History UsefulNotes / UltimateDefenceOfTheRealm

The three purpose-built "Harrier Carriers" that entered service in the 1980s- the first seeing service in the Falklands (just after it was proposed to be sold to Australia!). These vessels carried nuclear depth bombs until 1998 and used to carry Sea Dart SAM systems (also removed). Only the Illustrious is still in service, due for withdrawal in 2014.

These fighters, although still in Indian service, were retired from British service in 2006, it not being deemed cost-effective to upgrade for only six years' more service (i.e. until the YanksWithTanks finally delivered the F-35. Now that it's 2013 and the thing looks nowhere near getting off the ground, Parliament may be regretting this decision, as well as their rejection of the proposal for retrofitting the Sea Harriers' radar nosecones onto the Harrier GR.9 fleet). The remaining Harriers are of the GR.7/GR.9 variety.

Intended to be a silo-based deterrent for the UK, with a range of 3,700 kilometres/2,300 miles. Took half an hour to fuel, which with "four-minute warning" et. al, would have been a bit of a problem had it not been silo-based. Went way over budget, was politically unpopular (you have to remember the South-East of England is not Nebraska) and not supported by the services. Cancelled in 1960 before a full flight-test. Attempt to use it as part of a space launcher didn't work because the parts that weren't Blue Streak kept not working.

* You think "Chicken-powered nuclear land mine" is too silly to be an actual weapon? [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Peacock Blue Peacock]] consisted of a seven-ton tactical nuclear anti-tank mine, to be buried in northern Germany in the event of a land war against the Soviets. To keep the thing at a working temperature in the winter, the designers suggested sealing a live chicken in the case, with enough food and water to keep it alive for the week or so that the weapon would be viable. Fortunately, it never went into production over concerns of fallout and the apparent willingness to contaminate allied territory.

Since the British had already proven that they could and ''would'' pursue their own R&D of atomic and nuclear weapons, the USA resigned herself to the prospect of an atomic-armed Britain. Moreover, she reasoned that if she shared nuclear weapons R&D information with Britain then Britain would have far more money to spare for conventional weapons[[note]] nd particularly for the development and maintenance of an effective anti-submarine fleet for use in the Atlantic [[/note]]. The conclusions of the ''Strath'' Report of 1955 (official title ''THE DEFENCE IMPLICATIONS OF FALL-OUT FROM A HYDROGEN BOMB'')[[note]] [Assuming the use of ten ten-megaton hydrogen bombs, the minimum number the report thought needed to render the UK militarily useless in a war] Blast and heat would be the dominant hazard, accounting for more than '''9 million fatal casualties against less than 3 million fatal casualties from radiation''' [of a total UK population of 51 million]. [...] On the basis of an attack with ten bombs we also reckon that, in addition to casualties, a '''further 13 million people''' - many of them suffering from radiation sickness - would be '''pinned down in their houses or shelters for at least a week'''. Evacuation would increase this number. [...] It would be quite '''unrealistic to hope to maintain anything like normal medical standards''' [...] the '''chief difficulty would be to distinguish those who''', in addition to having received burns or other injuries, had also been exposed to a lethal dose of radiation and who '''would therefore ultimately die, and on whom it would be wasteful to expend scarce medical resources'''. [...] An attack upon the largest towns with ten hydrogen bombs would totally disrupt the industrial and commercial life of the country. Direct damage would be concentrated near the points of attack but these are likely to contain about one-third of the population and about half the industry. The normal communication and transport systems would come to a stop and the inability to move food, fuel, and material would also stop ordinary social and economic processes. The whole mechanism of money transactions would be disrupted. [...] Commercial stocks of food would suffer heavy loss. These losses would further deplete available supplies. In the period immediately after the attack the widespread contamination from fall-out would make internal '''distribution of whatever stocks were available virtually impossible''' in large parts of the country. People in areas of severe fall-out would, therefore, have to depend for a week or more on the food which they had stored in their shelters and homes at the time the bombs fell. [...] These considerations suggest that those who survive the attack would have to live for a '''considerable period under siege conditions''', and that the '''risk of starvation would be very real''' unless as substantial strategic reserve of food had been accumulated and distributed about the country in peace. It would, moreover, be essential that the '''Government should be in a position to take immediate and effective control over all food stocks and over their distribution'''. [...] The initial phase of attack would be succeeded by a critical period during which the surviving population would be struggling against disease, starvation, and the unimaginable psychological effects of nuclear bombardment. But provided what was left of the nation could get through that period and the survivors were able to devote their resources to the work of reorganising the country, they should eventually be able to produce a wide enough range of goods to meet ordinary civilian needs. The standard of living of the reduced population, althrough substantially lower than at present, would still be well above that of the greater part of the world. [...] there would be '''no hope of providing anything approaching peacetime standards of medical care''' [...] Research should be carried forward into methods of decontaminating water [even today there are no practical ones] [...] Plans should be made for the emergency distribution of limited supplies of drinking water pending the restoration of mains supplies [...] Plans should be prepared to enable the police and the courts to operate quickly and effectively under the conditions foreseen [...] In some parts of the country, particularly if several bombs fell in the same area, there '''might be complete chaos for a time and civil control would collapse'''. In such circumstances the '''local military commander would have to be prepared to take over''' from the civil authority responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and for the administration of Government. He would, if called upon, exercise his existing common-law powers to '''take whatever steps, however drastic, he considered necessary to restore order'''. [...] The '''ordinary machinery of the courts and prisons could not operate'''. Plans were made during the last war for '''"war zone courts" to function in areas which were involved in military operations'''. These plans should now be examined to see if a simple scheme could be worked out for the prompt dismissal of criminal cases. [[/note]], which were never released to the public for fear of massive panic and anti-nuclear sentiment, gave a particularly large incentive for Britain to develop nuclear weapons and systems of delivering them so that she might deter others from using nuclear weapons upon her.

-> ''The chief difficulty would be to distinguish those who, in addition to having received burns or other injuries, had also been exposed to a lethal dose of radiation and who would therefore ultimately die, and on whom it would be wasteful to expend scarce medical resources''.

