History Analysis / ValkyriaChroniclesIII

Let's suppose that Calamity Raven defeats the Nameless and the first missile from the Hammer destroys Randgriz. Fantastic! Dahau can congratulate himself and then telegraph or radio the good news to Schwartzgrad. Unfortunately, as soon as the details of the situation become clear to the Empire's leadership, they are unlikely to regard Dahau and Calamity Raven with any kind of trust or gratitude. In fact, there's really no way for Dahau to bargain with the Empire without things getting hostile.

To begin with, it's actually not guaranteed that the leaders will be pleased to learn about Randgriz being destroyed, because this ruins the negotiations they were conducting to end the war against Gallia. They had a good reason to have gone to the peace table, having lost Maximilian, Selvaria, and most of the invasion forces' combat effectiveness; blowing up Randgriz doesn't change the fact that the Empire is hardly in a position to renew its conventional invasion, and as long as they've still got the Federation to deal with it makes sense to close the Gallian front. Dahau launched the missile without any authorization from higher authorities, and trampled on the capital's foreign policy. But what about the Hammer of the Valkyrur, with its numerous spare missiles ready to go? Doesn't this mean the Empire no longer needs a negotiated peace, and can simply threaten Gallia into unconditional surrender? Well, that might not necessarily work, and more importantly, at this stage the Empire doesn't have the Hammer of the Valkyrur; Dahau does.

Finally, whoever doubts that a country would dare to use nukes against an invader for fear of being destroyed in response should not underestimate the motivations of honor and revenge. Human beings are norm-based creatures, who seem predisposed to invent and follow systematic rules of behavior that transcend the individual. This means that often, people will defy pure game theory logic in order to reward or punish others based on whether or not they follow the rules. A good example is the Ultimatum Game, a psychology experiment in which person A is given a cash prize to split with person B. A has one chance to offer to B a percentage which they think is fair, and if B accepts, they each get what they agreed. But if B feels the offer is unfair they can reject the deal, in which case neither A nor B gets anything. A narrow view of logic would suggest that B should accept any offer greater than zero, since something is better than nothing. Yet while the exact threshold differs across cultures and other variables, offers of less than 30% are often rejected. This suggests that people in the position of person B are trying to punish and deter unfair behavior even at a cost to themselves.\\

By making this your publicly-known policy you’re putting a lot of pressure on yourself to back it up with your actions, because if they invade and you don’t fire your nukes, you destroy the credibility of your nuclear deterrent from that point onward and call into question why you ever bothered getting the nukes if you’re not willing to defend yourself with them. In the worst case your un-fired nuclear weapons might be captured by the enemy, or even used against you. Therefore a nuclear deterrent is kind of "use-it-or-lose-it"; there is every pressure on you to use it if your enemy attacks, and your enemy knows it.\\

It's an appropriately high-stakes climax for perhaps the darkest Valkyria Chronicles game. But if run a "what if?" scenario based on what would have happened if Dahau had successfully fended off the Nameless, we can determine that Dahau's plan had very little chance of working from either a military or political perspective, and in the process learn something about why nuclear weapons aren't very useful as instruments of coercion in real life.

Deterrence means dissuading the other side from doing something by making them afraid of what you would do to them in retaliation. In order for a nuclear deterrent to be effective, the potential enemy needs to think that your weapons are genuinely capable of inflicting what they'd consider unacceptable losses on them if they crossed your red line, ''and'' they need to think that you aren't bluffing about the fact that if push came to shove, you would actually use it. Both of these factors are in your favor if you merely need to deter the enemy from invading or destroying you: if they just imagine what they would do in your position, they'll understand that certain actions ''would'' make you desperate enough to use your arsenal, and that grabbing your land really can’t be as important to them as preserving your existence is to you.\\

