History UsefulNotes / RedsWithRockets

Largely a conscript force, unlike the USA's post-[[UsefulNotes/TheVietnamWar Vietnam]] volunteer force. Pretty much everything about Soviet armed forces was designed around reliability, from durable-but-simple vehicles, to every distinct form of weapon having a distinctly named ammo (even if two different weapons had, say, rounds 40mm in diameter, the Soviets would call one of them a 38mm round, just so idiots in the supply chain would be less likely to make mistakes). The durable-but-simple philosophy also made it possible for the Soviets to have a remarkably successful foreign arms trade, even with lower productivity in their electronics sector; versions of vehicles made for export simply left out the bits that were tricky to manufacture and used cheaper (i.e. weaker) materials for everything, e.g. hull armor. Thus, say, the BMP-1 that Egypt operated was a ''much'' different beast than the BMP-1 that the Soviets themselves had.

From its establishment in 1917 to February 1946, the ground component of the Soviet armed forces was known as the '''Red Workers and Peasants' Army''', usually shortened to the '''Red Army'''. From February 1946 until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 it was known as the '''Soviet Army'''.

Taking western Europe was a cornerstone of the Soviet military's rhetoric throughout the Cold War, both in its struggle for funding and influence within the Soviet state and internationally. However, the Soviet military's ''ability'' to fulfill this mission fluctuated over time. For all that, there were a few constant factors in its favor. From the outset, its likely opponents would've failed to use their inferior numbers as a unified force[[note]]France was always a bit of a wild-card and it's anybody's guess whether they would have stuck their neck out over an 'Anglo-American' issue, especially while Stalin was alive -- he and UsefulNotes/CharlesDeGaulle were pretty chummy. Meanwhile, West Germany's politicians insisted on using their forces to defend their peace-time borders... which were often totally indefensible and would more than likely see their forces cut off from the rest of NATO[[/note]]. They also lacked an adequate defensive strategy to counteract the Warsaw Pact's offensive strategy, which would have been to deliver a massive knock-out blow to split NATO's forces in half on the North German Plain, crush the isolated northern pocket, and move on to break up and finish off what was left.

The Soviets military's ability to actually live up to its rhetoric depended very much on the time-period. From 1945-53, Stalin gave the military the resources it needed to carry out this mission - with the expectation that it would fulfill it even with its forces and the German, Polish, Soviet, etc cities that supplied it taking the USA's several-hundred nukes. From 1956, whatever ability the Soviet military might have retained after its one-fifth downsizing by Khruschev was totally negated by his insistence that they adopt and use tactical nuclear weapons (which, in all probability, would've led to the war going nuclear within a matter of days if not hours). Under Brezhnev in the late 1960s the Soviet military was gradually 'restored' to the point that they again had confidence in fulfilling the operation (without any use of nukes, of course). But in the late 1970s Soviet theorists began to fear what they saw as a coming 'revolution in military technology' which would make the campaign difficult if not impossible by the late 1980s, something subsequent studies (using NATO and WP records) have tended to confirm.

On the other hand, the actual likelyhood of the Soviets achieving this operational goal - regardless of their capabilities - depended very much on how the USA chose to respond with its nuclear arsenal. Throughout the 1940s-70s the USA initially, and later unofficially, had a policy of 'Massive Retaliation Doctrine'. In other words, in the event of any Russo-American conflict whatsoever the USA would have attempted to immediately glass the entire Warsaw Pact. In the 1970s-80s this was replaced by the 'Follow-On-Forces' tactical (FOFA) and 'Proportionate Response' strategic Doctrines. FOFA mandated that the USA mount a conventional 'tactical' defense and only use ''tactical'' nuclear weapons when NATO forces looked like they were losing, such as glassing Poland to prevent Soviet reinforcements arriving in central Europe. Proportionate Response limited the USA to roughly equivalent 'strategic' nuclear exchanges and forebade US from using nukes first. The problem with US doctrine was that it was not clear where the 'tactical' use of nuclear weapons ended and the 'strategic' use of nuclear weapons began, e.g. the aforementioned 'tactical' glassing of Poland [[note]] Nuking Poland's cities would have been a key element of stopping Soviet reinforcements, ammunition, and food from transiting through Poland to the frontlines. However, Poland would not have been ''on'' the frontlines (and may have been as far as 500km from them) and Polish forces might never have attacked any NATO units up to that point [[/note]]. At pretty much every stage of the Cold War, then, if the US president of the time had adhered to his military's official doctrine then [[GodzillaThreshold he would've made the war go nuclear within three weeks or less rather than lose western Europe.]] Depending on the Soviet leadership of the time's response, [[TakingYouWithMe this could've led to the northern hemisphere being cleansed of human life.]] But, hey, [[FateWorseThanDeath at least it wouldn't have meant negotiating with the]] DirtyCommies.

That said, tensions between the alliances were low throughout this period until the "Second Cold War" of 1979 onward, which saw the first proper (i.e. intense) arms race between the two. The former Sovietologist Christopher Donnelly has likened the Cold War to two players preparing for a game of chess, in which NATO focused on crafting the best pieces possible...and the USSR focused on becoming a Grand Master.