Since the British had already proven that they could and ''would'' pursue their own R&D of atomic and nuclear weapons, the USA resigned herself to the prospect of an atomic-armed Britain. Moreover, she reasoned that if she shared nuclear weapons R&D information with Britain then Britain would have far more money to spare for conventional weapons[[note]] nd particularly for the development and maintenance of an effective anti-submarine fleet for use in the Atlantic [[/note]]. The conclusions of the ''Strath'' Report of 1955 (official title ''THE DEFENCE IMPLICATIONS OF FALL-OUT FROM A HYDROGEN BOMB'')[[note]] [Assuming the use of ten ten-megaton hydrogen bombs, the minimum number the report thought needed to render the UK militarily useless in a war] Blast and heat would be the dominant hazard, accounting for more than ''9 million fatal casualties against less than 3 million fatal casualties from radiation'' [of a total UK population of 51 million]. [...] On the basis of an attack with ten bombs we also reckon that, in addition to casualties, a '''further 13 million people''' - many of them suffering from radiation sickness - would be '''pinned down in their houses or shelters for at least a week'''. Evacuation would increase this number. [...] It would be quite '''unrealistic to hope to maintain anything like normal medical standards''' [...] the '''chief difficulty would be to distinguish those who'', in addition to having received burns or other injuries, had also been exposed to a lethal dose of radiation and who ''would therefore ultimately die, and on whom it would be wasteful to expend scarce medical resources'''. [...] An attack upon the largest towns with ten hydrogen bombs would totally disrupt the industrial and commercial life of the country. Direct damage would be concentrated near the points of attack but these are likely to contain about one-third of the population and about half the industry. The normal communication and transport systems would come to a stop and the inability to move food, fuel, and material would also stop ordinary social and economic processes. The whole mechanism of money transactions would be disrupted. [...] Commercial stocks of food would suffer heavy loss. These losses would further deplete available supplies. In the period immediately after the attack the widespread contamination from fall-out would make internal '''distribution of whatever stocks were available virtually impossible''' in large parts of the country. People in areas of severe fall-out would, therefore, have to depend for a week or more on the food which they had stored in their shelters and homes at the time the bombs fell. [...] These considerations suggest that those who survive the attack would have to live for a '''considerable period under siege conditions''', and that the '''risk of starvation would be very real''' unless as substantial strategic reserve of food had been accumulated and distributed about the country in peace. It would, moreover, be essential that the '''Government should be in a position to take immediate and effective control over all food stocks and over their distribution'''. [...] The initial phase of attack would be succeeded by a critical period during which the surviving population would be struggling against disease, starvation, and the unimaginable psychological effects of nuclear bombardment. But provided what was left of the nation could get through that period and the survivors were able to devote their resources to the work of reorganising the country, they should eventually be able to produce a wide enough range of goods to meet ordinary civilian needs. The standard of living of the reduced population, althrough substantially lower than at present, would still be well above that of the greater part of the world. [...] there would be '''no hope of providing anything approaching peacetime standards of medical care''' [...] Research should be carried forward into methods of decontaminating water [even today there are no practical ones] [...] Plans should be made for the emergency distribution of limited supplies of drinking water pending the restoration of mains supplies [...] Plans should be prepared to enable the police and the courts to operate quickly and effectively under the conditions foreseen [...] In some parts of the country, particularly if several bombs fell in the same area, there '''might be complete chaos for a time and civil control would collapse'''. In such circumstances the '''local military commander would have to be prepared to take over''' from the civil authority responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and for the administration of Government. He would, if called upon, exercise his existing common-law powers to '''take whatever steps, however drastic, he considered necessary to restore order'''. [...] The '''ordinary machinery of the courts and prisons could not operate'''. Plans were made during the last war for '''"war zone courts" to function in areas which were involved in military operations'''. These plans should now be examined to see if a simple scheme could be worked out for the prompt dismissal of criminal cases. [[/note]], which were never released to the public for fear of massive panic and anti-nuclear sentiment, gave a particularly large incentive for Britain to develop nuclear weapons and systems of delivering them so that she might deter others from using nuclear weapons upon her.

