This page has a serious (if exceedingly interesting) natter issue. Documenting it here for prosperity.
From the F-14 section:
The F-14 was HEAVILY crippled by cost overruns during its development cycle and Carter's Secretary of Defense wholesale budget-slashed the US Navy's development funding for the F-14 project. This meant that the Tomcat's original secondary ground-attack role was sidelined due to lack of funding. Also the plane's TF 30 turbofans were heavily unsuited for air-to-ground and the plane was slated to receive more powerful engines but never did until the F-14A+ and B variants were finally developed in the late 80's and the software developed for them to carry ground ordnance in the 90's. Keep in mind that the F-14 was derived from the TF-X project developed by Mc Namara and that one TF-X's requirement was that it be for all three fixed-wing aviation services (USAF, USMC, and USN), so it had to be able to carry bombs/ground ordnance, and that requirement was brought over to the F-14 once TF-X was deemed unworthy for US Navy service. The TF-X project eventually led to the development of the USAF's F/B-111 fighter-bomber.
From the Battlecruiser section:
In all fairness the battlecruisers of the Royal Navy never experienced the devastating effects of plunging overhead fire until Jutland in 1916. The German Navy experienced it early in the war at Dogger Bank in 1915 where it nearly lost SMS Seydlitz to the effect of plunging fire into a powder magazine and they developed not only effective solutions to such fire but also anti-flash precautions that kept the effects of such fire to a minimum. Two of the three British battlecruisers that experienced plunging fire that penetrated the barbette tops of their turrets (HMS Indefatigable, HMS Queen Mary) were sunk.
What also did not help the battlecruiser was the design philosophy that tended to armour the entire hull even up to the bows, even though the armour provided to these locations was spotty at best, and an unwillingness to concentrate guns in triple or (in the French case), quadruple gun turrets. Superfiring turrets were seen as potentially causing damage issues to the gun(s) below the superfiring turret, and so many WW 1 designs relied on a preponderance of turrets which required lengthening the hull to accommodate the 10, 12, and even 14 gun designs that came out of British and German shipyards from 1906-1918, and armour protection was degraded even further by a need to protect all these turrets.
Any WW 2 'superdreadnought' type capital ship would definitely count. Some of the bigger ones had 18" guns, similar thicknesses of composite side armour, displaced tens of thousands of tonnes, were 700ft or more long and yet still hit 30 knots and more, flat out.
In the battles of the two World Wars, the concept of the "Fast Battleship" emerged. Essentially a battleship-tier warship that had speed comparable to a cruiser, without undue compromise to protection and armament, they merged the strengths of the battleship and the battlecruiser while discarding the weaknesses of both types. One of the most triumphant (and the last) examples of this concept was the US Navy's Iowa-class battleships. After carrier power was proven in World War 2, the days of big gun battleships started to come to a close, and the Iowa-class was one of the last.
Found a Youtube Channel with political stances you want to share? Hop on over to this page and add them.
This page has a serious (if exceedingly interesting) natter issue. Documenting it here for prosperity.
From the F-14 section:
From the Battlecruiser section:
- In all fairness the battlecruisers of the Royal Navy never experienced the devastating effects of plunging overhead fire until Jutland in 1916. The German Navy experienced it early in the war at Dogger Bank in 1915 where it nearly lost SMS Seydlitz to the effect of plunging fire into a powder magazine and they developed not only effective solutions to such fire but also anti-flash precautions that kept the effects of such fire to a minimum. Two of the three British battlecruisers that experienced plunging fire that penetrated the barbette tops of their turrets (HMS Indefatigable, HMS Queen Mary) were sunk.
What also did not help the battlecruiser was the design philosophy that tended to armour the entire hull even up to the bows, even though the armour provided to these locations was spotty at best, and an unwillingness to concentrate guns in triple or (in the French case), quadruple gun turrets. Superfiring turrets were seen as potentially causing damage issues to the gun(s) below the superfiring turret, and so many WW 1 designs relied on a preponderance of turrets which required lengthening the hull to accommodate the 10, 12, and even 14 gun designs that came out of British and German shipyards from 1906-1918, and armour protection was degraded even further by a need to protect all these turrets.- Any WW 2 'superdreadnought' type capital ship would definitely count. Some of the bigger ones had 18" guns, similar thicknesses of composite side armour, displaced tens of thousands of tonnes, were 700ft or more long and yet still hit 30 knots and more, flat out.
- In the battles of the two World Wars, the concept of the "Fast Battleship" emerged. Essentially a battleship-tier warship that had speed comparable to a cruiser, without undue compromise to protection and armament, they merged the strengths of the battleship and the battlecruiser while discarding the weaknesses of both types. One of the most triumphant (and the last) examples of this concept was the US Navy's Iowa-class battleships. After carrier power was proven in World War 2, the days of big gun battleships started to come to a close, and the Iowa-class was one of the last.
Found a Youtube Channel with political stances you want to share? Hop on over to this page and add them.