yours. If a bigger and stronger country grabs some of your land and you let them get away with it, then you've just taught them that there are no consequences for violating your sovereignty, which will make them more likely to do it again. The only way to stop this vicious cycle before it starts is to announce that you’ll start firing nukes at their armies if they cross your borders, and then be ready to make good on your threats if that happens. The last part is the real catch, because if the enemy tries a land grab and you ''don't’’ use your tactical nukes despite having said you would, you damage the future credibility of your nuclear deterrent by making the enemy think you’re not serious about using it. Again, use it or lose it.\\

Nukes might even be called upon to protect against serious but more limited violations of national sovereignty. In fact, there’s even a potential rationale for threatening "massive retaliation" with nukes in response to them trying for a more limited objective such as annexing a specific province, especially if their conventional power is far superior to yours. If a bigger and stronger country grabs some of your land and you let them get away with it, then you've just taught them that there are no consequences for violating your sovereignty, which will make them more likely to do it again. The only way to stop this vicious cycle before it starts is to announce that you’ll start firing nukes if their armies cross your borders, and then be ready to make good on your threats if that happens.\\

Remarkably for a game series whose world-building involves a significant amount of SchizoTech, and which at least in the first game was content to use Valkyria as PersonOfMassDestruction stand-ins or metaphors for nuclear weapons, the endgame of Valkyria Chronicles III introduces a refurbished LostSuperweapon called the Hammer of the Valkyrur which directly copies the form and function of a nuclear ICBM launch facility. With Prince Maximilian dead and Cardinal Borgia about to be exposed for his plot, Dahau resorts to killing Borgia and taking the Hammer for himself. Dahau believes he can use this weapon to create an independent Darcsen homeland through force: after he destroys Randgriz as a demonstration of its power, he intends to offer the technology to the Emperor in exchange for him granting statehood to the Darcsen people, and if necessary to force the Emperor to do it by threatening the imperial capital of Schwartzgrad with the same fate. Only the brave intervention of the Nameless led by Kurt Irving saves Randgriz and the Gallian-Imperial peace process from this weapon of mass destruction.

Now that deterrence is covered, let's look at nuclear coercion.

#Trying to decapitate your government or disable your ability to give commands to your nuclear forces.

Deterrence means dissuading the other side from doing something by making them afraid of what you would do to them in retaliation. In order for a nuclear deterrent to be effective, the first requirement is technical capability. You need weapons that can be deployed with little or no delay; with enough range and accuracy to hit the enemy's vital cities or other targets; by a delivery system that allows enough weapons to reach the target without being intercepted; and in sufficient numbers and yield to cause what the enemy would consider unacceptable damage and loss. But even if you have that, your enemy ''also'' needs to believe that you aren't bluffing about your willingness to use it. They need to think that if they cross the red line you have described in your previous warnings, you will actually press the button instead of backing down.\\

If you make a nuclear threat against a rival, then there are three possible outcomes:
#They cave in to your demands, so you get what you wanted even without using your nukes.
#They reject your demands, and you nuke them just like you said you would.
#They reject your demands, and you decide not to nuke them.

This cost/benefit equation is in your favor if you merely need to deter the enemy from invading or destroying you. Your enemy ought to realize that if they move to destroy your national independence, they're pushing your back against a wall and giving you no way out except to use your nukes. In fact, there’s even a potential rationale for "massive retaliation" with nukes in response to them trying for a more limited objective such as annexing a specific province, especially if their conventional power is far superior to yours. If a bigger and stronger country grabs some of your land and you let them get away with it, then you've just taught them that there are no consequences for violating your sovereignty, which will make them more likely to do it again. The only way to stop this vicious cycle before it starts is to announce that you’ll start firing nukes if their armies cross your borders, and then be ready to make good on your threats if that happens.\\