Deterrence means dissuading the other side from doing something by making them afraid of what you would do to them in retaliation. In order for a nuclear deterrent to be effective, the potential enemy needs to think that your weapons are genuinely capable of inflicting what they'd consider unacceptable losses on them if they crossed your red line, ''and'' they need to think that you aren't bluffing about the fact that if push came to shove, you would actually use it. Both of these factors are in your favor if you merely need to deter the enemy from invading or destroying you, because they have reason to believe that committing such aggression against you would make you desperate enough to use your arsenal, and grabbing your land really can’t be as important to them as preserving your existence is to you.\\

Deterrence means dissuading the other side from doing something by making them afraid of what you would do to them in retaliation. In order for a nuclear deterrent to be effective, the potential enemy needs to think that your weapons are genuinely capable of inflicting what they'd consider unacceptable losses on them if they crossed your red line, ''and'' they need to think that you aren't bluffing about the fact that if push came to shove, you would actually use it.\\

Deterrence means dissuading the other side from doing something by making them afraid of what you would do to them in retaliation. In order for a nuclear deterrent to be effective, they have to think that your weapons are genuinely capable of inflicting what they'd consider unacceptable losses on them if they crossed your red line, ''and'' they have to think that you aren't bluffing about the fact that if push came to shove, you would actually use it.\\

In a lot of popular fiction, having nuclear weapons when your opponent doesn't is treated as an instant checkmate that lets you to force them to do anything you demand. But if we look at real life examples, this isn't what actually happened. The United States dropped atomic bombs on Japan on the 6th and 9th of August, 1945, inaugurating a period in which the United States was the only country which had nuclear weapons. Despite this, the US either could not or would not use them to force the Soviet Union to capitulate on various issues such as Eastern Europe and Iran, nor could it prevent the Soviet Union from achieving a successful nuclear test on the 29th of August, 1949. There have also been multiple wars in which a nuclear power accepted conventional defeat at the hands of a non-nuclear power instead of resorting to nuclear coercion, such as the US in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan. So what's going on here?\\

Deterrence means dissuading the other side from doing something by making them afraid of what you would do in retaliation. In order for a nuclear deterrent to be effective, they have to think that your weapons are genuinely capable of inflicting what they'd consider unacceptable losses on them if they crossed your red line, and they have to think that you aren't bluffing about the fact that if push came to shove, you would actually use it.\\

The problem is that nuclear weapons are far more credible as a threat when you're telling your opponent not to invade your territory or attack your cities, than if you're demanding they give you territory that belongs to them or abandon what they perceive as their country's vital strategic interest. Nuclear weapons are treated psychologically as being in a different category from so-called conventional weapons like high explosive bombs. They are considered ''so'' destructive and destabilizing that their use is not morally justified or rational except when the survival of the country itself is actively being threatened. The GodzillaThreshold is only crossed if your enemy is 1) attacking you with nuclear weapons; 2) in the process of overrunning your internationally recognized home territory (NOT foreign colonies or newly captured land) with a massive conventional invasion; or 3) trying to assassinate your top leaders or otherwise disable your ability to give commands to your nuclear forces, in an effort to render you helpless against the first two. If your enemy does one of these things, and especially if you have a publicly stated policy on when you would use nuclear weapons, they can’t really complain if you nuke them in response, and world opinion is more likely to support you. This is all the more true because if your enemy doesn’t want you to nuke them, the solution is merely not to attack.\\

In contrast, whoever uses the nuke first ''without'' provocation gives up the moral high ground and invites the condemnation even of neutral and allied nations, partly because the taboo on using nuclear weapons is broadly in everyone's interest. People are generally willing to give up their right to make a nuclear first strike if it means that other people will agree not to do it to them. It would be dangerous to all countries if using nuclear weapons was demystified or destigmatized, and the only way to re-establish the nuclear taboo after it gets broken is to ostracize the violator with the dissolution of alliances, imposition of economic sanctions, and provision of support to the country that was attacked. These negative consequences make it difficult to use nuclear weapons frivolously.\\