Broadly, the Soviets focused on fighting simple and fighting smart - using simple and easy to maintain weapons, focusing on logistics, planning, and leadership. The Soviets would work out the broad strokes of campaigns months and years in advance, giving them solid guidelines for further planning or even improvisation right off the bat. While the use of Deception was practically a mandatory requirement of all planning, they still tended towards [[BoringButPractical simplicity in order to minimise the number of things that could go wrong]].

On the other hand, this centralization gives a confident commander much more leeway to exercise his skill at any level. An operational commander has lots of flexibility because he can trust his subordinates to do exactly what he wants. The weakness of ''yedinonachaliye'' breaks down at the operational level. Orders at this level are usually issued over the signatures of the commander, his chief of staff, and other relevant staff officers. This change reflects an acceptance of the fact that the higher level of complexity and responsibility at army-level and above is really beyond a single person. Responsibility and risk is shared at this level. A junior commander fighting as part of an operational maneuver group can be expected to display a high level of creativity and imagination due to his higher competence. Even close supervision on the tactical level is intended to place the commander at the front to produce a timely and effective reaction to battlefield events. Centralized command assists maintenance of the aim and directs resources towards the main effort.

In elite units, there is also the phenomenon of task-oriented control rather than ''yedinonachaliye''. The mission is stated in broad terms and accompanied by the essential elements of the superior's plan which is contained in his concept of operations. In the event of circumstances changing, a subordinate who is familiar with his superior's concept can adapt his efforts to ensure a worthwhile contribution to the overall goal. In other words, what a subordinate has to be told is what he is supposed to accomplish rather than how it should be done.

The '''Soviet style of command''' is distinctive. In the Soviet system, one-man command (yedinonachaliye) is an important concept. The commander is ultimately responsible for success or failure of his unit and has absolute authority over his subordinates. On one hand, this style makes normal tactical commanders close supervisors and interlopers of their subordinates in battle, lest failure reflect badly on himself. Incompetent subordinates facing the unexpected may choose to wait for orders rather than take a risk action, or continue with an action no longer relevant with the situation.

On the other hand, this centralization gives a confident commander much more leeway to exercise his skill at any level. An operational commander has lots of flexibility because he can trust his subordinates to do exactly what he wants. The weakness of yedinonachaliye breaks down at the operational level. Orders at this level are usually issued over the signatures of the commander, his chief of staff, and other relevant staff officers. This change reflects an acceptance of the fact that the higher level of complexity and responsibility at army-level and above is really beyond a single person. Responsibility and risk is shared at this level. A junior commander fighting as part of an operational maneuver group can be expected to display a high level of creativity and imagination due to his higher competence. Even close supervision on the tactical level is intended to place the commander at the front to produce a timely and effective reaction to battlefield events. Centralized command assists maintenance of the aim and directs resources towards the main effort.

Yedinonachaliye has considerable implications for providing support. If it was essential for a motorized rifle company to succeed in the attack, that subunit might find itself with a tank company in support, regimental artillery to provide fire support, and even a flight of attack helicopters to engage enemy reserves. The senior commanders and staffs would be there on the spot to make sure that all the elements were coordinated, so that the company commander could focus on accomplishing his task. The Soviets believed that providing the maximum support to succeeding forces would ultimately result in lower casualties, if an offensive battle could be rapidly converted from a breakthrough action into free-wheeling rear-area exploitation.

The effect of these procedures is that they are well suited in principle for fast-moving warfare. They ensure a common and standard approach to battlefield problems, and they speed up the staff planning. Like with battle drills, they ease the thought process when battle shock and stress inhibit constructive and rational thought.

Speed and flexibility is also accomplished through parallel planning. The essence of this method is that lower echelons do not wait for higher [=HQs=] to complete the full operational plan before embarking on their own planning. Subordinates are thus kept continuously in the picture by the staff and they are given a warning order as soon as the commander has received his from above. The commander will follow this with a preliminary decision, enabling detailed planning to be done. Should developments affect the initial concept in any way, this will be reflected in the final decision, and planning will be tailored accordingly.

In elite units, there is also the phenomenon of task-oriented rather than centralized control. The mission is stated in broad terms and accompanied by the essential elements of the superior's plan which is contained in his concept of operations. In the event of circumstances changing, a subordinate who is familiar with his superior's concept can adapt his efforts to ensure a worthwhile contribution to the overall goal. In other words, what a subordinate has to be told is what he is supposed to accomplish rather than how it should be done.

The effect of these staff and planning procedures is that they are well suited in principle for fast-moving warfare. They ensure a common and standard approach to battlefield problems, and they speed up the staff planning. Like with battle drills, they ease the thought process when staff officers are under battle shock and stress.

After a decision is made, the commander's staff creates the detailed plan. The staff fleshes out the decision's bare bones with detailed planning tailored to the circumstances of the battle and the terrain. Detailed, precise orders are issued for the initial phase an only, as enough hard data will not be available to allow an accurate forecast of the development of the situation. It is important to caution against detailed planning as rigidity and slowness. During the course of operations, the commander is obliged constantly to evaluate the changing situation, to predict likely developments and to issue new combat missions in accordance with his forecast. During World War II, tank armies showed an ability to conduct planning to undertake new missions during the course of operations, an ability that the rifle troops lacked. At lower tactical levels, decisionmaking and detailed planning is simpler and more austere due to the use of battle drills.