By making a publically-disseminated nuclear policy stating the specific situations in which you would use nukes, you are putting a lot of pressure on yourself to back it up with your actions. If they invade and you don’t fire your nukes (depending on the situation a warning shot or a limited tactical attack may be enough to show them you're serious), you destroy the credibility of your nuclear deterrent from that point onward and prompt everybody to ask why you bothered getting the nukes if you were never willing to use them against an aggressor. In the worst case your un-fired nuclear weapons might be captured by the enemy, or even turned against you. Therefore a nuclear deterrent is kind of "use-it-or-lose-it". There is every pressure on you to use it if your enemy attacks, and your enemy knows it.\\

Finally, whoever doubts that a country would dare to use nukes against an invader for fear of being destroyed in response should not underestimate the motivations of honor and revenge. Human beings are norm-based creatures, who seem predisposed to invent and follow systematic rules of behavior that transcend the selfish material interests of the individual. This means that often, people will defy pure game theory logic in order to reward or punish others based on whether or not they follow the rules. A good example is the [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ultimatum_game Ultimatum Game]], a psychology experiment in which person A is given a cash prize to split with person B. A has one chance to offer to B a percentage which they think is fair, and if B accepts, they each get what they agreed. But if B feels the offer is unfair they can reject the deal, in which case neither A nor B gets anything. A narrow view of rational self-interest would suggest that B should accept any offer greater than zero, since something is better than nothing. Yet while the exact threshold differs across cultures and other variables, offers of less than 30% are often rejected. This suggests that test subjects in the position of person B are trying to punish and deter unfair behavior even at a cost to themselves.\\

Whoever uses the nuke first ''without'' provocation gives up the moral high ground and invites the condemnation even of neutral and allied nations, partly because the taboo on using nuclear weapons is broadly in everyone's interest. People are generally willing to give up their right to make a nuclear first strike if it means that other people will agree not to do it to them. It would be dangerous to all countries if using nuclear weapons was demystified or destigmatized, and the only way to re-establish the nuclear taboo after it gets broken is to ostracize the violator with the dissolution of alliances, imposition of economic sanctions, and provision of support to the country that was attacked. These negative consequences make it difficult to use nuclear weapons frivolously.\\

The problem is that nuclear weapons are far more believable and effective as a threat when you're warning your opponent not to invade your territory or attack your cities, than if you're demanding they give you territory that belongs to them or give up their right to govern themselves without foreign interference. People think about nuclear weapons in a fundamentally different way compared to conventional weapons such as machine guns and howitzers: they are considered ''so'' destructive and destabilizing that their use is not morally justified or rational except when the survival of the country itself is actively being threatened. In general, the GodzillaThreshold is only crossed if your enemy is 1) attacking you with nuclear weapons; 2) invading your internationally recognized home territory (NOT foreign colonies or recently-captured land) with overwhelmingly superior conventional forces; or 3) trying to decapitate your government or disable your ability to give commands to your nuclear forces.\\

Deterrence means dissuading the other side from doing something by making them afraid of what you would do to them in retaliation. In order for a nuclear deterrent to be effective, the potential enemy needs to think that your weapons are genuinely capable of inflicting what they'd consider to be unacceptable losses against them in a realistic nuclear war scenario, ''and'' they need to believe that you aren't bluffing about your willingness to use it. They need to think that if they cross the red line you have described in your previous warnings, you will actually press the button instead of backing down.\\

Both of these factors are in your favor if you merely need to deter the enemy from invading or destroying you. Your enemy ought to realize that if they move to destroy your national independence, they're pushing your back against a wall and giving you no way out except to use your nukes. In fact, there’s even a potential rationale for "massive retaliation" with nukes in response to them trying for a more limited objective such as annexing a specific province, especially if their conventional power is far superior to yours. If a bigger and stronger country grabs some of your land and you let them get away with it, then you've just taught them that there are no consequences for violating your sovereignty, which will make them more likely to do it again. The only way to stop this vicious cycle before it starts is to announce that you’ll start firing nukes if their armies cross your borders, and then be ready to make good on your threats if that happens.\\