The problem is that nuclear weapons are far more credible as a threat when you're telling your opponent not to invade your territory or attack your cities, than if you're demanding they give you territory that belongs to them or abandon what they perceive as their country's vital strategic interest. Nuclear weapons are treated psychologically as being in a different category from so-called conventional weapons like high explosive bombs. They are considered ''so'' destructive and destabilizing that their use is not morally justified or rational except when the survival of the country itself is actively being threatened. The GodzillaThreshold is only crossed if your enemy is 1) attacking you with nuclear weapons; 2) in the process of overrunning your internationally recognized home territory (NOT foreign colonies or newly captured land) with a massive conventional invasion; or 3) trying to assassinate your top leaders or otherwise disable your ability to give commands to your nuclear forces, in an effort to render you helpless against the first two.\\

Whoever uses the nuke first without provocation gives up the moral high ground and invites the condemnation even of neutral and allied nations, partly because the taboo on using nuclear weapons is broadly in everyone's interest. People are generally willing to give up their right to make a nuclear first strike if it means that other people will agree not to do it to them. It would be dangerous to all countries if using nuclear weapons was demystified or destigmatized, and the only way to re-establish the nuclear taboo after it gets broken is to ostracize the violator with the dissolution of alliances, imposition of economic sanctions, and provision of support to the country that was attacked. These negative consequences make it difficult to use nuclear weapons frivolously.\\

Whoever uses the nuke first without provocation gives up the moral high ground and invites the condemnation even of neutral and allied nations, partly because the taboo on using nuclear weapons is broadly in everyone's interest. People are generally willing to give up their right to make a nuclear first strike if it means that other people will agree not to do it to them. It would be dangerous to all countries if using nuclear weapons was demystified or destigmatized, and the only way to re-establish the nuclear taboo after it gets broken is to ostracize the violator with the dissolution of alliances, imposition of economic sanctions, and provision of support to the country that was attacked. These negative consequences make it difficult to use nuclear weapons frivolously.

Nuclear weapons are also TooAwesomeToUse outside of the extremely narrow set of defensive circumstances where their use is legitimately "provoked", because as soon as you become the first one to start launching nukes, you automatically force your opponent across the GodzillaThreshold while simultaneously using up your final trump card. At that point there is nothing you can threaten to do to them that you aren't already doing. Therefore they have no more reason to restrain themselves or respect the red lines you draw in the sand, which means that they might feel free to kill your civilians, assasinate your leaders, SinkTheLifeboats, ShootTheMedicFirst, etc. That might not matter if you succeed in squashing their ability to resist in one fell swoop, but if you use the nuclear option and it somehow ''doesn't'' result in their complete military defeat and unconditional surrender, then you end up looking not only evil, but also weak. There's also the problem of radioactive fallout, especially when ground burst detonations are used, which depending on the prevailing winds could [[HoistByHisOwnPetard blow back over your own troops]] and will definitely make any other countries in the fallout path very angry at you.

The problem is that nuclear weapons are far more credible as a threat when you're telling your opponent not to invade your territory or attack your cities, than if you're demanding they give you territory that belongs to them or abandon what they perceive as their country's vital strategic interest. Nuclear weapons are treated psychologically as being in a different category from so-called conventional weapons like high explosive bombs. They are considered ''so'' destructive and destabilizing that their use is not morally justified or rational except when the survival of the country itself is actively being threatened. The GodzillaThreshold is only crossed if your enemy is 1) attacking you with nuclear weapons; 2) in the process of overrunning your internationally recognized home territory (NOT foreign colonies or newly captured land) with a massive conventional invasion; or 3) trying to assassinate your top leaders or otherwise disable your ability to give commands to your nuclear forces, in an effort to render you helpless against the first two.

The problem is that nuclear weapons are far more credible as a threat when you're telling your opponent not to invade your territory or attack your cities, than if you're demanding they give you territory that belongs to them or abandon what they perceive as their country's vital strategic interest. Nuclear weapons are treated psychologically as being in a different category from so-called conventional weapons like high explosive bombs. They are considered ''so'' destructive and destabilizing that their use is not morally justified or rational except when the survival of the country itself is actively being threatened. The GodzillaThreshold is only crossed if your enemy is 1) attacking you with nuclear weapons; 2) in the process of overrunning your internationally recognized home territory (NOT foreign colonies or newly captured land) with a massive conventional invasion; or 3) trying to assassinate your top leaders or otherwise disable your ability to give commands to your nuclear forces.