Since the British had already proven that they could and ''would'' pursue their own R&D of atomic and nuclear weapons, the USA resigned herself to the prospect of an atomic-armed Britain. Moreover, she reasoned that if she shared nuclear weapons R&D information with Britain then Britain would have far more money to spare for conventional weapons[[note]] nd particularly for the development and maintenance of an effective anti-submarine fleet for use in the Atlantic [[/note]]. The conclusions of the ''Strath'' Report of 1955 (official title ''THE DEFENCE IMPLICATIONS OF FALL-OUT FROM A HYDROGEN BOMB'')[[note]] [Assuming the use of ten ten-megaton hydrogen bombs, the minimum number the report thought needed to render the UK militarily useless in a war] Blast and heat would be the dominant hazard, accounting for more than 9 million fatal casualties against less than 3 million fatal casualties from radiation [of a total UK population of 51 million]. [...] On the basis of an attack with ten bombs we also reckon that, in addition to casualties, a '''further 13 million people''' - many of them suffering from radiation sickness - would be '''pinned down in their houses or shelters for at least a week'''. Evacuation would increase this number. [...] It would be quite '''unrealistic to hope to maintain anything like normal medical standards''' [...] the '''chief difficulty would be to distinguish those who, in addition to having received burns or other injuries, had also been exposed to a lethal dose of radiation and who would therefore ultimately die, and on whom it would be wasteful to expend scarce medical resources'''. [...] An attack upon the largest towns with ten hydrogen bombs would totally disrupt the industrial and commercial life of the country. Direct damage would be concentrated near the points of attack but these are likely to contain about one-third of the population and about half the industry. The normal communication and transport systems would come to a stop and the inability to move food, fuel, and material would also stop ordinary social and economic processes. The whole mechanism of money transactions would be disrupted. [...] Commercial stocks of food would suffer heavy loss. These losses would further deplete available supplies. In the period immediately after the attack the widespread contamination from fall-out would make internal '''distribution of whatever stocks were available virtually impossible''' in large parts of the country. People in areas of severe fall-out would, therefore, have to depend for a week or more on the food which they had stored in their shelters and homes at the time the bombs fell. [...] These considerations suggest that those who survive the attack would have to live for a '''considerable period under siege conditions''', and that the '''risk of starvation would be very real''' unless as substantial strategic reserve of food had been accumulated and distributed about the country in peace. It would, moreover, be essential that the '''Government should be in a position to take immediate and effective control over all food stocks and over their distribution'''. [...] The initial phase of attack would be succeeded by a critical period during which the surviving population would be struggling against disease, starvation, and the unimaginable psychological effects of nuclear bombardment. But provided what was left of the nation could get through that period and the survivors were able to devote their resources to the work of reorganising the country, they should eventually be able to produce a wide enough range of goods to meet ordinary civilian needs. The standard of living of the reduced population, althrough substantially lower than at present, would still be well above that of the greater part of the world. [...] there would be '''no hope of providing anything approaching peacetime standards of medical care''' [...] Research should be carried forward into methods of decontaminating water [even today there are no practical ones] [...] Plans should be made for the emergency distribution of limited supplies of drinking water pending the restoration of mains supplies [...] Plans should be prepared to enable the police and the courts to operate quickly and effectively under the conditions foreseen [...] In some parts of the country, particularly if several bombs fell in the same area, there '''might be complete chaos for a time and civil control would collapse'''. In such circumstances the '''local military commander would have to be prepared to take over''' from the civil authority responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and for the administration of Government. He would, if called upon, exercise his existing common-law powers to '''take whatever steps, however drastic, he considered necessary to restore order'''. [...] The '''ordinary machinery of the courts and prisons could not operate'''. Plans were made during the last war for '''"war zone courts" to function in areas which were involved in military operations'''. These plans should now be examined to see if a simple scheme could be worked out for the prompt dismissal of criminal cases. [[/note]], which were never released to the public for fear of massive panic and anti-nuclear sentiment, gave a particularly large incentive for Britain to develop nuclear weapons and systems of delivering them so that she might deter others from using nuclear weapons upon her.

-->-- 11/3/1955 Cabinet Home Defence Committeeon report by '''a Group of Officials''': THE DEFENCE IMPLICATIONS OF FALL-OUT FROM A HYDROGEN BOMB

-> ''The chief difficulty would be to distinguish those who, in addition to having received burns or other injuries, had also been exposed to a lethal does of radiation and who would therefore ultimately die, and on whom it would be wasteful to expend scarce medical resources''.

Since the British had already proven that they could and ''would'' pursue their own R&D of atomic and nuclear weapons, the USA resigned herself to the prospect of an atomic-armed Britain. Moreover, she reasoned that if she shared nuclear weapons R&D information with Britain then Britain would have far more money to spare for conventional weapons[[note]] nd particularly for the development and maintenance of an effective anti-submarine fleet for use in the Atlantic [[/note]]. The conclusions of the ''Strath'' Report of 1955 (official title ''THE DEFENCE IMPLICATIONS OF FALL-OUT FROM A HYDROGEN BOMB'')[[note]] [Assuming the use of ten ten-megaton hydrogen bombs, the minimum number the report thought needed to render the UK militarily useless in a war] Blast and heat would be the dominant hazard, accounting for more than 9 million fatal casualties against less than 3 million fatal casualties from radiation [of a total UK population of 51 million]. [...] On the basis of an attack with ten bombs we also reckon that, in addition to casualties, a '''further 13 million people''' - many of them suffering from radiation sickness - would be '''pinned down in their houses or shelters for at least a week'''. Evacuation would increase this number. [...] It would be quite '''unrealistic to hope to maintain anything like normal medical standards''' [...] the '''chief difficulty would be to distinguish those who, in addition to having received burns or other injuries, had also been exposed to a lethal does of radiation and who would therefore ultimately die, and on whom it would be wasteful to expend scarce medical resources'''. [...] An attack upon the largest towns with ten hydrogen bombs would totally disrupt the industrial and commercial life of the country. Direct damage would be concentrated near the points of attack but these are likely to contain about one-third of the population and about half the industry. The normal communication and transport systems would come to a stop and the inability to move food, fuel, and material would also stop ordinary social and economic processes. The whole mechanism of money transactions would be disrupted. [...] Commercial stocks of food would suffer heavy loss. These losses would further deplete available supplies. In the period immediately after the attack the widespread contamination from fall-out would make internal '''distribution of whatever stocks were available virtually impossible''' in large parts of the country. People in areas of severe fall-out would, therefore, have to depend for a week or more on the food which they had stored in their shelters and homes at the time the bombs fell. [...] These considerations suggest that those who survive the attack would have to live for a '''considerable period under siege conditions''', and that the '''risk of starvation would be very real''' unless as substantial strategic reserve of food had been accumulated and distributed about the country in peace. It would, moreover, be essential that the '''Government should be in a position to take immediate and effective control over all food stocks and over their distribution'''. [...] The initial phase of attack would be succeeded by a critical period during which the surviving population would be struggling against disease, starvation, and the unimaginable psychological effects of nuclear bombardment. But provided what was left of the nation could get through that period and the survivors were able to devote their resources to the work of reorganising the country, they should eventually be able to produce a wide enough range of goods to meet ordinary civilian needs. The standard of living of the reduced population, althrough substantially lower than at present, would still be well above that of the greater part of the world. [...] there would be '''no hope of providing anything approaching peacetime standards of medical care''' [...] Research should be carried forward into methods of decontaminating water [even today there are no practical ones] [...] Plans should be made for the emergency distribution of limited supplies of drinking water pending the restoration of mains supplies [...] Plans should be prepared to enable the police and the courts to operate quickly and effectively under the conditions foreseen [...] In some parts of the country, particularly if several bombs fell in the same area, there '''might be complete chaos for a time and civil control would collapse'''. In such circumstances the '''local military commander would have to be prepared to take over''' from the civil authority responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and for the administration of Government. He would, if called upon, exercise his existing common-law powers to '''take whatever steps, however drastic, he considered necessary to restore order'''. [...] The '''ordinary machinery of the courts and prisons could not operate'''. Plans were made during the last war for '''"war zone courts" to function in areas which were involved in military operations'''. These plans should now be examined to see if a simple scheme could be worked out for the prompt dismissal of criminal cases. [[/note]], which were never released to the public for fear of massive panic and anti-nuclear sentiment, gave a particularly large incentive for Britain to develop nuclear weapons and systems of delivering them so that she might deter others from using nuclear weapons upon her.