By making this your publicly-known policy you’re putting a lot of pressure on yourself to back it up with your actions. If they invade and you don’t fire your nukes (depending on the situation a warning shot or a limited tactical attack may be enough to show them you're serious), you destroy the credibility of your nuclear deterrent from that point onward and prompt everybody to ask why you even bothered getting the nukes if you’re not willing to defend yourself with them. In the worst case your un-fired nuclear weapons might be captured by the enemy, or even turned against you. Therefore a nuclear deterrent is kind of "use-it-or-lose-it". There is every pressure on you to use it if your enemy attacks, and your enemy knows it.\\

Finally, whoever doubts that a country would dare to use nukes against an invader for fear of being destroyed in response should not underestimate the motivations of honor and revenge. Human beings are norm-based creatures, who seem predisposed to invent and follow systematic rules of behavior that transcend the selfish material interests of the individual. This means that often, people will defy pure game theory logic in order to reward or punish others based on whether or not they follow the rules. A good example is the [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ultimatum_game Ultimatum Game]], a psychology experiment in which person A is given a cash prize to split with person B. A has one chance to offer to B a percentage which they think is fair, and if B accepts, they each get what they agreed. But if B feels the offer is unfair they can reject the deal, in which case neither A nor B gets anything. A narrow view of rational self-interest would suggest that B should accept any offer greater than zero, since something is better than nothing. Yet while the exact threshold differs across cultures and other variables, offers of less than 30% are often rejected. This suggests that test subjects in the position of person B are trying to punish and deter unfair behavior even at a cost to themselves.\\

Whoever uses the nuke first ''without'' provocation gives up the moral high ground and invites the condemnation even of neutral and allied nations, partly because the taboo on using nuclear weapons is broadly in everyone's interest. People are generally willing to give up their right to make a nuclear first strike if it means that other people will agree not to do it to them. It would be dangerous to all countries if using nuclear weapons was demystified or destigmatized, and the only way to re-establish the nuclear taboo after it gets broken is to ostracize the violator with the dissolution of alliances, imposition of economic sanctions, and provision of support to the country that was attacked. These negative consequences make it difficult to use nuclear weapons frivolously.\\

Nuclear weapons are also TooAwesomeToUse outside of the extremely narrow set of defensive circumstances where their use is legitimately "provoked", because as soon as you become the first one to start launching nukes, you automatically force your opponent across the GodzillaThreshold while simultaneously using up your final trump card. At that point there is nothing you can threaten to do to them that you aren't already doing. Therefore they have no more reason to restrain themselves or respect the red lines you draw in the sand, which means that they might feel free to kill your civilians, assasinate your leaders, SinkTheLifeboats, ShootTheMedicFirst, etc. That might not matter in a narrow military sense if you succeed in squashing their ability to resist in one fell swoop, but if you use the nuclear option and it somehow ''doesn't'' result in their complete military defeat and unconditional surrender, then you end up looking not only evil, but also weak. There's also the problem of radioactive fallout, especially when ground burst detonations are used, which depending on the prevailing winds could [[HoistByHisOwnPetard blow back over your own troops]] and will definitely make any other countries in the fallout path very angry at you.\\

In a lot of popular fiction, having nuclear weapons when your opponent doesn't is treated as an instant checkmate that lets you force them to do anything you demand. But if we look at real life examples, this isn't what actually happened. The United States dropped atomic bombs on Japan on the 6th and 9th of August, 1945, inaugurating a period in which the United States was the only country which had nuclear weapons. Despite this, the US either could not or would not use them to force the Soviet Union to capitulate on various issues such as Eastern Europe and Iran, nor could it prevent the Soviet Union from achieving a successful nuclear test on the 29th of August, 1949. There have also been multiple wars in which a nuclear power accepted conventional defeat at the hands of a non-nuclear power instead of resorting to nuclear coercion, such as the US in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan. So what's going on here?\\