The problem is that nuclear weapons are far more credible as a threat when you're telling your opponent not to invade your territory or attack your cities, than if you're demanding they give you territory that belongs to them or abandon what they percieve as their country's vital strategic interest. Nuclear weapons are treated psychologically as being in a different category from so-called conventional weapons; in other words, the difference is in kind rather than merely of degree. They are considered so destructive that their use is not morally justified except when the survival of the country itself is actively being threatened.

Remarkably for a game series whose world-building involves a significant amount of SchizoTech, and which at least in the first game was content to use Valkyria as PersonOfMassDestruction stand-ins or metaphors for nuclear weapons, the endgame of Valkyria Chronicles III introduces a refurbished LostSuperweapon called the Hammer of the Valkyrur which directly copies the form and function of a nuclear ICBM launch facility. Dahau believes he can use this weapon to create an independent Darcsen homeland: after he destroys the Gallian capital of Randgriz as a demonstration of its power, he intends to offer the technology to the Emperor in exchange for him granting statehood to the Darcsen people, and if necessary to force the Emperor to do it by threatening the imperial capital of Schwartzgrad with the same fate.

In a lot of popular fiction, having nuclear weapons when your opponent doesn't is treated as an instant checkmate that lets you to force them to do anything you demand. But if we look at real life examples, this isn't what actually happened. The United States dropped atomic bombs on Japan on the 6th and 9th of August, 1945, inaugurating a period in which the United States was the only country which had nuclear weapons. Despite this, the US either could not or would not use them to force the Soviet Union to capitulate on various issues such as its takeover of the Eastern Bloc countries and the postwar organization of Germany, nor could it prevent the Soviet Union from achieving a successful nuclear test on the 29th of August, 1949. There have also been multiple wars in which a nuclear power accepted conventional defeat at the hands of a non-nuclear power instead of resorting to nuclear coercion, such as the US in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan. So what's going on here?\\

In a lot of popular fiction, having nuclear weapons when your opponent doesn't is treated as an instant checkmate that lets you to force them to do anything you demand. But if we look at real life examples, this isn't what actually happened. The United States dropped atomic bombs on Japan on the 6th and 9th of August, 1945, inaugurating a period in which the United States was the only country which had nuclear weapons. Despite this, the US either could not or would not use them to force the Soviet Union to capitulate on various issues such as its takeover of the Eastern Bloc countries and the postwar organization of Germany, nor could it prevent the Soviet Union from achieving a successful nuclear test on the 29th of August, 1949. There have also been multiple wars in which a nuclear power accepted conventional defeat at the hands of a non-nuclear power instead of resorting to nuclear coercion, such as the US in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan. So what's going on here?

In real life, nuclear weapons can be deployed in various ways in an attempt to prevent them from being neutralized by the enemy. Land-based strategic [=ICBMs=] are traditionally set up in underground silos where the launcher shaft containing each missile is protected by armored blast doors, which open when a missile is launched. Each missile gets its own silo, from which it can be launched at any time. Land-based silos were more effective back when a counter-force nuclear strike would have been fairly inaccurate, meaning the silos just had to survive a nearby detonation rather than a direct hit. Once it became possible to target ICBM silos with precision, the best defense was to get early warning of enemy missiles and launch one's own [=ICBMs=] before they could be destroyed in their silos. The alternative to hardening a stationary facility is to have mobile launch systems where the missiles can be kept moving around to make them harder for the enemy to find and target, namely by using tracked or wheeled transporter erector launcher (TEL) vehicles, nuclear missile trains, or nuclear ballistic missile submarines.