-->-- 11/3/1955 Cabinet Home Defence Committeeon rport by '''a Group of Officials''': THE DEFENCE IMPLICATIONS OF FALL-OUT FROM A HYDROGEN BOMB

-> Blast and heat would be the dominant hazard, accounting for more than 9 million fatal casualties against less than 3 million fatal casualties from radiation [...] On the basis of an attack with ten bombs we also reckon that, in addition to casualties, a further 13 million people - many of them suffering from radiation sickness - would be pinned down in their houses or shelters for at least a week. [[ColdEquation Evacuation would increase]] [[NiceJobBreakingItHero this number]].
-->-- An ''extremely'' optimistic estimate presented to the Cabinet Home Defence Committeeon 11/3/1955 by '''a Group of Officials'''[[note]] Like most assessments made before the late '70s it takes no account of the colossal firestorms which would immolate the targeted cities, killing millions more. The report also only covers an attack in which the ''absolute minimum'' number of weapons necessary to take Britain out of the war are used, something unlikely in an opponent that likes to be sure about these sorts of things. Report Title: THE DEFENCE IMPLICATIONS OF FALL-OUT FROM A HYDROGEN BOMB. Also known as 'The Strath Report'. [[/note]]

Since the British had already proven that they could and ''would'' pursue their own R&D of atomic and nuclear weapons, the USA resigned herself to the prospect of an atomic-armed Britain. Moreover, she reasoned that if she shared nuclear weapons R&D information with Britain then Britain would have far more money to spare for conventional weapons[[note]] nd particularly for the development and maintenance of an effective anti-submarine fleet for use in the Atlantic [[/note]]. The conclusions of the ''Strath'' Report of 1955 (official title ''THE DEFENCE IMPLICATIONS OF FALL-OUT FROM A HYDROGEN BOMB'')[[note]] [Assuming the use of ten ten-megaton hydrogen bombs, the minimum number the report thought needed to render the UK militarily useless in a war] Blast and heat would be the dominant hazard, accounting for more than 9 million fatal casualties against less than 3 million fatal casualties from radiation [of a total UK population of 51 million]. [...] On the basis of an attack with ten bombs we also reckon that, in addition to casualties, a '''further 13 million people''' - many of them suffering from radiation sickness - would be '''pinned down in their houses or shelters for at least a week'''. Evacuation would increase this number. [...] It would be quite '''unrealistic to hope to maintain anything like normal medical standards''' [...] the '''chief difficulty would be to distinguish those who, in addition to having received burns or other injuries, had also been exposed to a lethal does of radiation and who would therefore ultimately die, and on whom it would be wasteful to expend scarce medical resources'''. [...] An attack upon the largest towns with ten hydrogen bombs would totally disrupt the industrial and commercial life of the country. Direct damage would be concentrated near the points of attack but these are likely to contain about one-third of the population and about half the industry. The normal communication and transport systems would come to a stop and the inability to move food, fuel, and material would also stop ordinary social and economic processes. The whole mechanism of money transactions would be disrupted. [...] Commercial stocks of food would suffer heavy loss. These losses would further deplete available supplies. In the period immediately after the attack the widespread contamination from fall-out would make internal '''distribution of whatever stocks were available virtually impossible''' in large parts of the country. People in areas of severe fall-out would, therefore, have to depend for a week or more on the food which they had stored in their shelters and homes at the time the bombs fell. [...] These considerations suggest that those who survive the attack would have to live for a '''considerable period under siege conditions''', and that the '''risk of starvation would be very real''' unless as substantial strategic reserve of food had been accumulated and distributed about the country in peace. It would, moreover, be essential that the '''Government should be in a position to take immediate and effective control over all food stocks and over their distribution'''. [...] The initial phase of attack would be succeeded by a critical period during which the surviving population would be struggling against disease, starvation, and the unimaginable psychological effects of nuclear bombardment. But provided what was left of the nation could get through that period and the survivors were able to devote their resources to the work of reorganising the country, they should eventually be able to produce a wide enough range of goods to meet ordinary civilian needs. The standard of living of the reduced population, althrough substantially lower than at present, would still be well above that of the greater part of the world. [...] there would be no hope of providing anything approaching peacetime standards of medical care''' [...] Research should be carried forward into methods of decontaminating water [even today there are '''no practical ones] [...] Plans should be made for the emergency distribution of limited supplies of drinking water pending the restoration of mains supplies [...] Plans should be prepared to enable the police and the courts to operate quickly and effectively under the conditions foreseen [...] In some parts of the country, particularly if several bombs fell in the same area, there '''might be complete chaos for a time and civil control would collapse'''. In such circumstances the '''local military commander would have to be prepared to take over''' from the civil authority responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and for the administration of Government. He would, if called upon, exercise his existing common-law powers to '''take whatever steps, however drastic, he considered necessary to restore order'''. [...] The '''ordinary machinery of the courts and prisons could not operate'''. Plans were made during the last war for '''"war zone courts" to function in areas which were involved in military operations'''. These plans should now be examined to see if a simple scheme could be worked out for the prompt dismissal of criminal cases. [[/note]], which were never released to the public for fear of massive panic and anti-nuclear sentiment, gave a particularly large incentive for Britain to develop nuclear weapons and systems of delivering them so that she might deter others from using nuclear weapons upon her.