The problem is that nuclear weapons are far more persuasive and believable as a threat when you're telling your opponent not to invade your territory or attack your cities, than if you're demanding they give you territory that belongs to them or abandon what they perceive as their country's vital strategic interest. Nuclear weapons are treated psychologically as being in a different category from so-called conventional weapons like high explosive bombs. They are considered ''so'' destructive and destabilizing that their use is not morally justified or rational except when the survival of the country itself is actively being threatened. The GodzillaThreshold is only crossed if your enemy is 1) attacking you with nuclear weapons; 2) in the process of overrunning your internationally recognized home territory (NOT foreign colonies or newly captured land) with a massive conventional invasion; or 3) trying to assassinate your top leaders or otherwise disable your ability to give commands to your nuclear forces, in an effort to render you helpless against the first two.\\

Deterrence means dissuading the other side from doing something by making them afraid of what you would do to them in retaliation. In order for a nuclear deterrent to be effective, the potential enemy needs to think that your weapons are genuinely capable of inflicting what they'd consider unacceptable losses on them if they crossed your red line, ''and'' they need to think that you aren't bluffing about the fact that if push came to shove, you would actually use it.\\

Both of these factors are in your favor if you merely need to deter the enemy from invading or destroying you. They ought to realize that if they move to destroy your national independence, they're pushing your back against a wall and giving you no way out except to use your nukes. In fact, there’s even a potential rationale for Massive Retaliation with nukes in response to them trying for a more limited objective such as annexing a specific province, especially if their conventional power is far superior to yours. If a bigger and stronger country grabs some of your land and you let them get away with it, then you’ve just taught them that there are no consequences for violating your sovereignty, which will make them more likely to do it again. The only way to stop this vicious cycle before it starts is to announce that you’ll use nukes if their armies cross your borders, and be ready to go through with it if that happens.\\

By making this your publicly-known policy you’re putting a lot of pressure on yourself to back it up with your actions, because if they invade and you don’t fire your nukes, you destroy the credibility of your nuclear deterrent from that point onward and call into question why you ever bothered getting the nukes if you’re not willing to defend yourself with them. In the worst case your un-fired nuclear weapons might be captured by the enemy, or even used against you. Therefore a nuclear deterrent is kind of "use-it-or-lose-it". There is every pressure on you to use it if your enemy attacks, and your enemy knows it.\\

Finally, whoever doubts that a country would dare to use nukes against an invader for fear of being destroyed in response should not underestimate the motivations of honor and revenge. Human beings are norm-based creatures, who seem predisposed to invent and follow systematic rules of behavior that transcend the individual. This means that often, people will defy pure game theory logic in order to reward or punish others based on whether or not they follow the rules. A good example is the [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ultimatum_game Ultimatum Game]], a psychology experiment in which person A is given a cash prize to split with person B. A has one chance to offer to B a percentage which they think is fair, and if B accepts, they each get what they agreed. But if B feels the offer is unfair they can reject the deal, in which case neither A nor B gets anything. A narrow view of logic would suggest that B should accept any offer greater than zero, since something is better than nothing. Yet while the exact threshold differs across cultures and other variables, offers of less than 30% are often rejected. This suggests that people in the position of person B are trying to punish and deter unfair behavior even at a cost to themselves.\\

Nuclear weapons are also TooAwesomeToUse outside of the extremely narrow set of defensive circumstances where their use is legitimately "provoked", because as soon as you become the first one to start launching nukes, you automatically force your opponent across the GodzillaThreshold while simultaneously using up your final trump card. At that point there is nothing you can threaten to do to them that you aren't already doing. Therefore they have no more reason to restrain themselves or respect the red lines you draw in the sand, which means that they might feel free to kill your civilians, assasinate your leaders, SinkTheLifeboats, ShootTheMedicFirst, etc. That might not matter if you succeed in squashing their ability to resist in one fell swoop, but if you use the nuclear option and it somehow ''doesn't'' result in their complete military defeat and unconditional surrender, then you end up looking not only evil, but also weak. There's also the problem of radioactive fallout, especially when ground burst detonations are used, which depending on the prevailing winds could [[HoistByHisOwnPetard blow back over your own troops]] and will definitely make any other countries in the fallout path very angry at you.\\