Nuclear weapons are also TooAwesomeToUse outside of the extremely narrow set of defensive circumstances where their use is legitimately "provoked", because as soon as you become the first one to start launching nukes, you automatically force your opponent across the GodzillaThreshold. At that point there is nothing you can threaten to do to them that you aren't already doing. Therefore they have no more reason to restrain themselves or respect the red lines you draw in the sand, which means that they might feel free to kill your civilians, assasinate your leaders, SinkTheLifeboats, ShootTheMedicFirst, etc. There's also the problem of radioactive fallout, especially when ground burst detonations are used, which depending on the prevailing winds could [[HoistByHisOwnPetard blow back over your own troops]] and will definitely make any other countries in the fallout path very angry at you.

The problem with the Hammer of the Valkyrur is that it's based out of only one large, above-ground structure. Because it's immobile, unconcealed, poorly fortified, and not part of a redundant network spread over a large area, it is highly vulnerable to a pre-emptive attack. An imperial force could just ride in and destroy the missile on the launchpad, especially if unlike the Nameless they were willing to risk blowing themselves up to stop the launch. Since there's only one launchpad for a whole magazine full of spires, only one missile at a time can be made ready, so the attacker can neutralize all the missiles at once just by capturing the launchpad. Even the spire's ability to bombard an area with energy projectiles turns out to be insufficient for area denial against ground troops.

Nuclear weapons are also TooAwesomeToUse as offensive first strike weapons because once you start firing nukes at the enemy, you automatically force them across the GodzillaThreshold. At that point there is nothing you can threaten to do to them that you aren't already doing. Therefore they have no more reason to restrain themselves or respect the red lines you draw in the sand, which means that they might feel free to kill your civilians, assasinate your leaders, SinkTheLifeboats, ShootTheMedicFirst, etc. There's also the problem of radioactive fallout, especially when ground burst detonations are used, which depending on the prevailing winds could [[HoistByHisOwnPetard blow back over your own troops]] and will definitely make any other countries in the fallout path very angry at you.

Nuclear weapons are also TooAwesomeToUse because once you start firing nukes at the enemy, you automatically force them across the GodzillaThreshold. At that point there is nothing you can threaten to do to them that you aren't already doing. Therefore they have no more reason to restrain themselves or respect the red lines you draw in the sand, which means that they might feel free to kill your civilians, assasinate your leaders, SinkTheLifeboats, ShootTheMedicFirst, etc. There's also the problem of radioactive fallout, especially when ground burst detonations are used, which depending on the prevailing winds could [[HoistByHisOwnPetard blow back over your own troops]] and will definitely make any other countries in the fallout path very angry at you.

The problem is that nuclear weapons are far more credible as a threat when you're telling your opponent not to invade your territory or attack your cities, than if you're demanding they give you territory that belongs to them or abandon what they percieve as their country's vital strategic interest. Nuclear weapons are treated psychologically as being in a different category from so-called conventional weapons; in other words, the difference is in kind rather than merely of degree. They are considered so destructive that their use is not morally justified except when the survival of the country itself is actively being threatened. Whoever uses the nuke first gives up the moral high ground and invites the condemnation even of neutral and allied nations, partly because the taboo on using nuclear weapons is broadly in everyone's interest.

People are generally willing to give up their right to make a nuclear first strike if it means that other people will agree not to do it to them. It would be dangerous to all countries if using nuclear weapons was demystified or destigmatized, and the only way to re-establish the nuclear taboo after it gets broken is to ostracize the violator with the dissolution of alliances, imposition of economic sanctions, and provision of support to the country that was attacked. These negative consequences make it difficult to use nuclear weapons frivolously.