Since the British had already proven that they could and ''would'' pursue their own R&D of atomic and nuclear weapons, the USA resigned herself to the prospect of an atomic-armed Britain. Moreover, she reasoned that if she shared nuclear weapons R&D information with Britain then Britain would have far more money to spare for conventional weapons[[note]] nd particularly for the development and maintenance of an effective anti-submarine fleet for use in the Atlantic [[/note]]. The conclusions of the ''Strath'' Report of 1955 (official title ''THE DEFENCE IMPLICATIONS OF FALL-OUT FROM A HYDROGEN BOMB'')[[note]] [Assuming the use of ten ten-megaton hydrogen bombs, the minimum number the report thought needed to render the UK militarily useless in a war] Blast and heat would be the dominant hazard, accounting for more than 9 million fatal casualties''' against less than 3 million fatal casualties from radiation [of a total UK population of 51 million]. [...] On the basis of an attack with ten bombs we also reckon that, in addition to casualties, a '''further 13 million people''' - many of them suffering from radiation sickness - would be '''pinned down in their houses or shelters for at least a week'''. Evacuation would increase this number. [...] It would be quite '''unrealistic to hope to maintain anything like normal medical standards''' [...] the '''chief difficulty would be to distinguish those who, in addition to having received burns or other injuries, had also been exposed to a lethal does of radiation and who would therefore ultimately die, and on whom it would be wasteful to expend scarce medical resources'''. [...] An attack upon the largest towns with ten hydrogen bombs would totally disrupt the industrial and commercial life of the country. Direct damage would be concentrated near the points of attack but these are likely to contain about one-third of the population and about half the industry. The normal communication and transport systems would come to a stop and the inability to move food, fuel, and material would also stop ordinary social and economic processes. The whole mechanism of money transactions would be disrupted. [...] Commercial stocks of food would suffer heavy loss. These losses would further deplete available supplies. In the period immediately after the attack the widespread contamination from fall-out would make internal '''distribution of whatever stocks were available virtually impossible''' in large parts of the country. People in areas of severe fall-out would, therefore, have to depend for a week or more on the food which they had stored in their shelters and homes at the time the bombs fell. [...] These considerations suggest that those who survive the attack would have to live for a '''considerable period under siege conditions''', and that the '''risk of starvation would be very real''' unless as substantial strategic reserve of food had been accumulated and distributed about the country in peace. It would, moreover, be essential that the '''Government should be in a position to take immediate and effective control over all food stocks and over their distribution'''. [...] The initial phase of attack would be succeeded by a critical period during which the surviving population would be struggling against disease, starvation, and the unimaginable psychological effects of nuclear bombardment. But provided what was left of the nation could get through that period and the survivors were able to devote their resources to the work of reorganising the country, they should eventually be able to produce a wide enough range of goods to meet ordinary civilian needs. The standard of living of the reduced population, althrough substantially lower than at present, would still be well above that of the greater part of the world. [...] there would be no hope of providing anything approaching peacetime standards of medical care''' [...] Research should be carried forward into methods of decontaminating water [even today there are '''no practical ones] [...] Plans should be made for the emergency distribution of limited supplies of drinking water pending the restoration of mains supplies [...] Plans should be prepared to enable the police and the courts to operate quickly and effectively under the conditions foreseen [...] In some parts of the country, particularly if several bombs fell in the same area, there '''might be complete chaos for a time and civil control would collapse'''. In such circumstances the '''local military commander would have to be prepared to take over''' from the civil authority responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and for the administration of Government. He would, if called upon, exercise his existing common-law powers to '''take whatever steps, however drastic, he considered necessary to restore order'''. [...] The '''ordinary machinery of the courts and prisons could not operate'''. Plans were made during the last war for '''"war zone courts" to function in areas which were involved in military operations'''. These plans should now be examined to see if a simple scheme could be worked out for the prompt dismissal of criminal cases. [[/note]], which were never released to the public for fear of massive panic and anti-nuclear sentiment, gave a particularly large incentive for Britain to develop nuclear weapons and systems of delivering them so that she might deter others from using nuclear weapons upon her.

Since the British had already proven that they could and ''would'' pursue their own R&D of atomic and nuclear weapons, the USA resigned herself to the prospect of an atomic-armed Britain. Moreover, she reasoned that if she shared nuclear weapons R&D information with Britain then Britain would have far more money to spare for conventional weapons[[note]] nd particularly for the development and maintenance of an effective anti-submarine fleet for use in the Atlantic [[/note]]. The conclusions of the ''Strath'' Report of 1955 (official title ''THE DEFENCE IMPLICATIONS OF FALL-OUT FROM A HYDROGEN BOMB'')[[note]] [Assuming the use of ten ten-megaton hydrogen bombs, the minimum number the report thought needed to render the UK militarily useless in a war] Blast and heat would be the dominant hazard, accounting for more than 9 million fatal casualties against less than 3 million fatal casualties from radiation [of a total UK population of 51 million]. [...] On the basis of an attack with ten bombs we also reckon that, in addition to casualties, a further 13 million people - many of them suffering from radiation sickness - would be pinned down in their houses or shelters for at least a week. Evacuation would increase this number. [...] It would be quite unrealistic to hope to maintain anything like normal medical standards [...] the chief difficulty would be to distinguish those who, in addition to having received burns or other injuries, had also been exposed to a lethal does of radiation and who would therefore ultimately die, and on whom it would be wasteful to expend scarce medical resources. [...] An attack upon the largest towns with ten hydrogen bombs would totally disrupt the industrial and commercial life of the country. Direct damage would be concentrated near the points of attack but these are likely to contain about one-third of the population and about half the industry. The normal communication and transport systems would come to a stop and the inability to move food, fuel, and material would also stop ordinary social and economic processes. The whole mechanism of money transactions would be disrupted. [...] Commercial stocks of food would suffer heavy loss. These losses would further deplete available supplies. In the period immediately after the attack the widespread contamination from fall-out would make internal distribution of whatever stocks were available virtually impossible in large parts of the country. People in areas of severe fall-out would, therefore, have to depend for a week or more on the food which they had stored in their shelters and homes at the time the bombs fell. [...] These considerations suggest that those who survive the attack would have to live for a considerable period under siege conditions, and that the risk of starvation would be very real unless as substantial strategic reserve of food had been accumulated and distributed about the country in peace. It would, moreover, be essential that the Government should be in a position to take immediate and effective control over all food stocks and over their distribution. [...] The initial phase of attack would be succeeded by a critical period during which the surviving population would be struggling against disease, starvation, and the unimaginable psychological effects of nuclear bombardment. But provided what was left of the nation could get through that period and the survivors were able to devote their resources to the work of reorganising the country, they should eventually be able to produce a wide enough range of goods to meet ordinary civilian needs. The standard of living of the reduced population, althrough substantially lower than at present, would still be well above that of the greater part of the world. [...] there would be no hope of providing anything approaching peacetime standards of medical care [...] Research should be carried forward into methods of decontaminating water [even today there are no practical ones] [...] Plans should be made for the emergency distribution of limited supplies of drinking water pending the restoration of mains supplies [...] Plans should be prepared to enable the police and the courts to operate quickly and effectively under the conditions foreseen [...] In some parts of the country, particularly if several bombs fell in the same area, there might be complete chaos for a time and civil control would collapse. In such circumstances the local military commander would have to be prepared to take over from the civil authority responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and for the administration of Government. He would, if called upon, exerce his existing common-law powers to take whatever steps, however drastic, he considered necessary to restore order. [...] The ordinary machinery of the courts and prisons could not operate. Plans were made during the last war for "war zone courts" to function in areas which were involved in military operations. These plans should now be examined to see if a simple scheme could be worked out for the prompt dismissal of criminal cases. [[/note]], which were never released to the public for fear of massive panic and anti-nuclear sentiment, gave a particularly large incentive for Britain to develop nuclear weapons and systems of delivering them so that she might deter others from using nuclear weapons upon her.