It is also important to review the Soviet style in '''planning'''. If NATO commanders make an appreciation and prepare a plan, Soviet commanders are trained to assess the situation and ''make a decision''. At the tactical level, decisions are made from personal battlefield observation and then selecting one of a number "off the peg" solutions to solve battlefield problems. At the operational level, it is based upon the commander's assigned mission, his knowledge of the senior commander's concept of operations, on his knowledge of the general situation, and on scrutiny of a series of options presented by his chief of staff. The decision will include the concept, organization for combat, axes of advance, battle tasks for major units, and command and control organization.

After a decision is made, the commander's staff creates the detailed plan. The staff fleshes out decision's bare bones with detailed planning tailored to the circumstances of the battle and the terrain. Detailed, precise orders are issued for the initial phase an only, as enough hard data will not be available to allow an accurate forecast of the development of the situation. It is important to caution against detailed planning as rigidity and slowness. During the course of operations, the commander is obliged constantly to evaluate the changing situation, to predict likely developments and to issue new combat missions in accordance with his forecast. During World War II, tank armies showed an ability to conduct planning to undertake new missions during the course of operations, an ability that the rifle troops lacked. At lower tactical levels, decisionmaking and detailed planning is simpler and more austere due to the use of battle drills.

After a decision is made, the commander's staff creates the detailed plan. The staff fleshes out decision's bare bones with detailed planning tailored to the circumstances of the battle and the terrain. Detailed, precise orders are issued for the initial phase of an only, as enough hard data will not be available to allow an accurate forecast of the development of the situation. It is important to caution against detailed planning as rigidity and slowness. During the course of operations, the commander is obliged constantly to evaluate the changing situation, to predict likely developments and to issue new combat missions in accordance with his forecast. During World War II, tank armies showed an ability to conduct planning to undertake new missions during the course of operations, an ability that the rifle troops lacked.

In both decisionmaking and detailed planning, the Soviets relied on mathematical calculations nomograms, and norms to determine the quantitative aspects of the battlefield. The numerical base of this is derived from an operational analysis of current weapons and tactics, combined with historical analysis of past wars. The data mining was performed by the General Staff's Military History Directorate, a body of over 1000 historians in the late 1980s. For example, there are calculations to estimate the density and combat strength of a NATO army corps. There are norms for everything, from the time required to plan a battalion attack to the number of 152mm artillery rounds required to suppress a NATO tank platoon at a range of 15 kms. Norms are used both as a basis for staff calculations and as measures against which troops and units may be tested and assessed. These tools do not dictate decisions to the commander, but provide him with the parameters for a successful solution to combat requirements. By the 1980s, the Soviets saw norms as averages rather than absolutes, as guides in planning rather than figures to be adhered to rigidly in all circumstances.

The '''Soviet style of command''' is distinctive. In the Soviet system, one-man command (yedinonachaliye) is an important concept. The commander is ultimately responsible for success or failure of his unit and has absolute authority over his subordinates. On one hand, this style makes tactical commanders close supervisors of their subordinates in battle, lest failure reflect badly on himself. Incompetent subordinates facing the unexpected may choose to wait for orders rather than take a risk action, or continue with an action no longer relevant with the situation.

It has to be remembered that the Soviet Union had a whole different view of war than NATO, or indeed that of Western-style armies which we find ourselves most familiar with.

While thinking about the Soviet way of war, it is important to avoid mirror-imaging or stereotyping, such as:
* Dismissing the entire Soviet way of war as a mindless WeHaveReserves ZergRush.
* Taking Soviet ideas and concepts out of context. This can happen, for example when looking at a Soviet unit (such as a battalion) and assuming that operates in exactly the same role as a battatlion in a NATO force and judging its performance by those criteria.

Without mirror-imaging, the Soviet Union’s military is much different than the stereotypical Red [[WeHaveReserves Horde]] it was often depicted as during UsefulNotes/WorldWarII and the UsefulNotes/ColdWar.

The Soviets differentiated between war and armed conflict; war involves the entire country and society. Armed conflict is the principle form of struggle in war to achieve both military and political strategic goals by the Armed Forces.

The Soviets approached war in a scientific way. Almost everything is given a definition and structured which may look very rigid and inflexible in Western eyes. The fact is that having a base set of definitions makes sure that everyone can easily understand what is being said. For example, when Soviet officers discuss about, say the "the tactics of a bronegruppa (armored group)” there's no uncertainty about--and therefore no need to define what tactics are, or what a bronegruppa is. This is in contrast to Western military circles, where, for example people often have different or conflicting definitions on exactly what is "operational art".