It might be tempting to think that a limited, tactical use of a nuclear weapon against military targets could turn the tide of a battle without provoking the full international backlash associated with an all-out strategic nuclear volley against the enemy's cities or centers of government. However, this is far from reliable. Since ground troops are often spread out over a wide area, and military assets like armored fighting vehicles are specifically designed for resistance to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, it would probably take multiple nuclear warheads to make a significant difference on the operational level of warfare. Therefore the attacker may have to choose between only using one weapon and getting very little military benefit compared to the diplomatic penalties incurred, or launching such a barrage of tactical nukes that the scale of outrage and risk of retaliation would be similar to resorting to strategic nukes in the first place.

To begin with, it's actually not guaranteed that the leaders will be pleased to learn about Randgriz being destroyed, because this ruins the negotiations they were conducting to end the war against Gallia. They had a good reason to have gone to the peace table, having lost Maximilian, Selvaria, and most of the invasion forces' combat effectiveness; blowing up Randgriz doesn't change the fact that the Empire is hardly in a position to renew its conventional invasion, and as long as they've still got the Federation to deal with it makes sense to close the Gallian front. Dahau launched the missile without any authorization from higher authorities, and trampled on the capital's foreign policy. But what about the Hammer of the Valkyrur, with its numerous spare missiles ready to go? Doesn't this mean the Empire no longer needs a negotiated peace, and can simply threaten Gallia into unconditional surrender? Well, that might not necessarily work, and more importantly, at this stage the Empire doesn't have the Hammer of the Valkyrur; Dahau does.\\

Dahau is a former Darcsen resistance fighter who fought against the Empire, and only got into the Imperial military through the patronage of Borgia and Maximilian, both of whom are now dead. The idea of a former seperatist rebel getting his hands on such a destructive weapon ought to be deeply alarming in and of itself. But it gets worse: even if Dahau doesn't tell them about how Borgia hid the discovery and rebuilding of this system as part of a treasonous plot to sabotage the war effort and eventually make himself theocrat of the entire continent, the fact that somebody developed this weapon as a rogue project without letting anybody in the government know about or approve it obviously implies premeditated disloyalty against the government; the fact that Dahau didn't blow the whistle on this when he had the chance means he is at least complicit.\\

Dahau is a former Darcsen resistance fighter who fought against the Empire, and only got into the Imperial military through the patronage of Borgia and Maximilian, both of whom are now dead. The idea of a former seperatist rebel getting his hands on such a destructive weapon ought to be deeply alarming in and of itself. Even if Dahau doesn't tell them about how Borgia hid the discovery and rebuilding of this system as part of a treasonous plot to sabotage the war effort and eventually make himself theocrat of the entire continent, the fact that somebody developed this weapon as a rogue project without letting anybody in the government know about or approve it obviously implies premeditated disloyalty against the government; the fact that Dahau didn't blow the whistle on this when he had the chance means he is at least complicit.

Dahau is a former Darcsen resistance fighter who fought against the Empire, and only got into the Imperial military through the patronage of Borgia and Maximilian, both of whom are now dead. The idea of a former seperatist rebel getting his hands on such a destructive weapon ought to be deeply alarming in and of itself. Even if Dahau doesn't tell them about how Borgia hid the discovery and rebuilding of this system as part of a treasonous plot to sabotage the war effort and eventually make himself theocrat of the entire continent, the fact that somebody developed this weapon as a rogue project without letting anybody in the government know about or approve it obviously implies premeditated disloyalty against the government.