-->-- An ''extremely'' optimistic estimate presented to the Cabinet Home Defence Committeeon 11/3/1955 by '''a Group of Officials'''[[note]] Report Title: THE DEFENCE IMPLICATIONS OF FALL-OUT FROM A HYDROGEN BOMB. Also known as 'The Strath Report'. [[/note]]

-> Blast and heat would be the dominant hazard, accounting for more than 9 million fatal casualties against less than 3 million fatal casualties from radiation [...] On the basis of an attack with ten bombs we also reckon that, in addition to casualties, a further 13 million people - many of them suffering from radiation sickness - would be pinned down in their houses or shelters for at least a week. [[NiceJobBreakingItHero Evacuation would increase this number]].

->On the basis of an attack with ten bombs we also reckon that, in addition to casualties, a further 13 million people - many of them suffering from radiation sickness - would be pinned down in their houses or shelters for at least a week. [[NiceJobBreakingItHero Evacuation would increase this number]].

Despite the critical contribution of many British scientists to the USA's ''Manhattan Project'' to develop atomic weapons during WorldWarTwo, the United Kingdom was refused US technical to develop their own atomic weapons after WorldWarTwo as the USA wanted to maintain a monopoly on atomic weaponry. In order to shore up Britain's Great Power status, Clement Attlee and Winston Churchill's governments recognised the need to continue substituting military for economic power; Britain had not had the largest economy of the Great Powers since the 1890s (having surpassed the Empire of the Qing in the 1850s), but she had nonetheless continued to play a significant role on the world stage by virtue of her fleet and alliance with France. Despite being totally broke after the debts of the war and the colossal costs of establishing a modern 'Welfare State', Britain pursued her own atomic bomb project alone (not even collaborating with the French!) and at great cost. She managed to detonate her first atomic bomb in the Australian state of Western Australia in 1952, but by that time the USA had already developed 'nuclear' weapons and in 1954 the USA detonated her first 'hydrogen' thermonuclear device (the latter being several thousand times more powerful again than a roughly equivalent atomic weapon).

Despite the critical contribution of many British scientists to the USA's ''Manhattan Project'' to develop atomic weapons during WorldWarTwo, the United Kingdom was refused US technical to develop their own atomic weapons after WorldWarTwo as the USA wanted to maintain a monopoly on atomic weaponry. In order to shore up Britain's Great Power status, Clement Attlee and Winston Churchill's governments recognised the need to continue substituting military for economic power; Britain had not had the largest economy of the Great Powers since the 1890s (and before that, the 1850s), but she had nonetheless continued to play a significant role on the world stage by virtue of her fleet and alliance with France. Despite being totally broke after the debts of the war and the colossal costs of establishing a modern 'Welfare State', Britain pursued her own atomic bomb project alone (not even collaborating with the French!) and at great cost. She managed to detonate her first atomic bomb in the Australian state of Western Australia in 1952, but by that time the USA had already developed 'nuclear' weapons and in 1954 the USA detonated her first 'hydrogen' thermonuclear device (the latter being several thousand times more powerful again than a roughly equivalent atomic weapon).