Here are the terms used in understanding Soviet military thought:
* Military Doctrine: The Soviet politicians’ accepted view on the nature of modern wars and the use of Armed Forces in them, and also on the requirements arising from these views regarding the country and its Armed Forces being made ready for war, based on factors such as threat perceptions or international interests. An example of doctrine would be Gorbachev's "defensive doctrine" of the late 1980s. Once handed down by the leadership, doctrine has the weight of law. It must be noted that this is ''not'' the same as our Western definition of "doctrine" used in terms like "tactical doctrine".
* Military Science: Basically the study of everything pertaining to the preparation and use of the military, including organization, military geography, logistics, and military history. The subset to note is military art. Compared to military doctrine, this area is often subject to debate in Soviet military circles.
* Military Art: The theory and practice of fighting as a whole. The components of importance are strategy, operational art, and tactics.
** Strategy: This is the highest component of military art, concerned with the preparation and conduct of war and strategic operations under the context of military doctrine. Applied in actual conflicts strategy determines the strategic missions of armed forces and the necessary forces the achieve these missions.
** Operational Art: This is the big cornerstone of the Soviet way of war. It is the act of combining the actions of a large number of forces over a significant area of space and time to achieve a strategic aim. Operational art occupies the middle ground between strategy and tactics--something not implemented by Western armies until the 1980s and still poorly understood today. Its relation to tactics is that every battle is fought in the context of an operational plan, and there’s a damn good reason why it is being fought the way it is.
** Tactics: The laws and principles of employing available means to win battles. In the Soviet view, tactics were conducted by forces at divisional level or lower.
* Initiative: what operational- and tactical-level commanders display when they use a combination of logic and intuition to improvise changes to an Operational Plan that will ensure its goals are met, to the benefit of the wider war effort.
* Insurbordination: what operational- and tactical-level commanders display when they change the goals of an Operational Plan to benefit themselves and/or their forces, to the detriment of the wider war effort.

[[quoteleft:350:http://static.tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pub/images/USSR_diagram_8522.jpg]]

As Soviet theorist Aleksandr Svechin once said, "Tactics make the steps from which operational leaps are assembled; strategy points out the path".

If a Russian were considering war as a game of chess, then his experience would move him to consider that the West invests a great deal of money and effort into each chess piece, thereby creating highly competent, well motivated, very individualistic and extremely well equipped chess pieces, The Soviet Union, by comparison, he would see as deliberately limiting the capability, initiative and equipment of each individual chess piece, and instead investing a large percentage of her effort in raising a breed of grand masters who could play chess well, understanding and accepting the natural limitations of each piece. The "grand masters" are the operational commanders and their staffs. Once committed to war, theirs is the task of out-thinking and outplaying the opponent. The very limitations of their subordinates add to the strength of their position of command. Their ability to bring fresh sets of chess pieces to the board when the first Soviet set has been lost, would also be seen by a Russian as a great advantage. The nature of the individual chess pieces means that it would be easier for grand masters to execute a change to a plan in the face of the "fog and friction" of war.

Another thing about the Soviets' operational focus was how they dealt with logistics and sustainability. Up front, a Soviet division compared to a NATO division appears to show marked deficiencies in logistical support. The real logistical backbone of the Soviet Army is concentrated at ''front'' and army level, which allows operational commanders to ensure resources are not wasted, as might happen in NATO divisions which have the logistical support to undertake any mission, regardless of the division's task. Soviet divisions are supplied to the judgement of ''front'' planners; divisions on the main axis and [=OMGs=] receive priority support, while those on a secondary axis or defending receive secondary attention. This is one of the factors allowing operational commanders to achieve great flexibility as explained in the chess analogy.

Since the Soviet Union was a continental land power, the ground forces naturally received the most attention of all the other arms. The overall goal of the Soviet Air Force was to provide a ''third dimension'' to a land battle. The Soviet Navy as well was intended to provide a flank for the ground forces in the context of a strategic operation, rather than as an independent tool of "power projection" in the mold of the U.S. or Royal Navies. Since academic and training school structure mirrored these concerns (the overwhelming majority of specialist schools and most military academies in the country dated to ''after'' the founding of the Red Army), the Soviet armed forces didn't experience the well-known interservice rivalries of some western military forces: for example, any Soviet air force general officer was likely to have studied, at least in part, at an army academy, encouraging cooperation between branches. Consequently, the high value that Soviet planners placed on NATO air forces during the Cold War was ''not'' because any imagined superiority over their own air power or a belief that air power alone could trump ground forces; it was because on paper, air power was NATO's most flexible form of ''operational'' firepower, which ties in how the Soviets analyzed NATO defenses.

In UsefulNotes/WorldWarII and the UsefulNotes/ColdWar, the cornerstone of the Soviet design for the offensive was the concept of deep battle and deep operations. Tactical forward and raiding detachments and subsequently operational maneuver groups would be inserted into the enemy's rear at the earliest possible moment. These were to undermine fatally the stability of the defense by seizing depth defense lines before they could be occupied by the enemy, by combating enemy reserves in meeting battles, by destroying the command structure and logistic support on which the front line formations depended to halt the attacker's main forces, and by encircling the enemy's defending groupings. In this way the enemy would be defeated more or less simultaneously in front and rear, and his defense would be collapsed and destroyed rather than merely pushed back to fight again once reinforced from the depth or passive sectors.

By the 1980s, the cornerstone of the Soviet offensive became the ''theater-strategic operation'', which was a framework for achieving strategic military objectives by armed forces in a continental theater of military operations, in the initial period of war (30 days) and without the use of nuclear weapons.