The problem is that nuclear weapons are far more credible as a threat when you're telling your opponent not to invade your territory or attack your cities, than if you're demanding they give you territory that belongs to them or abandon what they percieve as their country's vital strategic interest. Nuclear weapons are treated psychologically as being in a different category from so-called conventional weapons; in other words, the difference is in kind rather than merely of degree. They are considered so destructive that their use is not morally justified except when the survival of the country itself is actively being threatened. Whoever uses the nuke first gives up the moral high ground and invites the condemnation even of neutral and allied nations, partly because the taboo on using nuclear weapons is broadly in everyone's interest. People are generally willing to give up their right to make a nuclear first strike if it means that other people will agree not to do it to them. It would be dangerous to all countries if using nuclear weapons was demystified or destigmatized, and the only way to re-establish the nuclear taboo after it gets broken is to ostracize the violator with the dissolution of alliances, imposition of economic sanctions, and provision of support to the country that was attacked. These negative consequences make it difficult to use nuclear weapons frivolously.

Nuclear weapons are also TooAwesomeToUse because once you start firing nukes at the enemy, you automatically force them across the GodzillaThreshold. At that point there is nothing you can threaten to do to them that you aren't already doing. Therefore they have no more reason to restrain themselves or respect the red lines you draw in the sand, which means that they might feel free to kill your civilians, assasinate your leaders, SinkTheLifeboats, ShootTheMedicFirst, etc.

It might be tempting to think that a limited, tactical use of a nuclear weapon could turn the tide of a battle without provoking the full backlash and retaliation associated with an all-out strategic nuclear volley.

Remarkably for a game series whose world-building involves a significant amount of SchizoTech, and which at least in the first game was content to use Valkyria as PersonOfMassDestruction stand-ins or metaphors for nuclear weapons, the endgame of Valkyria Chronicles III introduces a refurbished LostSuperweapon called the Hammer of the Valkyrur which directly copies the form and function of a nuclear ICBM launch facility. Dahau believes he can use this weapon to create an independent Darcsen homeland: after he destroys the Gallian capital of Randgriz as a demonstration of its power, he intends to offer the technology to the Emperor in exchange for him granting statehood to the Darcsen people, and then threaten to destroy the Imperial capital of Schwartzgrad if the Emperor refuses.

The problem with the Hammer of the Valkyrur is that it's based out of only one large, above-ground missile silo. Because it's immobile, unconcealed, poorly fortified, and not part of a redundant network spread over a large area, it is highly vulnerable to a pre-emptive attack. An imperial force could just ride in and destroy the missile on the launchpad, especially if unlike the Nameless they were willing to risk blowing themselves up to stop the launch. Since there's only one launchpad for a whole magazine full of spires, only one missile at a time can be made ready, so the attacker can neutralize all the missiles at once just by capturing the launchpad. Even the spire's ability to bombard an area with energy projectiles turns out to be insufficient for area denial against ground troops.

In real life, nuclear weapons can be deployed in various ways in an attempt to prevent them from being neutralized by the enemy. Land-based strategic [=ICBMs=] are traditionally set up in underground silos where the launcher shaft containing each missile is protected by armored blast doors, which open when a missile is launched. Each missile gets its own silo, from which it can be launched at any time. Land-based silos were more effective back when a counter-force nuclear strike would have been fairly inaccurate, meaning they just had to survive a nearby detonation rather than a direct hit. Once it became possible to target ICBM silos with precision, the best defense was to get early warning of enemy missiles and launch one's own [=ICBMs=] before they could be destroyed in their silos. The alternative to hardening a stationary facility is to have mobile launch systems where the missiles can be kept moving around to make them harder for the enemy to find and target, namely by using tracked or wheeled transporter erector launcher (TEL) vehicles, nuclear missile trains, or nuclear ballistic missile submarines.

The problem with the Hammer of the Valkyrur is that it's based out of only one large, above-ground missile silo. Because it's immobile, unconcealed, poorly fortified, and not part of a redundant network spread over a large area, it is highly vulnerable to a pre-emptive attack. An imperial force could just ride in and destroy the missile on the launchpad, especially if unlike the Nameless they were willing to risk blowing themselves up to stop the launch. Since there's only one launchpad, only one missile at a time can be made ready, so the attacker can neutralize all the missiles at once just by capturing the launchpad. Even the spire's ability to bombard an area with energy projectiles turns out to be insufficient for area denial against ground troops.