Since the British had already proven that they could and ''would'' pursue their own R&D of atomic and nuclear weapons, the USA resigned herself to the prospect of an atomic-armed Britain. Moreover, she reasoned that if she shared nuclear weapons R&D information with Britain then Britain would have far more money to spare for conventional weapons[[note]] nd particularly for the development and maintenance of an effective anti-submarine fleet for use in the Atlantic [[/note]]. The conclusions of the ''Strath'' Report of 1955 (official title ''THE DEFENCE IMPLICATIONS OF FALL-OUT FROM A HYDROGEN BOMB'')[[note]] [Assuming the use of ten ten-megaton hydrogen bombs, the minimum number the report thought needed to render the UK militarily useless in a war] Blast and heat would be the dominant hazard, accounting for more than 9 million fatal casualties against less than 3 million fatal casualties from radiation [of a total UK population of 51 million]. [...] On the basis of an attack with ten bombs we also reckon that, in addition to casualties, a further 13 million people - many of them suffering from radiation sickness - would be pinned down in their houses or shelters for at least a week. Evacuation would increase this number. [...] It would be quite unrealistic to hope to maintain anything like normal medical standards [...] the chief difficulty would be to distinguish those who, in addition to having received burns or other injuries, had also been exposed to a lethal does of radiation and who would therefore ultimately die, and on whom it would be wasteful to expend scarce medical resources. [...] An attack upon the largest towns with ten hydrogen bombs would totally disrupt the industrial and commercial life of the country. Direct damage would be concentrated near the points of attack but these are likely to contain about one-third of the population and about half the industry. The normal communication and transport systems would come to a stop and the inability to move food, fuel, and material would also stop ordinary social and economic processes. The whole mechanism of money transactions would be disrupted. [...] Commercial stocks of food would suffer heavy loss. These losses would further deplete available supplies. In the period immediately after the attack the widespread contamination from fall-out would make internal distribution of whatever stocks were available virtually impossible in large parts of the country. People in areas of severe fall-out would, therefore, have to depend for a week or more on the food which they had stored in their shelters and homes at the time the bombs fell. [...] These considerations suggest that those who survive the attack would have to live for a considerable period under siege conditions, and that the risk of starvation would be very real unless as substantial strategic reserve of food had been accumulated and distributed about the country in peace. It would, moreover, be essential that the Government should be in a position to take immediate and effective control over all food stocks and over their distribution. [...] The initial phase of attack would be succeeded by a critical period during which the surviving population would be struggling against disease, starvation, and the unimaginable psychological effects of nuclear bombardment. But provided what was left of the nation could get through that period and the survivors were able to devote their resources to the work of reorganising the country, they should eventually be able to produce a wide enough range of goods to meet ordinary civilian needs. The standard of living of the reduced population, althrough substantially lower than at present, would still be well above that of the greater part of the world. [...] there would be no hope of providing anything approaching peacetime standards of medical care [...] Plans should be laid for immediate and effective control over all food stocks and their distribution under the siege conditions which might prevail for a long time [...] Research should be carried forward into methods of decontaminating water [even today there are no practical ones] [...] Plans should be made for the emergency distribution of limited supplies of drinking water pending the restoration of mains supplies [...] Plans should be prepared to enable the police and the courts to operate quickly and effectively under the conditions foreseen [...] In some parts of the country, particularly if several bombs fell in the same area, there might be complete chaos for a time and civil control would collapse. In such circumstances the local military commander would have to be prepared to take over from the civil authority responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and for the administration of Government. He would, if called upon, exercising his existing common-law powers to take whatever steps, however drastic, he considered necessary to restore order. [...] The ordinary machinery of the courts and prisons could not operate. Plans were made during the last war for "war zone courts" to function in areas which were involved in military operations. These plans should now be examined to see if a simple scheme could be worked out for the prompt dismissal of criminal cases. [[/note]], which were never released to the public for fear of massive panic and anti-nuclear sentiment, gave a particularly large incentive for Britain to develop nuclear weapons and systems of delivering them so that she might deter others from using nuclear weapons upon her.

Since the British had already proven that they could and ''would'' pursue their own R&D of atomic and nuclear weapons, the USA resigned herself to the prospect of an atomic-armed Britain. Moreover, she reasoned that if she shared nuclear weapons R&D information with Britain then Britain would have far more money to spare for conventional weapons[[note]] nd particularly for the development and maintenance of an effective anti-submarine fleet for use in the Atlantic [[/note]]. The conclusions of the ''Strath'' Report of 1955 (official title ''THE DEFENCE IMPLICATIONS OF FALL-OUT FROM A HYDROGEN BOMB'')[[note]] [Assuming the use of ten ten-megaton hydrogen bombs, the minimum number the report thought needed to render the UK militarily useless in a war] Blast and heat would be the dominant hazard, accounting for more than 9 million fatal casualties against less than 3 million fatal casualties from radiation [of a total UK population of 51 million]. [...] On the basis of an attack with ten bombs we also reckon that, in addition to casualties, a further 13 million people - many of them suffering from radiation sickness - would be pinned down in their houses or shelters for at least a week. Evacuation would increase this number. [...] It would be quite unrealistic to hope to maintain anything like normal medical standards [...] the chief difficulty would be to distinguish those who, in addition to having received burns or other injuries, had also been exposed to a lethal does of radiation and who would therefore ultimately die, and on whom it would be wasteful to expend scarce medical resources. [...] An attack upon the largest towns with ten hydrogen bombs would totally disrupt the industrial and commercial life of the country. Direct damage would be concentrated near the points of attack but these are likely to contain about one-third of the population and about half the industry. The normal communication and transport systems would come to a stop and the inability to move food, fuel, and material would also stop ordinary social and economic processes. The whole mechanism of money transactions would be disrupted. [...] With home agricultural production drastically curtailed there would be serious difficulty in maintaining adequate food supplies [...] The initial phase of attack would be succeeded by a critical period during which the surviving population would be struggling against disease, starvation, and the unimaginable psychological effects of nuclear bombardment. But provided what was left of the nation could get through that period and the survivors were able to devote their resources to the work of reorganising the country, they should eventually be able to produce a wide enough range of goods to meet ordinary civilian needs. The standard of living of the reduced population, althrough substantially lower than at present, would still be well above that of the greater part of the world. [...] there would be no hope of providing anything approaching peacetime standards of medical care [...] Plans should be laid for immediate and effective control over all food stocks and their distribution under the siege conditions which might prevail for a long time [...] Research should be carried forward into methods of decontaminating water [even today there are no practical ones] [...] Plans should be made for the emergency distribution of limited supplies of drinking water pending the restoration of mains supplies [...] Plans should be prepared to enable the police and the courts to operate quickly and effectively under the conditions foreseen [...] In some parts of the country, particularly if several bombs fell in the same area, there might be complete chaos for a time and civil control would collapse. In such circumstances the local military commander would have to be prepared to take over from the civil authority responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and for the administration of Government. He would, if called upon, exercising his existing common-law powers to take whatever steps, however drastic, he considered necessary to restore order. [...] The ordinary machinery of the courts and prisons could not operate. Plans were made during the last war for "war zone courts" to function in areas which were involved in military operations. These plans should now be examined to see if a simple scheme could be worked out for the prompt dismissal of criminal cases. [[/note]], which were never released to the public for fear of massive panic and anti-nuclear sentiment, gave a particularly large incentive for Britain to develop nuclear weapons and systems of delivering them so that she might deter others from using nuclear weapons upon her.