Some words must be said about Soviet nuclear strategy and escalation: Contrary to popular belief, the Soviets would ''never'' initiate the use of nuclear weapons in a war. In the context of a conventional war, the Soviets would use nuclear weapons if NATO decided on their ''mass'' use first, or if the Soviet homeland was being threatened with a strategic offensive. The Soviets never planned on nuking to "recharge" a bogged-down offensive. The Soviet leadership claimed that NATO use of any nuclear weapon would be responded with all-out nuclear war, but the General Staff considered the possibility of proportionate responses to a limited U.S. attack, although they "doubted that nuclear war could remain limited for long." (This way of thinking leaked into nearly every piece of Eastern Bloc propaganda pertaining to war: the Westerners, [[CorruptCorporateExecutive evil capitalists]], [[GeneralRipper General Rippers]] were always portrayed as power-hungry maniacs ready to do everything to subdue the enemy, [[TakingYouWithMe including a nuclear apocalypse]], while the Soviets always insisted they were against wars of aggression and even stronger against nuclear war. '''The only acceptable use of nukes was strictly defensive'''.)

The introduction of the SS-20 in 1976 and numerous tactical nuclear weapons since 1980 was not so much about a "no-warning first strike", but to create a nuclear umbrella in which conventional operations could be conducted. By matching NATO at every level of the nuclear escalation ladder, the Soviets intended to send a message that NATO could no longer get itself out of a hole just by using a few nuclear weapons if conventional defense fails. Nuclear parity or superiority on the Soviet side would have created mutual deterrence where both sides would be reluctant to escalate.

Regarding command and control, the Soviets extended their scientific view of war into the decision making and planning processes. '''It is wrong to view Soviet command and control as a rigid, top-down system without any flexibility.''' The Soviet view is that it is the scientifically developed methods of decision making and planning that leads to the “right” decisions in combat instead of the intuitive genius of commanders. This view leads to the heavy use of calculated norms, mathematical nomograms and equations that creates uniformity at all levels of command, but is not unduly rigid. The bottom line in Soviet planning is that planning and decision-making requires scientific substantiation. However, commanders need not to undertake calculations rigidly and are only viewed as guidelines for the commander--contrary to the Western stereotype. During the Great Patriotic War, many operational-level commanders were expected, and could adjust to the situation if things were not going to plan.

In the command structure, the one-man centralized control in their view gives flexibility in employment to achieve overall goals and unity of management. On the other hand, the execution of the plans in battle and its management is decentralized. Despite the scientific nature of the Soviet command structure, initiative and flexibility were usually expected of officers (regiment or battalion commanders and up depending on the time) and they would consider anyone making mistakes by simply following the field manual to the letter (following the Western stereotype) to be incompetent.

In Soviet troop control, initiative was not discouraged. The Soviets saw initiative rather differently than the Western way. Soviet initiative requires a commander to pursue every possible option to accomplish the assigned task--within the constraints of military doctrine (and that was broader and more flexible than most people in the West understood). What the Soviets detested was "native wit"--our Western definition of "initiative" as undisciplined and unprofessional daredevil decisions used over a proper planning and a sound framework of thought.

In keeping with this type of thinking, Soviet commanders at all levels use a concept known as 'correlation of forces and means' (or simply correlation of forces) to determine an objective determination of the degree of superiority of one side over the other. In layman's terms it can be expressed as a series of ratios. Contrary to popular belief, this ratio just does not take into account of the quantitative factors of forces, but also qualitative factors, training, terrain, type of combat action being conducted and logistical support.

Soviet military scientists believed that it was possible to achieve victory with a slightly superior, equal, or even inferior overall correlation of forces and means in relation to the enemy. The critical task was to create such a decisive correlation of forces advantage in designated sectors of main effort so that the assigned mission has a high probability of success.

So, how did the the Soviets approached the idea of [[ZergRush mass attacks]]? Linear frontal attacks, used as a big bludgeon were viewed as the least effective means of attacking. Since the mid-1960s, Soviet writers have renounced the possibility or wisdom of conducting classic frontal penetration operations, or "gnawing through" the defense.

Of course, the Soviets could sustain casualties to a higher degree than other armies, but manpower wasn’t inexhaustible. Casualties are never something that could be "disregarded". Indeed, "Quantity has a quality of its own.", but only if it is used ''effectively''. Barreling forward as a steamroller with massed forces and no maneuver, or regarding costly frontal attacks as perfectly acceptable was certainly '''not''' the way the Soviets would have done things.

To say that the Soviets do not endorse the idea of a small, professional army does not mean that they underestimate the armies concerned. They have a healthy respect, for example, the U.S. V Corps or any of the West German corps. However, they would point out that when the V Corps had been eroded by battle, there is no replacement formation to take its place. When the 8th Guards Army has been eroded in battle, there ''is'' a replacement to take its place. Such replacements weren't a case of WeHaveReserves, but a fall-back to continue fighting with in the case that 8th Guards Army is no longer a combat-capable force.

See also: UsefulNotes/RussiansWithRustingRockets, UsefulNotes/FromRussiaWithNukes, for the later Soviet and Russian military in later times.

* Order of Suvorov- again for exceptional duty. Named after famous general Alexander Suvorov, responsible for the phrase "Train hard, fight easy". This is one of the so-called "leaders' orders", which are both named for famous military commanders of the past and awarded to high-ranking officers only.