Since the British had already proven that they could and ''would'' pursue their own R&D of atomic and nuclear weapons, the USA resigned herself to the prospect of an atomic-armed Britain. Moreover, she reasoned that if she shared nuclear weapons R&D information with Britain then Britain would have far more money to spare for conventional weapons[[note]] nd particularly for the development and maintenance of an effective anti-submarine fleet for use in the Atlantic [[/note]]. The conclusions of the ''Strath'' Report of 1955 (official title ''THE DEFENCE IMPLICATIONS OF FALL-OUT FROM A HYDROGEN BOMB'')[[note]] [Assuming the use of ten ten-megaton hydrogen bombs, the minimum number the report thought needed to render the UK militarily useless in a war] Blast and heat would be the dominant hazard, accounting for more than 9 million fatal casualties against less than 3 million fatal casualties from radiation [of a total UK population of 51 million]. [...] On the basis of an attack with ten bombs we also reckon that, in addition to casualties, a further 13 million people - many of them suffering from radiation sickness - would be pinned down in their houses or shelters for at least a week. Evacuation would increase this number. [...] It would be quite unrealistic to hope to maintain anything like normal medical standards [...] the chief difficulty would be to distinguish those who, in addition to having received burns or other injuries, had also been exposed to a lethal does of radiation and who would therefore ultimately die, and on whom it would be wasteful to expend scarce medical resources. [...] The United Kingdom economy is a complex and highly integrated system dependent on rapid commmunications and transport. An attack upon the largest towns with ten hydrogen bombs would totally disrupt the industrial and commercial life of the country. Direct damage would be concetrated near the points of attack but these are likely to contain about one-third of the population and about half the industry. The normal communication and transport systems would come to a stop and the inability to move food, fuel, and material would also stop ordinary social and economic processes. The whole mechanism of money transactions would be disrupted. [...] With home agricultural production drastically curtailed there would be serious difficulty in maintaining adequate food supplies [...] The initial phase of attack would be succeeded by a critical period during which the surviving population would be struggling against disease, starvation, and the unimaginable psychological effects of nuclear bombardment. But provided what was left of the nation could get through that period and the survivors were able to devote their resources to the work of reorganising the country, they should eventually be able to produce a wide enough range of goods to meet ordinary civilian needs. The standard of living of the reduced population, althrough substantially lower than at present, would still be well above that of the greater part of the world. [...] there would be no hope of providing anything approaching peacetime standards of medical care [...] Plans should be laid for immediate and effective control over all food stocks and their distribution under the siege conditions which might prevail for a long time [...] Research should be carried forward into methods of decontaminating water [even today there are no practical ones] [...] Plans should be made for the emergency distribution of limited supplies of drinking water pending the restoration of mains supplies [...] Plans should be prepared to enable the police and the courts to operate quickly and effectively under the conditions foreseen [...] In some parts of the country, particularly if several bombs fell in the same area, there might be complete chaos for a time and civil control would collapse. In such circumstances the local military commander would have to be prepared to take over from the civil authority responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and for the administration of Government. He would, if called upon, exercising his existing common-law powers to take whatever steps, however drastic, he considered necessary to restore order. [...] The ordinary machinery of the courts and prisons could not operate. Plans were made during the last war for "war zone courts" to function in areas which were involved in military operations. These plans should now be examined to see if a simple scheme could be worked out for the prompt dismissal of criminal cases. [[/note]], which were never released to the public for fear of massive panic and anti-nuclear sentiment, gave a particularly large incentive for Britain to develop nuclear weapons and systems of delivering them so that she might deter others from using nuclear weapons upon her.

The United Kingdom detonated its first atomic bomb in 1952, but had worked on the Manhattan Project (with facilities in Britain, Australia, and Canada) before then.

* A Vulcan and its nuclear warload ends up being the main plot device of the Film/JamesBond film ''Film/{{Thunderball}}''.

* Carried by one Vulcan in the climax of ''[[Literature/JamesBond Devil May Care]]''- [[spoiler: it does not have to use it]]

* Three appear in the climax to ''[[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Devil_May_Care_(novel) Devil May Care]]''.

The first of the "V-Bombers" and one of Britain's first jet bombers, the Valiant entered service as a low risk alternative to the aerodynamically more advanced Vulcan and Victor and conducted Britain's nuclear tests. T. Designed to fly higher and faster than contemporary fighters, technology (namely the S-75/SA-2 SAM) quickly caught up to it and it had to fly low and and slow to avoid Soviet radar. The extra turbulence from such flying meant that their structures were prematurely weakened, leading to an early retirement. Saw service during the Suez Crisis of 1956, being employed in the classic conventional carpet bombing role.

The first of the "V-Bombers" and one of Britain's first jet bombers, conducting Britain's nuclear tests. Designed to fly higher and faster than contemporary fighters, technology (namely the S-75/SA-2 SAM) quickly caught up to it and it had to fly low and and slow to avoid Soviet radar. The extra turbulence from such flying meant that their structures were prematurely weakened, leading to an early retirement. Saw service during the Suez Crisis of 1956, being employed in the classic conventional carpet bombing role.

The second "V-Bomber" and the longest-lived as its large delta wing was best suited of the three designs for low-altitude flight, although this was by accident as again it was designed to fly higher and faster than contemporary fighters (but once again technology caught up with it). The only time it dropped weapons in anger was also one of the most interesting bomber operations in history: during the Falklands War, the RAF barely had enough time to hastily cancel the Vulcan's retirement, retrain the crews in air-to-air refuelling, and sent them on what was then the longest bombing mission in history, Operation Black Buck, to bomb Argentinian positions on Stanley Island. The modifications necessary for this operation involved tons of engineering improvisation. [=XH558=] has recently been restored to flying condition and has been flying airshows, though it will be permanently grounded in 2013 due to the ruinous costs of its upkeep.