* Order of Victory - Only 20 of these made. Awarded to the top Soviet generals of the [[UsefulNotes/WorldWarII Great Patriotic War]], as well as to Stalin and some foreign leaders. Contains 174 diamonds and is worth a lot without the historical value of it.[[note]][[UsefulNotes/DwightDEisenhower General Eisenhower]]'s Order of Victory star had been studded with fake diamonds.[[/note]]

** T-34 set the standards that every subsequent Soviet tank followed: it was reasonably well armored, very well armed, yet lighter and faster compared to its contemporaries partly due to being relatively small and compact (especially in height). On the other hand, its dimensions severely limited the internal space, lowered crew effectiveness, and made upgrades difficult (problems that also hampered T-55 and T-72). The small size, however, also gave it much tactical advantage, especially in concealment (many German generals thought their own Panther and Tiger were too big and that the smaller T-34 was much better in defensive operations) and in strategic mobility, such as in river crossings (German Tigers could not cross many bridges in Soviet Russia. Even after the war, strategic bridges in Eastern Europe were built so that lighter Soviet designed tanks could use them, but bigger and heavier NATO tanks could not.)

** By contrast, Syria's T-72M1 tanks (note: Unlike Iraq above, Syria was the Soviet Union's closest ally in the Middle East, and was home to one of the few Soviet naval bases abroad in Tartus) performed [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T-72#Syria shocking well against Israeli tanks in the 1982 Lebanon War]]. While details vary, both sides acknowledged that Syrian armor effectively engaged and destroyed the best tanks [[IsraelisWithInfraredMissiles Israel]] had to offer, the M[=60A1=] and famed Merkava in South Lebanon, with few or no losses. Then-president of Syria Hafez Al-Assad described the export model T-72M1 tanks as "The best tanks in the world." Given the prestigious reputation of the Merkava (a very effective T-62 killer) and circumstances where Patton tanks handily outperformed T-72 tanks in other wars, the conflict probably spoke a great deal to the importance of up-to-date parts and training from the manufacturing country for an tank importer (not just Soviet tanks, but in general).

* R-73/AA-11 "Archer": One of the world's best short-range air-to-air missiles, with an "off-boresight" capability, allowing to be launched up to 60 degrees from an aircraft's centreline via a helmet-mounted sight. Led to a lot of missiles in response, especially after some mock dogfights where German (via the old EastGermany) [=MiG-29=]s whipped American F-16s, including Sidewinder upgrades.

* Vice-Admiral '''Vasili Arkhipov''' served on the Soviet submarine ''K-19'', and during its nuclear accident was exposed to a high level of radiation trying to fix the broken reactor. His main claim to fame is being another rocket-armed Red who prevented WorldWarIII. During the CubanMissileCrisis, an American battlegroup decided it would be a good idea to [[TooDumbToLive drop practice depth charges on the Soviet submarine]] ''B-59'', on which Arkhipov was serving as executive officer. The sub was part of a flotilla. The captain of the sub, concerned that war had already broken out, elected to [[NukeEm fire a nuclear torpedo at the American squadron.]] He was supported by the ship's ''[[PoliticalOfficer zampolit]]''. Arkhipov, who held the same rank as the captain, and who was overall flotilla commander, persuaded the captain to surface and await orders from Moscow. Robert [=McNamara=] credited Arkhipov's actions with "saving the world." Unlike his Voyska PVO counterpart Stanislav Petrov (see above), Moscow appreciated Arkhipov saving their asses, and he ended up a Vice-Admiral and headmaster of Kirov Naval Academy.

Every Red with Rocket is a graduate of the ImperialStormtrooperMarksmanshipAcademy. Considering differences in Soviet and Western training doctrines[[note]]The Soviet Union trained its soldiers who wielded assault rifles to favor the full automatic setting and fire in short bursts. Western forces preferred to teach either firing in burst mode or in semiautomatic mode.[[/note]], this might have some small basis in reality, but is a {{Flanderization}}. In reality, marksmanship was important and trained into every soldier. In fact, Soviet marksmanship wasn't too shabby, even by modern standards.[[note]] Soviet soldiers were trained to be able to make 350M shots (~385Yds) on human-sized targets with the AKM, and 500M (~550Yds) shots on human-sized targets with the AK-74, all while only using stock military rifles and issued ammo, while only using the stock AK iron sights. For comparison, the modern [[UsefulNotes/YanksWithTanks U.S. Army]] only goes out to 300Yds (~270M) with the M4a1 and electronic optics. The USMC, known for their borderline chauvanistic fixation on marksmanship, only go out to 500Yds (~450M) on the M16a4.[[/note]]

* Lavochkin [=LaGG=]/La series: Another mainstay fighter of the Soviet Air Force, also serving from the beginning until the end of the Great Patriotic War. Like the Yak-1, the [=LaGG-3=] was also mediocre, and was pretty much a [[WalkingDisasterArea Flying Disaster Area]] to boot (it was nicknamed the "Morticians Friend," and pilots joked that its designation stood for "''Lakirovannii Garantirovannii Grob''" (Varnished, Guaranteed Coffin)). This changed when the chief designer decided to refit one with a more powerful radial engine, giving birth to the La-5. Unlike the [=LaGG-3=], this plane was capable of going toe-to-toe with German fighters at low altitude. This finally culminated in the La-7, which entered service in mid-1944, and managed to outperform the now increasingly obsolete planes the Luftwaffe was still fielding up until the end of the war. Postwar, the Lavochkin design bureau brought out the La-9 and La-11, the last piston-engined fighters to enter service with the USSR. Most of these would be exported, like the Yak-9P, to [[ChineseWithChopperSupport China]] and [[NorthKoreansWithNodongs North Korea]] during TheKoreanWar.

Largely a conscript force, unlike the USA's more volunteer force (at least after the UsefulNotes/VietnamWar). Pretty much everything about Soviet armed forces was designed around reliability, from durable-but-simple vehicles, to every distinct form of weapon having a distinctly named ammo (even if two different weapons had, say, rounds 40mm in diameter, the Soviets would call one of them a 38mm round, just so idiots in the supply chain would be less likely to make mistakes). The durable-but-simple philosophy also made it possible for the Soviets to have a remarkably successful foreign arms trade, even with lower productivity in their electronics sector; versions of vehicles made for export simply left out the bits that were tricky to manufacture and used cheaper (i.e. weaker) materials for everything, e.g. hull armor. Thus, say, the BMP-1 that Egypt operated was a ''much'' different beast than the BMP-1 that the Soviets themselves had.

* [[http://world.guns.ru/smg/smg02-e.htm PPSh-41]] - or, among other names, the "Pah-Pah-Shah" (due to that being the spelling in Russian). It's known for its massive drum magazine which was copied from a Finnish model and could carry 71 rounds (although the gun could make use of 35-round box magazines as well). Developed during UsefulNotes/WorldWarII to replace [[http://world.guns.ru/smg/smg01-e.htm PPD-40]] submachine gun with something better suited for mass production (like [[http://world.guns.ru/smg/smg32-e.htm Grease gun]] vs. Tommy Gun) and around 6 million were produced. It proved to be very popular with Soviet soldiers despite some drawbacks, such as its length, weight and outdated wooden furniture with rifle grip. Also saw action in the hands of Chinese troops in the Korean conflict (aka "burp gun").

* [[http://world.guns.ru/smg/rus/ppp-43-e.html PPS-43]] - The forgotten half-brother of the [=PPSh-41=]. Created in response to a requirement for a shorter and lighter submachine gun, the PPS-43 turned out to be even easier to make: it cost half the amount of steel required to make a [=PPSh-41=] and could be assembled in two thirds the time with even less skilled labour involved. Due to its use of a folding stock and pistol grip as well as its lower cyclic rate of fire, it was also much easier to handle as well. For reasons that have partly to do with the fact that most of them were built at Leningrad (which was under siege by the Germans for over three years), the PPS-43 was not as widely used as its more famous counterpart. Still, very few guns manage to come close to the PPS-43's level of simplicity, and over 2 million were made by the Russians alone. They were used extensively by the Vietnamese.

* [[http://world.guns.ru/assault/as01-e.htm AK-47]] - The ''world famous'' AK. Most produced firearm in history. Scoring probably millions of kills for its users. Appears on the flags of Mozambique and Hezbollah. In fiction, used by every terrorist group going and of course, the Reds With Rockets. However, in a bizarre RealLife case of AKA47, what most people would think are AK-47's are actually the AKM, an updated version created in 1959(whereas the most definitive classic "AK47" would be the circa 1955 Type III milled receiver). Alternatively, they could actually mean the Chinese [[SuspiciouslySimilarSubstitute Type 56]]. The only meaningful differences are the Chinese markings versus Russian markings, a commonly provided swivel for the flip-out bayonet à la SKS (which in Chinese production is called the Type 56 carbine despite the SKS and AK having little relation, as China began production of both weapons in 1956), and that the front sight has an enclosed hood like the SVT-40, instead of the open top of the true AK.

* The RPK, with a thicker receiver similar to the original Type III AK47 receiver, and a longer and thicker barrel. Meant to be the squad auto weapon, using either extended AK magazines or drums that hold about 75 rounds. Contrast with the earlier, belt-fed RPD it replaced.

* The instantly recognizable [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mil_Mi-24 Mi-24]] attack helicopter series, easily identified in the "D" model and onward by a "double bubble" cockpit design. Beginning in the late 1960's, the Mi-24 would undergo numerous design changes over it's 40+ years of service for the Soviet and later Russian army. Unique in that it is both a dedicated attack helicopter with a troop transport capability, it has been produced in a wide variety of variants with an equally wide selection of firepower, with variants capable of sporting everything from machine guns, cannons, numerous varieties of rockets, guided ATGMs and even dumb-fire bombs. This heavily armored attack helicopter has been exported to over 30 nations, seen action in dozens of conflicts, and has appeared in everything from films, to literature to video games. Although it's been gradually replaced in Russian service by the newer Ka-50 and Mi-28 attack helicopters, the Mi-24 is expected to be in Russian use well into the late 2020's, and will likely serve in the armies of other nations for even longer.

* The instantly recognizable [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mil_Mi-24 Mi-24]] attack helicopter series, easily identified in the "D" model and onward by a "double bubble" cockpit design. Beginning in the late 1960's, the Mi-24 would undergo numerous design changes over it's 40+ years of service for the Soviet and later Russian army. Unique in that it is both a dedicated attack helicopter with a troop transport capability, it has been produced in a wide variety of variants with an equally wide selection of firepower, allowing it to handle a wide range of mission profiles. This heavily armored attack helicopter has been exported to over 30 nations, seen action in dozens of conflicts, and has appeared in everything from films, to literature to video games. Although it's been gradually replaced in Russian service by the newer Ka-50 and Mi-28 attack helicopters, the Mi-24 is expected to be in Russian use well into the late 2020's, and will likely serve in the armies of other nations for even longer.

Apart from the bomber aircraft mentioned [[Main/{{MnogoNukes}} here]], the Soviets also produced some very advanced fighters, helicopters, and some stand-out tanks and [=APCs=]. What often escapes notice is how small a lot of the cockpits were. Russian military leaders in WWII had the bright idea to sort the army by size, making big men infantry, and letting the little men be tank crew. This meant building the tank smaller, and therefore getting thicker armor for the same weight. This philosophy carried forward over time and into areas as disparate as rocket science. Vostok space capsules were tiny, so the first Russian cosmonauts were also small; YuriGagarin was about 5'5", whereas American astronauts Alan Shepard and Neil Armstrong were 5'11" and 5'9" respectively. This is another reason to bring in the ladies (see below), as they started to run short on men small enough to fit.

** The Nagant remained in active use by the Soviet Union by guards and rear area troops for the entirety of its history. It is still given to marksman and snipers in limited numbers by the [[TheNewRussia Russian Federation.]] It is very unlikely that this gun will be truly retired anytime soon

* T-72: The main tank up from the 1970s up to the collapse of the SovietUnion in their western military districts. The poor performance of export versions against tanks of the M1 Abrams generation has damaged its reputation, but Iraq proved its superiority over a comparable force of exported M60 Pattons in the Iran-Iraq War.

Broadly, the Soviets focused on fighting simple and fighting smart - using simple and easy to maintain weapons, focusing on logistics, planning, and leadership. The Soviets would work out the broad strokes of campaigns months and years in advance, giving them solid guidelines for further planning or even improvisation right off the bat. While the use of Deception was practically a mandatory requirement of all planning, they still tended towards ([[BoringButPractical simplicity in order to minimise the number of things that could go wrong]].

The numbers are also impressive, and it's easy to see why NATO was so obsessed with countering them - even if they did it in completely the wrong way. In 1979 the Soviet Union had more than ''twice'' as many [=MiG-21=] fighters than the [[UsefulNotes/BritsWithBattleships Royal Air Force and Fleet Air Arm's]] combat aircraft combined. Despite the relative poverty of her country and simplicity of her weapons, everyone agrees that the Red Army was still vastly superior to the dreadful armies fielded by the Russian Empire as part of the Entente in UsefulNotes/WorldWarOne - for though the Tsar's armies had only been slightly less well-equipped than those of the Allies, her army had still been organized on 19th century lines and logistics, planning, and leadership were alternately neglected and screwed over by a chain of command which never made it clear who exactly was in charge of what and whom[[note]] leading to supply-hoarding, reinforcement-hoarding, and inter-army rivalry to the detriment of the overall war effort. This is because the Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery remained completely separate forces that did not work together AT ALL, and the Ministry Of War and the General Staff did not co-operate on running the war effort either... not to mention the critical imbalance of work-loads between the ranks, with some ranks being impossibly overworked (even in peacetime!) and others having almost no work to do at all [[/note]]. This is largely because the Red Army that emerged from the Russian Civil War was reformed (having been forged out of the shattered remnants of the Tsar's armies) specifically to counter The Whites' unreformed forces by being the pinnacle of a well-organized and efficient military force[[note]] The Soviets took "military science" extremely seriously, to the point that it was the only academic field in the country which was never censored ''at all''. "Never", that is, with the exception of Stalin's purge of the Red Army itself in 1937-39. Though the purge only removed some 4-8% of the total officer corps, the best and most able commanders and thinkers (chiefly Tukhachevsky) were killed/imprisoned in disproportionately high numbers. [[/note]].

* [[http://world.guns.ru/smg/smg02-e.htm PPSh-41]] - or, among other names, the "Pah-Pah-Shah" (due to that being the spelling in Russian). It's known for its massive drum magazine which was copied from a Finnish model and could carry 71 rounds (although the gun could make use of 35-round box magazines as well). Developed during UsefulNotes/WorldWarTwo to replace [[http://world.guns.ru/smg/smg01-e.htm PPD-40]] submachine gun with something better suited for mass production (like [[http://world.guns.ru/smg/smg32-e.htm Grease gun]] vs. Tommy Gun) and around 6 million were produced. It proved to be very popular with Soviet soldiers despite some drawbacks, such as its length, weight and outdated wooden furniture with rifle grip. Also saw action in the hands of Chinese troops in the Korean conflict (aka "burp gun").
** If you're played a UsefulNotes/WorldWarTwo game involving the Red Army (but '''not''' ''{{Battlefield 1942}}''), you will almost certainly have "fired" this at some point.

Without mirror-imaging, the Soviet Union’s military is much different than the stereotypical Red [[WeHaveReserves Horde]] it was often depicted as during WorldWarTwo and the UsefulNotes/ColdWar.